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ABSTRACT
The Grammatical Status of the English Dative Alternation
Richard T. Oehrle
Submitted to the Department of Foreign Literatures and
Linguistics on September 23, 1975, in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This thesis is concerned with the syntactic alternation between
structures of the form X-V -NP -NPk-Y and structures of the
form X-V -NP k-P-NP -Y (where 'P' is either 'to' or 'for').
Two theories of this alternation are considered: on one theory,
in cases where the alternation is applicable, one of these
structures is base-generated and the other is derived by means
of transformation; on the other theory, both structures are
base-generated and the relation between them is characterized
by means of a lexical redundancy rule which reduces the in-
dependent information content of the lexicon (along lines
proposed by Jackendoff). The thesis is divided into three
parts. In Part One, on the basis of a detailed semantic
analysis of sentences which conform to one or the other of
these structures, the following conclusions are reached: first,
that independent of the alternation in question, both
structures are generated by the phrase-structure rules of
the base; second, that there are semantic restrictions on the
alternation; third, that semantic interpretation is not
always invariant under the alternation; fourth, that semantic
considerations alone cannot provide sufficient conditions for
the applicability of the alternation. In Part Two, syntactic
considerations which bear on the choice between these two
hypotheses are discussed. The main conclusion of this part
is that with respect to syntactic operations, there is no
evidence that favors a distinction between base-generated
instances of the double object construction and transformation-
ally-derived instances of the double object construction. In
Part Three, a variety of arguments are presented which favor
the theory based on a lexical redundancy rule over a trans-
formational theory.
Thesis Supervisor: Morris Halle
Title: Professor of Linguistics
To Tanya Reinhart
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INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the theory of transformational generative
grammar, there has been a presumption that a transformational
analysis is the appropriate way of handling English sentences
related by what I shall call throughout this work the 'dative
alternation', as in:
la) John gave a book to Mary.
b) John gave Mary a book.
2a) John bought a car for Mary.
b) John bought Mary a car.
In the context of certain grammatical theories, such a presumption
has some justification. In particular, if transformations are
the only device in a grammar by which shared distributional
regularities can be stated (or shared semantic properties, for
that matter), postulating a dative transformation offers a way
of accounting for some of the shared properties of sentences of
the prepositional dative form (e.g., (la), (2a)) and the
corresponding sentences of the double object structure (e.g.,
(lb), (2b)). On the other hand, if we enrich grammatical theory
to such an extent that such regularities can be stated in other
ways, the question arises as to what is the appropriate way in
which to state the relation between such pairs of sentences.
Chomsky (1972, p. 13) states the general problem in
the following way:
8In general, it is to be expected that enrichment
of one component of the grammar will permit simplfica-
tion in other parts. Thus certain descriptive
problems can be handled by enriching the lexicon and
simplifying the categorial component of the base, or
conversely; or by simplifying the base at the cost of
greater complexity of transformations, or conversely.
The proper balance between various components of the
grammar is entirely an empirical issue. We have no
a priori insight into the "trading relation" between
the various parts. There are no general considerations
that settle this matter....
Our inquiry into the dative alternation is thus a special case
of this general problem.
In particular, we shall attempt to adjudge the relative
merits of two hypotheses. On one hypothesis, the relations
between the sentences of (1), and the sentences of (2) as well,
is accounted for by a transformation, i.e., an operation which
maps phrase-markers into phrase-markers. On this hypothesis,
then, sentences (la) and (lb) have a common deep structure, as
do the sentences of (2). On the second hypothesis, all four
sentences have distinct deep structures. In other words, the
verb give is subcategorized in two distinct ways, and will
consequently satisfy the conditions for lexical insertion into
both the prepositional dative structure and the double object
structure. On this hypothesis, the relation between the pair
of sentences in (1), as well as the relation between the pair
of sentences in (2), will be stated by means of a lexical
redundancy rule, essentially along the lines of Jackendoff's
proposals concerning morphology (cf. Jackendoff 1974a). If it
is correct to assume, as I have, that linguistic theory provides
both of these ways of expressing regularities of various kinds,
it is of some interest to ask not only which device is to be
preferred for the expression of the dative alternation, but
also whether there are general principles which enable us to
decide for any given phenomenon what is the preferred way of
expressing it in a grammar.
In the case of the dative alternation, it is obvious
that in many respects the two hypotheses have equivalent empirical
consequences. Nevertheless, we shall argue at the conclusion of
this work that there exist a variety of considerations, all of
which support the postulation of a lexical redundancy rule over
the postulation of a transformational rule to account for the
dative alternation. This conclusion arises from considerations
based on factors implicit in the nature of the two hypotheses
we have proposed. For example, in a lexical entry, the
phonological representation of a word is associated with
morphological, categorial, subcategorizational, and semantic
information. It is apparently the case that transformations
need only refer to a subset of this information. In particular,
if it is possible to restrict transformations so that they can
refer only to categorial information, it is methodologically
desirable to do so. Thus, if in the general case transformations
operate only on the basis of categorial distinctions and it is
found that the domain of the dative alternation is constrained
on other grounds, then a transformational solution of the dative
problem is not to be preferred.
Another relevant factor pertains to the interaction
of the dative alternation with the various rules that constitute
the transformational component of the grammar. Since on the
redundancy rule hypothesis, there is no distinction between those
instances of the dative constructions which are base-generated
and those which are transformationally derived, this theory
entails that the alternation is totally independent of whatever
rules makes up the transformational component. Consider the
interaction of there-insertion and the passive transformation,
in which we find there-insertion applicable to the output of the
passive, as in There was a demonstrator arrested by the police,
while we find the passive applying to the output of there-inser-
tion, as in There was believed to have been a riot. If we could
find evidence of this kind of interaction involving the dative
alternation, the redundancy rule hypothesis would be clearly
falsified and the transformational hypothesis would be perferred.
In the absence of such interaction, however, methodological
considerations favor the redundancy rule hypothesis, as we shall
in fact argue in Part Three.
Thus, although the two hypotheses we consider are
equivalent with respect to the expression of some of the
regularities manifested by the various dative constructions,
there remain ways of distinguishing the two hypotheses. In
this work, the investigation of this problem is carried out in
three parts.
Part One deals with the semantic properties of the
dative constructions and the role semantic considerations play
in characterizing the domain of the alternation. The groundwork
for this inquiry involves a detailed description of certain
semantic aspects of sentences which belong to the set of dative
constructions: in particular, we attempt to isolate and
characterize a certain property of those verbs which occur in
the double object construction but not in the prepositional
dative construction.
In particular, we argue in section 1 of Part One that
sentences employing the verb give fall into two general classes
on the basis of certain structural characteristics of the set
of truth-conditions assigned to each sentence (on each
interpretation). Aspects of these two classes are further
explored in sections 2 and 3. Of particular interest is the
fact that in general, sentences whose interpretation falls into
the second of these two classes do not have a reflex in the
prepositional construction (although the verb in question may
occur in both the prepositional structure and the double object
structure). This provides an indication that the double object
structure is base-generated, at least for some cases. In
section 4, we show that the verbs teach and show have certain
uses in which they are restricted to the double object structure,
and, furthermore, that the interpretation of the sentences of
this kind falls within the general characterization of the second
class discussed above. In section 5, the role of time and
modality in the semantic interpretation of the dative constructions
is discussed and we attempt to relate aspects of this discussion
to the two classes we isolated initially. Finally, in section 6,
the prepositional construction'are considered, and we discuss
the general question of the role of semantic considerations in
the formulation of the domain of the dative alternation--a
question that arises whether the alternation is stated by means
of a transformation or accounted for on the basis of a lexical
redundancy rule. We shall argue that certain sentences which
meet the syntactic characterization of the domain of the dative
alternation fail to meet certain necessary semantic criteria,
and propose that the domain of the alternation be formulated in
such a way that reference to these criteria is possible. We
also argue, however, that it is extremely implausible that
sufficient conditions (for the applicability of the alternation)
based on semantic properties can be formulated. For this
reason, we propose a morphological constraint which further
limits the domain of the dative alternation. At the conclusion
of Part One, we propose a formulation of the dative alternation
and review the treatment of a variety of cases.
Part Two takes up various syntactic issues which are of
relevance in ascertaining the value of postulating a dative
transformation. The dative constructions betray a variety of
syntactic idiosyncracies. We whall be interested in what bearing
these idiosyncracies have on the transformational hypothesis:
do aspects of the syntactic behavior of the dative structures
follow in a natural way from the postulation of a dative
transformation? Is there any way in which those instances of
the dative constructions whic~are base-generated can be
distinguished from those which are putatively transformationally
derived? We concentrate on four areas: pronominal restrictions
on the double object construction; the interaction of the dative
alternation and the passive transformation; the interaction of
the verb + particle construction and the dative constructions;
and movement constraints on the indirect object. For each of
these cases, we argue that the syntactic facts in question
provide no evidence in favor of a transformational theory of the
dative alternation. Our investigation of these syntactic problems
also bears on certain other problems of linguistic theory.
Part Three is devoted to the evaluation of the two
hypotheses we consider. As I said above, there are a variety
of considerations, based on the material of the first two parts
of this thesis, which support the redundancy rule hypothesis over
the transformational hypothesis. If this is correct, it suggests
that we explore the properties of these two types of rules
further in the hope that by distinguishing them deeper questions
in linguistic theory may be resolved.
I: SEMANTIC ASPECTS OF THE DATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
0. The purpose of this chapter is to give a correct
account of the semantic properties of the sentences which occur
in one or the other of the dative constructions, and to assess
what influence, if any, these semantic properties exert on
questions of syntax. Ultimately, I will be concerned with two
principal questions: first, is there some semantic property or
set of properties such that, given that a verb occurs in one of
the dative constructions and has this set of properties, it
follows that this verb does (or does not) occur in the other
dative construction; second, given that a verb occurs in both
constructions, is it in general the case that the various pairs
of sentences which differ only in this syntactic respect are
equivalent.
I shall argue that, with respect to the first question,
there is a strong correlation between certain semantic properties
of a given set of verbs and certain syntactic facts, i.e., that
this set of verbs occurs only in the double object construction.
If this is in fact the case, it provides a principled reason to
generate at least some cases of the double object construction in
the base. I shall further argue that if a verb occurs in the
prepositional dative construction, its semantic properties, though
not entirely irrelevant, are not sufficient to determine whether
or not it occurs in the double object construction. With respect
to the second question, I shall present a variety of cases
which demonstrate that it is not always the case that pairs of
sentences which differ only in that one is an instance of the
double object construction while the other is an instance of the
prepositional dative construction are semantically equivalent.
0.1 Since we will be trafficking shortly in 'semantic
properties', and since semantic properties are notoriously the
subject of controversy, it is important to clarify to some extent
at least the semantic framework adopted here. The fundamental
notion in what follows is that of truth, and the fundamental
method I have adopted is the postulation of truth-conditions, the
satisfaction of which is essential to the truth of the sentence
to which the truth conditions are assigned. I am far from
convinced that truth is the sole fundamental notion for linguistic
semantics and I make no claim in what follows to have given a
complete or exhaustive semantic analysis of the dative constructions:
I only harbor the hope that the analyses presented are descrip-
tively correct.
Although I shall not argue in depth for the position
I adopt here with respect to truth-conditions, there are several
considerations which in my opinion justify this position. For
oen thing, I can envision no adequate theory of meaning which
does not incorporate an equivalent to truth-conditions. Another
consideration is based on certain problems which arise concerning
the status of semantic intuitions.
Among our linguistic abilities are the ability to
apply (or refuse to apply) a given sentence to a given state of
affairs and the ability to recognize the truth or falsity of a
sentence relative to a given situation.1 Of importance is the
constrast between intuitions concerning applicability and
intuitions about the meaning of sentences in isolation from
situations of which they are true or false. For instance, a
minimal condition on synonymy is that if two sentences A and B
are synonymous, then for any given state of affairs (or model),
they must have the same truth value. But there are cases in
which judgments of synonymity are rescinded. In particular,
this occurs if we are able to construct a model for which sentence
A and sentence B have distinct truth values. In other words, on
the basis of intuitions about applicability (or satisfaction
with respect to a given model), we can discover that two
sentences which we once considered synonymous are in fact not
synonymous. However, it would seem to be impossible to discover
that two sentences are synonymous (except in cases which involve
stipulated definitions). It is for this reason that I consider
intuitions concerning applicability to have a different status
than intuitions concerning synonymity (and related notions2 )
and concentrate on the problem of postulating sets of truth-
conditions.
If the analyses which I shall present below are correct,
then the truth-conditions posited for a given Verb are necessary
conditions for the sentences in which that verb occurs to be
true. 3 I make no claim to have given sufficient conditions:
I see no way in which to tell when one has arrived at a complete
set of such conditions. I must admit, however, that I would be
surprised in some cases if it is found that the conditions which
I postulate are not sufficient.
0.2 I shall postulate certain predicates and relations that
are claimed to hold if the sentence in question is true. I
represent these predicates and relations with single capital
letters, and I represent the arguments of these predicates and
relations in various ways: in the simplest cases, in which the
argument is merely the referent of a certain NP, we shall write
(in the case of a one-place predicate) either 'P(NPa )' or
merely 'P(a)'; in more complicated cases, certain changes in
this notation may be introduced. The relations employed are of
various kinds, including two-place relations between individuals,
as in ?R(a,b)', relations between an individual and a proposition,
as in 'R(a, S(b,c))', and relations between propositions, as in
?T(R(a,b), S(c,d))'. For the most part quantifiers are simply
left out, even when they are essential to a proper translation
into first-order predicate calculus. The purpose of our
notation is not formal rigor, but rather as a means of gaining
insight into semantic structure.
As usual, then, the truth-conditions will be stated
in a meta-language. The question invariably arises as to the
interpretation of the symbols employed in the meta-language.
In general, I see no reason to suppose that the various
predicate- and relation-symbols of the meta-language will have
any single best translati6n into the object language.
In fact, we shall find that in some cases a clear characteriza-
tion of the interpretation of these symbols is difficult to
attain.
Ideally, one would like to be able to give an inter-
pretation of the symbols of the meta-language which was completely
independent of the vocabulary of the object language. Whether
this is possible even in principle in the case in which the
object language is one's own natural language can well be
doubted. Yet one may hope that such dependence on the object
language can be reduced to a minimum. One way of reducing this
dependence is to attempt to analyze the vocabulary of the object
language in terms of a small set of primitives which are them-
selves, however, dependent on the object language for their
interpretation. Such a manoeuvre, though perhaps useful, does
not face the problem squarely. A different tack would be to
attempt to provide each primitive symbol with a characterization
which would be clear enough so that the concept which the
primitive symbol represents is graspable (and perhaps even
communicable) without essential reliance on any particular item
of the vocabulary of the object language. Thus, while reliance
on the object language in giving the characterization would
still be indispensable, the dependency on particular words
would be reduced to a minimum. Such difficulties are a problem
for any theory of the semantics of natural language.
1.0 For the purposes of our inquiry, the most important
semantic aspect of a verb which occurs in the double object
construction concerns certain structural properties of the set
of truth-conditions assigned to that verb.5 The most versatile
of all the double object verbs is give, and we shall begin by
investigating this verb.
1.1 I will begin with a case which is multiply ambiguous,
for in such a case it is perhaps simplest to see the necessity
for sharply separating the semantic properties of each reading.
Thus, consider the sentence:
1) Nixon gave Mailer a book.
On one reading, (1) asserts that the ownership of the book
passed from Nixon to Mailer; on another reading, (1) is
compatible with a situation in which Nixon merely handed the
book to Mailer, and questions of ownership are simply irrelevant;
on a third reading, (1) is compatible with a situation in
which Mailer wrote a book which he wouldn't have been able to
write if it hadn't been for Nixon.
1.1.1 More precisely, the first reading of (1) seens to
involve the following elements:
2) i) immediately prior to the tense-referent,
Nixon owned a certain book.
ii) at the time specified by the tense, Nixon acts
in such a way as to transfer the ownership of
the book to Mailer.
We can formalize these conditions as follows, where 't0
represents the tense-referent, In? represents Nixon, 'im'
represents Mailer, and 'b' represents the book in question:
3) i) prior to t0, O(n,b)
ii) at t0 , A(n)
iii) at t0, M(A(n), 0(m,b))
The interpretation of these conditions is relatively straight-
forward. The relation 'O(x,y)' holds if and only if x owns y.
In other words, the variable 'x' ranges over human individuals
and the variable 'y' ranges over objects (both physical and
abstract, as we shall see later) in the social domain. Moreover,
the relation 'O(xy)' is exhaustive in the following sense: if
the variables 'x' and 'w' range over human individuals, and the
variable 'y' ranges over objects in the social domain, then
4) (Ax)(Ay)((O(x,y)) -+ (Aw)((O(w,y)) ++ (x=w)))
This meaning postulate rules out sentences like:
5) #John owns this bicycle and so does Mary.
It applies only after the operation of the scope component. 6
The predicate 'A(x)t is to be interpreted as follows:
x executes an intentional act within a domain of social action.
The relation ?M(XY)' is to be interpreted as follows: as a
result of X, Y holds. I have given the predicate 'A(x)' a
rather abstract interpretation, in order to avoid the problem
of specifying the myriad ways in which the transferrance of
ownership is actually carried out--the signing of a piece of
paper, any one of a large variety of linguistic acts, any one
of a large variety of gestures which achieve a tacit understanding
between the gesturer and those to whom these gestures are directed,
etc. Such a specification, even if feasible, would miss the
point that what is important is only that in order for a sentence
like (1) to be true on the interpretation that we are considering,
the referent of the subject of (1) need only have acted in such
a way as to ensure that the relation 'O(x,y)' holds of the
respective referents of the indirect object and the direct object.
In conjunction with the meaning postulate (4), a consequence of
this is that the relation 'O(x,y)' no longer holds of the referent
of the subject and the referent of the direct object.
1.1.2 We turn now to the second reading of (1), on which
the book changes hands without the ownership being affected.
The set of truth-conditions which we shall assign to (1) on
this reading is quite similar to (3), the set postulated to
account for the first reading. There appear to be two crucial
distinctions, however. One involves the replacement of the
relation 'O(x,y)' by another relation, call it 'C(x,y)'. The
other involves the fact that this reading seems to hold of
situations only where there is an 'uptake' on the part of the
referent of the indirect object.7
We want the relation 'C(x,y)' to range over a variety
of cases, from cases in which x grasps y with the hand to cases
in which x has y at x's disposal to cases in which x has y
among his possessions. Thus we have setences like the following,
which on our account are all instances of the second reading:
6) I gave John my bicycle (for the afternoon).
7) I gave John my telephone number.
8) I gave John the paper he wanted: I left it in
his mailbox.
It has been pointed out, by Frege and C.I. Lewis for example,
that as the extension of a concept increases, its content
diminishes. Nevertheless, we shall represent the various
relations which are pertinent to a more careful analysis of
(6-8) by the symbol 'C(x,y)', since a more precise delineation
of the concepts involved does not seem to affect our program in
any way.
The second question raised above concerns the 'uptake'
of the referent of the indirect object: by 'uptake', I mean
that the indirect object must accept the custody of the direct
object, either by physically grasping it, or by acknowledging
that the transferrance of custody has taken place, or in some
cases merely by convention. Consider the following circumstance:
A comes into B's office and lays something on B's desk; if B
is totally unaware of A's presence and in no way acknowledges
the presence of the article in question, then it seems to me
inappropriate to say that A gave B the article in question
(unless some prior arrangement had been made between A and B).
On the other hand, if some prior arrangement had in fact been
made, or if B acknowledges that he accepts the article (in any
one of a number of ways), then we might well say that A gave B
the article. If this is correct, then it will not suffice to
cast the truth-conditions of this interpretation of sentences
like (1) merely in terms of the physical location of an object
with respect to various individuals.9 Rather, we must take
account of the social agreement--tacit or not--which holds
between subject and indirect object.
Assuming all of this to be correct, then, we write:
9) i) prior to t0, C(nb)
ii) at (or prior to) t0, A(n) & A(m)
iii) at tO, M((A(n) & A(m)), C(m,b))
In other words, our analysis states that in order for a sentence
of the form a gives b c to hold on the second reading, it must
be the case that, first, a has custody of c; second, that a and
b arrive at least at a tacit agreement; and, finally, that as a
result of this agreement, b has custody of c.
In some ways, this schema is not altogether satisfac-
tory, since in some cases the agreement itself does not suffice
to effect the transferrance of custody. I do not know exactly
how to improve the analysis: it may be the case that some kind
of physical action is always required. The difficulty stems from
the fact that, as long as the agreement has been reached (or
conventionally holds, as in the case of (8), where merely
depositing an object in a mailbox seems to be sufficient) this
physical action may be undertaken by either the subject or the
indirect object: the subject may leave the article in question
at some prearranged location, or the indirect object may take
the article in question from its location, or the article in
question may remain in the same physical location. Below, we
try to give examples which illustrate the second and third cases;
an example of the first case is fiven in (8):
10) John gave Harry a copy of the paper: he left it
on his desk and presumably it was Harry who
took it.
11) John gave Harry his bicycle for the day: but the
bicycle just sat there the whole day. I
guess Harry didn't need it. 10
In other words, if it is desirable to treat these cases in a
unitary fashion, then whatever physical action may be involved
is subsidiary to the agreement arrived at on the part of the
subject and the indirect object: the cooperative nature of
the enterprise is essential. It is this characteristic which
distinguishes this use of give from two other, very general,
verbs: offer and take. 1 Like give, offer is equivocal
concerning whether ownership or custody is at issue, but unlike
give, the truth-conditions on offer necessitate only that the
possessor of the article in question is willing to give it up
to another: no agreement or 'uptake' is required on the latter's
part. Similarly, take is applicable to a wide range of circum-
stances in which an article undergoes a change in possession.
The salient distinction is that there need be no act of agree-
ment involved, in the case of take. Thus, although the range
of circumstances for which sentences using give are true inter-
sects with those for which sentences using offer or take are
true, they must be distinguished.
1.1.3 We said above that the third reading of (1) is
compatible with a situation in which Mailer wrote a book which
he wouldn't have been able to write if it hadn't been for
Nixon. Rather than speaking of a single 'reading' in such
cases, it might have been more appropriate to speak of a family
of possible interpretations, for there is considerable variabil-
ity in the characterization of the relation between the indirect
object and the direct object. I shall illustrate this shortly.
The salient semantic property of this family of readings,
however, is not the range of relations which hold between the
indirect object and the direct object, but the fact that for the
purposes of analysis, no relation holds between the subject and
the direct object at all: rather there is a relation of a
causal type which pertains between the subject and the relation
holding between the indirect object and the direct object. In
other words, the structure of the truth-conditions for such
sentences is simply as follows:
12) at t0, S(n, R(m,b))
The question now at hand is how to properly constrain the
interpretation of the relations 'S(x,Y)' and 'R(w,z)'.
1.1.3.1 One of the properties which we should like to attribute
to the relation 'S(x,Y)' is that it be roughly of a causal
nature. Without attempting to present a characterization of
the various (linguistic) senses of causation, we may nevertheless
ask whether we want to construe ?S(x,Y)? as true only if the
existence of x is a sufficient condition for Y to hold, or whether
1x' represents a- necessary condition for the truth of Y.
Neither interpretation of ?S(x,Y)' is very satisfactory. For
instance, it's clear that in many cases, the interpretation
based on sufficiency is out of place: in sentence (1), for
example, the truth of the sentence might well depend on many
other factors than Nixon's existence--Mailer's talents, his
energy, and so forth. But the construal based on necessary
conditions is perhaps also not quite to the point, since Mailer
might easily have written some other book even if Nixon had
never existed. We might think that he wouldn't have written
the particular book he did write if it hadn't been for Nixon,
but this tack constitutes only an evasion of the issue which is
open to other objections. For example, we find sentences like:
13) The war years gave Mailer his first big success.
It makes little sense to say here that if it hadn't been for the
'war years', Mailer would not have attained the particular 'big
success? that he did attain: the problem here is one of
individuation.
Regardless of what the correct analysis of (linguistic)
causation may be, however, we may still distinguish the role the
subject plays in the interpretation of (1) on the third reading
from the role it plays in the interpretation of the first two
readings. We have already mentioned the fact that, on the third
reading, it is apparently the case that no relation whatsoever
is required to hold between the subject and the direct object,
in contradistinction to the first two readings. Another indica-
tion of this is the relative freedom of selection of the subject
for sentences which have the third reading as opposed to the
first two readings. An example of this is (13) above, which has
no readings corresponding to the first two readings.12 Further
examples of this freedom of selection are:
14) Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book.
15) The American program to land a man on the moon
gave Mailer a book.
In neither of these cases is either of the first two readings
available.
1.1.3.2 When we turn to the relation 'R', things are not much
more perspicuous. The most obvious way to paraphrase sentence
(1) under the third reading is as something like:
16) If it hadn't been for Nixon, Mailer wouldn't have
written a (certain) book.
Yet, even assuming that such a paraphrase is correct in this
case, its correctness is based to a large extent on our knowl-
edge of the world, rather than on linguistic knowledge alone:
we are likely to know in this case that "Mailer" probably denotes
Norman Mailer, a well-known author. Yet, depending on the
referent of the indirect object in such sentences, paraphrases
can easily vary. Consider:
17) A series of accidental circumstances gave Knopf &
Co. The Magic Mountain.
Here, we might wish to say, as a paraphrase, that if it hadn't
been for those accidental circumstances, Knopf & Co. wouldn't
have had the rights to publish The Magic Mountain.
If we are interested in paraphrases of the form,
18) If it hadn't been for a, b wouldn't have V'ed c.
The content of V is probably determined to some extend on knowl-
edge we have of the world. At least the plausibility of the
various paraphrases offered would seem to support this view,
since they are quite distinct. Furthermore, with respect to
(17), if we have no idea what 'Knopf & Co.' or 'The Magic
Mountain' refer to, our choice of paraphrase--if indeed we have
one available--is likely to be quite different. In spite of
this, however, we might still want to say that there is some
notion of intrinsic connection between the indirect object and
the direct object. 1 3 Another way of putting this point is as
follows: the semantic properties of the truth-conditions
assigned to sentences which have what I have called the third
reading provide a way of structuring the factual knowledge at
our disposal--the exact specification of what is meant by such
sentences is in many cases a matter of pragmatic guesswork.
One final point about the third reading of (1). This
concerns the fact that the NP a book receives an abstract inter-
pretation, at least on any interpretation for which (16) is an
approximate paraphrase. Although I am unable to specify exactly
how this fact should be handled, it may be a special case of a
more general phenomenon that is taken up in section 3.4.2.
1.1.3.3 Although we have been unable to clarify successfully
the precise interpretation of 'S' and 'R', nevertheless it is
still possible to distinguish the third reading of (1) from the
first two readings on the basis of the structural characteristics
of the set of truth-conditions assigned to each reading. Both of
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the first two readings contain a statement to the effect that
there is a relation (either 1O' or 'CI) holding between the
subject and the direct object prior to the tense-referent. The
third reading contains no such statement. 14 We shall see later
that this distinction is of use in characterizing in a partial
way the range of the intersection of the inside dative and out-
side dative constructions.
2.0 In this section, we shall extend the analysis presented
for the first two readings of (1) to a variety of other cases.
We note the fact that the relation which is postulated to hold
between the subject and the direct object prior to the tense
referent is the same relation which later holds of the indirect
object and the direct object at the time of the tense-referent. 15
In other words, the first reading characterizes a transfer of
ownership, the second reading characterizes a transfer of custody,
and the third reading is distinguished in that questions of
transferrance are not involved.
2.1 It has often been noted that there is a connection
between a large subset of the verbs which occur in the dative
constructions and concepts involving 'possession'. Yet the
concept 'possession' is itself a diffuse one. For instance,
there is no English verb which exactly expresses the concept
of custody as we tried to define it is section 1.1.2: have itself
is much too broad. Furthermore, although both own and possess are
used to express a certain relation between humans and their
belongings,16 in abstract domains, the verb possess has strikingly
distinct uses, as the sentences below illustrate:
19) The citizens possess the right to appeal.
20) *The citizens own the right to appeal.
21) Bill Cosby possesses great talent.
22) *Bill Cosby owns great talent.
23) ?Kennecott Copper possesses the mineral rights to
Chile.
24) Kennecott Copper owns the mineral rights to Chile.
Yet although we must evidently make a distinction between
(inalienable) non-transferrable social rights and transferrable
social rights, on the one hand, to handle the constrast between
(19-20) and (23-24), we must make further distinctions to limit
the use of possess in its inalienable aspects. Thus, although
(21) is good, (25-26) are bad (in contrast to the corresponding
sentences with have given in (27-28)):
25) *John possesses a bad liver.
26) *John possesses a headache.
27) John has a bad liver.
28) John has a headache.
We can represent these various distinctions in the following
table:
29)
CONCRETE
have
own
possess
belong to
hand
pass
bequeathe
give
ALIENABLE
INALIENABLE have
*own
*possess
*belong to
*hand
*pass
?bequeathe
give
ABSTRACT
have
own
?possess
belong to
*hand
*pass
bequeathe
give
have
*own
possess
*belong to
*hand
*pass
?bequeathe (genetically)
give
This table represents only an initial step in analysis. Further
distinctions must be made at least along the following lines:
first, some notion of surrogate-ownership is necessary to
distinguish rent and sell, and this notion must come to grips
with whether it is possible, for exampleto rent abstract things
like mineral rights; second, temporal qualifications are necessary
to distinguish lend from give; third, some qualification is
needed to distinguish the custody-reading of give, which is quite
general, from the rather special senses associated with verbs
like hand and pass; finally, if the possessional nature of the
dative-cases is to be assimilated within a general analysis of
'possessional' verbs, some means must be devised to deal with
verbs like throw, which, as we shall see shortly, raise rather
special problems.
The first two problems raised present no serious
problems for an enterprise that aims to assimilate (at least)
some of the dative (double object) constructions within an
analysis of 'possessional' verbs. Various details need working
out, however. Consider temporal qualifications on the relation
between the indirect object and the direct object. Given
sentences like those below,
30) John rented Harry an apartment in the Bronx for
three months.
31) John leased me his apartment for a week.
32) John lent me his bicycle for a week.
is it the case that the temporal period specified by the for-
phrase is a part of the (contractual) agreement entered into by
the subject and the indirect object? I myself have the feeling
that for the first two cases, the answer is yes, whereas for (32)
it's not clear: the for-phrase may simply specify the amount of
time during which the indirect object had the direct object in
his possession. Differences of this kind, if they exist, support
the decision made in section 1.1.2 to emphasize the social nature
of many of the instances of transferrance which such verbs are
used to describe. The fact that there are in certain cases what
seem to be analytical connections between certain lexical items,
e.g. bequeathe1 and own, is represented in our analysis by the
fact that in the truth-conditions assigned to these verbs, there
will be certain predicates or relations in common. If enough
conceptual content can be given to the relations employed, such
an approach offers a promising way to deal with such perennial
problems as the connections between buy, sell, and own, for
example. 18
Assuming that such analytical connections exist, then,
we have a (formally) precise way of representing them: given
two verbs for which we wish to posit such a connection, the
truth-conditions assigned in each case will exhibit an inter-
section. Such an approach is able to capture the felt similarity
between two lexical items as well as any approach can, without
incurring some of the more obvious drawbacks. 19
In many cases, however, there is no simple verb of
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'possession' which expresses precisely the possessive aspect
of a given double-object verb. This may be seen by considering
in detail the cases of hand, pass, and throw.2 0
2.2 In both the cases of hand and pass, there must be
something like local contact between the subject and indirect
object. The notion 'local contact' is both imprecise and in
need of qualification. With hand, for instance, the transferrance
of the entity represented by the direct object is from the hand
of the subject to the hand of the indirect object. This does
not obviate the condition that there must be an act on the part
of the subject constituting an 'offer' and an act of acceptance
on the part of the indirect object. More precisely, we write:
33) NP. hand NP. NPi j k
i) prior to t0, H(NPi, NPk)
ii) at t0, I(NPi, H(NPJ, NPk)) & A(NP ) & A(NP.) &
M((A(NP.) & A(NP.) (-H(NP., NPk) &
H(NP , NPk
The relation 'H(x,y)' holds of a person and a physical object:
its interpretation is that the person (x) holds the object (y)
in the hand. The relation 'I(x,Y)' holds of a person and a
predicate or relation: its interpretation is that the person
(x) intends the predicate or relation (Y) to hold. The predicate
'A(x)' is to be interpreted as above in section 1.1.2: namely,
x executes an intentional act within a domain of social action.
Similarly, the relation 'M(X,Y)' is to be interpreted: as a
result of X, Y holds. Thus, we claim that in order for a
sentence of the form x hands y z to be true, it must first be
the case that x holds z in the hand, and then, that with the
intention that y hold z, x releases z and y takes z. It may be
felt that such conditions are merely an awkward way of doing
violence to what is a kind of gestalt process. But our analysis
is designed to account for several crucial aspects of this
process, namely: 1) the use of hand is inappropriate to describe
a situation in which one person takes an object from another
without consent; 2) the use of hand is inappropriate if there
is no act of acceptance by the reciever of the object, i.e.,
merely laying an object in the hand of another does not constitute
handing the object to that person; 3) the intention on the
part of the subject is important in order to rule out cases in
which the article in question is transferred in a way that
satisfies the physical criteria set up, but is brought about
without the explicit intention of the subject, i.e., if the
subject merely lets go of the article in question and the indirect
object happens to simultaneously grasp it.21 The relation
'H(x,y)l can be given a precise interpretation. Yet there is no
simple verb in English which expresses this concept.
The verb pass differs in a number of ways from hand.
One way in which the sets of truth-conditions assigned to these
verbs differ is that pass allows the presence of intermediaries
who cooperate in transferring the article in question, whereas
hand does not. I shall leave open the way in which this
distinction is to be represented. Of more immediate importance
is the distinction manifested by these two verbs with respect to
the 'uptake' on the part of the indirect object.
That some uptake on the part of the indirect object is
in fact necessary for a sentence of the form x pass y z to be
true of a situation can be seen by considering cases in which
whatever physical criteria we set for pass are satisfied, yet
there is no acknowledgment on the part of the receptor. For
instance, sentence (34) is not true of a situation in which Mike
is asleep, or so deeply engrossed in conversation with some
third party that he does not notice the arrival of the picture:
34) Alex passed Mike the picture.
On the other hand, however, pass, unlike hand, does
not seem to require a physical uptake. In this respect, pass
resembles the custodial sense of give. Consider (34) again.
Suppose the picture in question had aroused Mike's interest while
he and his friends were sitting at the dinner table. If Mike is
too busy manipulating his utensils to physically take the picture,
and Alex places the picture on the table in front of Mike in such
a way as to enable Mike to scrutinize the picture to his satisfac-
tion, then (34) might well be true. This distinguishes the uptake
of pass from the uptake of hand. But pass is distinct from give
in that a local contact is necessary.
The verb throw is again apparently different from
either of these verbs with respect to the uptake condition.
Without going into all the details proper to the analysis of
sentences of the form x throw y z, we merely note that for such
a sentence to be true, the object z must come within some region
under the physical control of y. Again, the precise analysis
of 'physical control' is hard to specify: we merely note that it
has to be broad enough to comprehend situations in which y is
intended to catch z and situations in y is intended to hit z with
a bat (for instance). It appears to be the case that some
interaction on the part of y and z is necessary: thus a sentence
of the required form does not seem to be true if the object z
merely comes to rest near y. In any case, it can easily be seen
that the uptake condition on the part of the indirect object in
sentences with throw is distinct from the other cases we have
discussed. 22
2.3 All of this raises the following problem: if we want
to claim that notion 'possessive verb' is of importance in
characterizing a certain set of verbs which occur in the double
object construction, how can this generalization be expressed,
in view of the fact that analysis shows that distinct concepts
of possession are needed? There are two ways in which this
problem can be met: a substantive theory of 'possession' which
would relate all of these different concepts in terms of their
content; and a formal theory which ignores the exact content of
the various 'possessive' concepts, but groups the cases we are
interested in together on the basis of certain formal properties
associated with their assigned sets of truth-conditions.
Without disparaging the substantive theory, I would
like to propose a way in which the formal theory, based on the
notation which I have adopted, can handle this problem. I will
first outline the proposal in a strong form.
The most striking aspect of the sets of truth-conditions
so far presented for the cases which we have claimed deal with
questions of transferrance is the fact that there is a relation
claimed to hold of the subject of the sentences at issue and the
direct object, and this same relation holds (later) between the
indirect object and the direct object. This is the case for the
first reading we provided for give (cf. (3)); it is true for the
custodial interpretation of give (cf. (9)); it is true for hand
(cf. (33)). Furthermore, a proper analysis of verbs like sell
and bequeathe will manifest this property as well. We thus have
a formal way of characterizing the concept 'transferrance',
namely, as follows:
35) If the set of truth-conditions assigned to a verb
contains the following propositions and R and R'
are identical, then the verb has the transferrance
property:
i) prior to t0, R(NP1 , NPk)
ii) at t0, R'(NP , NP k)
(where ?NP ' represents the subject of the verb)
In cases in which we are interested in transferrance of possession,
we let 'R(x,y)' be any arbitrary relation holding of a person and
physical objects or alienable social rights.
As stated, this notion of transferrance may be too
general for our purposes, but its interest stems from the fact
that given this characterization of transferrance, we can give
the following implication concerning the relation between syntactic
form and semantic content:
36) If a verb occurs in the double object construction
and has the transferrance property, it occurs in
the prepositional dative construction as well.
In later sections of this thesis, we shall see certain aspects
of the double object construction which suggest that we
strengthen this implication, but for the time being, there are
certain problems which require attention.
First, the definition of transferrance is too strong.
In particular, if the analysis of rent requires as I suggested
above a concept 'surrogate-ownership', the definition fails for
the case of rent. Second, if the discussion above concerning
pass and throw was to the point', the fact that no physical uptake
is required on the part of the indirect object raises difficulties,
since evidently more must be said about the relations holding of
the subject and the direct object. In other words, both of
these cases violate the requirement that the relation holding
of the subject and the indirect object be identical to the
relation holding (later) of the indirect object and the direct
object.
I know of no way to handle the problem of rent within
a purely formal analysis. What apparently is needed is to relax
the identity condition in (35) that the relations be exactly
the same. Let us assume that the notion of 'surrogate-ownership,
is subordinate to the relation 'O(x,y)' which represents the
ownership of y by x. Although this notion of subordination may
be intuitively satisfactory, I do not know at present how to give
it more content. Nevertheless, I shall modify the characteriza-
tion of transferrance so that it reads as follows:
37) If the set of truth-conditions assigned to a verb
contains the following propositions and either
R and R' are identical or R' is subordinate to R,
then the verb has the transferrance property:
i) prior to t0, R(NPi, NPk)
ii) at t0 , R'(NP., NPk)
(where NP represents the subject of the verb)
As far as the second problem is concerned, one way in
which it can be avoided is as follows. Let there be some
general notion 'D(x,y)', which receives the interpretation
'x physically controls y'. We then incorporate this relation
into the truth-conditions of verbs like pass, throw, and hit
and put the burden of differentiating these verbs on various
aspects of their interpretation which restrict them to certain
kinds of physical action.24 I leave open exactly how such a
program can be carried out.
In this section, we have attempted to extend the analysis
proposed for the first two readings of the sentence Nixon gave
Mailer a book to various other instances of the double object
construction. The connection between a large group of verbs
which occur in the double object construction with the concept
'possession' was noted, and an analysis of 'possessive verbs? was
presented which shows that various distinctions are required in
order to adequately separate one type of possession from another.
Furthermore, we attempted to demonstrate that in the general
case the concepts of 'possession' which are relevant to the verbs
which occur in the double object construction are distinct from
those for which we have simple verbs. This has led to an attempt
to give a formal characterization of the notion 'transferrance'
as a way of expressing the 'possessional' characteristics of
certain double object verbs. In ensuing sections, we shall
explore in more detail the consequences of the implicational
statement (36), a proposal which relates certain aspects of a
verb's semantic properties to aspects concerning its occurrence
in two different syntactic structures.
3.0 Let us return to the third reading of sentence (1) of
section 1.1. The characterization of this type that I proposed
was simply:
1) at tO, S(NP1 , R(NPj, NPk
where 'S(x,Y) is a causal relation whose precise interpretation
has been left open, and R(x,y) represents what we merely called
an 'intrinsic connection' between x and y.
The crucial difference between this schema and the
schemata given for the other readings is, as I pointed out above,
the fact that no relation holds between NP. and NP prior to
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t0. One consequence of this is that, other things being equal,
the selectional range of NP for sentences of this type is much
larger than it is for sentences of the type discussed in section
2. For the latter type, there is always some relation
'R(NP1 , NPk)' which holds of the subject and the direct object,
and the necessity for NP to conform to this relation limits its
selectional range. Thus, in contrast to verbs like sell, for
example, verbs which occur in sentences that are interpreted
along the lines of the schema in (1) allow abstract subjects:
2) Interviewing Nixon gave Mailer a book.
3) #Interviewing Nixon sold Mailer a book.
By investigating the selectional range of NPk in sentences which
are interpreted in accordance with the schema given in (1), we
may hope to discover a more precise way of characterizing the
relations involved. In this section, I shall present three
rather special cases for which a more precise interpretation
can be formalized. I shall then attempt to provide a uniform
way of characterizing all three cases, and suggest a way in
which the analysis can be extended to some rather idiomatic
cases.
3.0.1 Consider the following sentences:
6) John gave the table a kick.
7) The concert tour gave Stravinsky a new patron.
8) The operation gave Max an ugly appearance.
In all of these cases, the sentence involved has the linear
structure NP - V - NP - NPk. But although in each sentence
there is an NPk, as shown by the typically nominal structure
'det - (adj) - noun', the various NPk have certain properties
which distinguish them from garden-variety referential expressions.
For example, in each of these cases, it is impossible to question
such expressions:
9) *Which kick did John give the table?
10) *Which patron did the concert tour give Stravinsky?
11) *Which ugly appearance did the operation give Max?
By constructing an account of such behavior, we will be in a
position both to understand more about the relation 'R' of (1)
and to understand the range of the dative alternation in an
improved fashion.
3.1 By tpredicational noun', I mean the (semelfactive)
nominalization of a verb. In particular, I shall mean
nominalizations like the following:
12) verb predicational noun
to kick a kick
to try a try
to start a start
to pull a pull
to push a push
to hit a hit
to swing a swing
to punch a punch
to test a test
to look a look
to glance a glance
Without attempting a complete characterization of the range of
this type of nominalization, we note that only activity predicates
seem to be involved (*a know, *an own, *a see, etc.) and only
one- or two-place predicates (*a put, *a give, etc.).
Such nominalizations have interesting properties.
Most important for our purposes is the fact that when they occur
in the double object construction as NPk, the predicate that they
are derived from plays a role in the entailments of the sentence
and NP. is always construed as one of the arguments of this
predicate. For example, the sentence
13) Gibson gave Smith a look at the samples.
entails that Smith looked at the examples. In certain cases
NP is also construed as an argument of the predicate from which
the predicational noun is derived. Thus, (14)
14) Gibson gave the rope a pull.
entails that Gibson pulled the rope. In some cases, this leads
to ambiguity:
15) The Braves gave Aaron a try.
(15) is consistent either with a situation in which the Braves
tried Aaron or with a situation in which the Braves let Aaron try.
Predicational nouns share with infinitives, gerunds,
and participles certain properties concerning control (of an
understood argument place by some other noun phrase in the
sentence):
16) When I walked into the room, I noticed that John's
kick had caused the house of cards to collapse.
17) *When I walked into the room, I noticed that a kick
had caused the house of cards to collapse.
As with infinitives and gerunds and participles generally,
generic and modal contexts relax this constraint:
18) A kick may cause a house of cards to collapse.
As example (18) shows, predicational nouns may occur
in other environments than the double object construction. That
the environment affects the interpretation of the related
predicate is shown by examples like:
19) The mule got a kick (in the teeth).
20) The mule gave a kick (*in the teeth).
Thus, (19) is true of a situation in which the mule was kicked
in the teeth, whereas (20) is true of a situation in which the
mule kicked.
A way of dealing with the control problem raised by
such cases that captures the dependency on the matrix verb has
been suggested by Jackendoff (1972, particularly pp. 217-219)
and elaborated by Higgins (1973, pp. 179-187). The heart of the
suggestion is a 'matching principle' which pairs up the thematic
relations of the matrix sentence with the controlled arguments
of the predicate from which the nominalization is derived.
Higgins states the principle as follows:
21) To each of the understood noun phrases of the
noun phrase whose head is the nominalization
there must correspond a noun phrase in the
sentence which bears the same thematic relation
to the verb as that noun phrase bears to the
nominalization.
--Higgins, 1973, pp. 182-183.
The attractiveness of this principle is its generality and its
expression of the dependency of the control relations on the
main verb.
With respect to the verb give, however, this principle
raises severe problems. What thematic relations are involved
when give is used in the double object construction? Depending
on which criterion we use, it would seem to change. And this in
turn robs the principle (21) of any explanatory value when we
apply it to constructions with give.
If a verb is used to describe motion, the thing that
moves is the Theme. In such contexts, the motion of the Theme
originates at the Source and terminates at the Goal. In order
to generalize the concepts employed in this system, something
like the following principle is required: when a verb whose
thematic relations are well-defined for motional contexts is
extended to non-motional contexts, the thematic relations of the
various syntactic positions for which the verb is subcategorized
remain constant. Yet if this is so, the matching principle
as formulated in (21) cannot be right. For example, consider
the ambiguity of (15). On one reading, the one consistent with
'The Braves try Aaron', 'Aaron' is presumably the Theme of try;
on the other reading, the one consistent with 'The Braves let
Aaron try', 'Aaron' is presumably the Agent of try. Therefore,
if the matching principle is correct, the principle of invariance
of thematic relations is not. Similar conclusions follow from a
consideration of examples like:
22) Nixon gave his press secretary a shove.
23) Nixon gave his press secretary a thrill.
There is one consideration which provides some evidence that we
should relax the principle of invariance of thematic relations
rather than dispense with the matiching principle. This concerns
the fact that a consequence of preserving the matching principle
is that the thematic relation assigned to the indirect object
must change as the thematic relation of the argument place of
the predicate which the indirect object controls changes. From
this consideration alone, it is not clear which principle to
reject. But note that as the thematic relation assigned to the
indirect object changes, there appears to be a corresponding
shift in the thematic role of the subject of give. This provides
evidence that the principle of invariance is not always
applicable.
There is an alternative description of the facts,
independent of the system of thematic relations, which is
descriptively adequate (but goes no further) and provides a
useful way of illustrating the problem. Assume that each
predicational noun is entered in the lexicon,25 and each lexical
entry of a predicational noun is specified for which arguments
must be controlled. We noted above that there appear to be no
predicational nouns which are derived from three-place predicates
like put. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to the case
in which there is either one empty argument-place to be filled,
or two. If there is only one empty argument-place to be filled,
the indirect object fills it. The completed predicate is then
listed as an entailment of the sentence. Concomitantly, however,
we assign to the subject of give the interpretation 'permissive
agent' with respect to this entailed predicate. Stated more
formally, this comes out as:
24) Given the structure:
NP give NP. NPk
and 'NP k' is a predicational noun with one empty
argument place, derived from the predicate P,
the sentence represented by this structure is
true if and only if,-'
i) P(NP.) is true.
ii) E(NP., P(NP.)), where the relation
'E(x,Y)' is interpreted as 'x permits Y,26
Assuming that the expression 'a look at the samples' is a
predicational noun with one empty argument place (related to the
sentence 'x look at the samples'), applying these instructions
to (13) above provides a reasonable approximation to the
intuitive interpretation. It is worth pointing out that if
there is only one empty argument-place, it must be the subject,
and furthermore, in the cases of which I am aware, the subject
is always interpreted agentively. One would hope that this
fact could be correlated with the fact that the subject of give
is interpreted in a permissive role.
Let us now turn to the case in which the predicational
noun is represented in the lexicon with two empty argument-
places. Again we need to formulate rules which fill these
argument-places. The rules are simple: assign the indirect
object to the argument-place which corresponds to the direct
object of the verb from which the predicational noun is derived;
assign the subject of give to the argument-place of the
predicational noun which corresponds to the subject of the verb
from which the predicational noun is derived. Thus,
25) Given the structure:
NP. give NP. NPi a k
and 'NP is a predicational noun with two
empty argument-places, derived from the predicate
P, the sentence represented by this structure
is true if and only if
i) P(NP., NP.) is true.
In this case we need say nothing about permission. If the
subject of the verb from which the predicational noun is derived
is interpreted agentively, then there is an agentive interpreta-
tion; if not, there is not.
We mentioned above in section 3.0 that the selectional
range of a given noun phrase is constrained by the different
predicates and relations which the noun phrase must satisfy in
order for the sentence in which the noun phrase occurs to be true.
If this is correct, and our two interpretive schemata (24) and
(25) are correct, then we should find selectional dependencies
between the empty argument-places of the predicational nouns
which occur with give and the noun phrases (NP. and NP.) which
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are assigned to these argument-places by our rules. This is
in fact the case, as examples like the following show:
26 a) Nixon shoved Ziegler.
b) Nixon gave Ziegler a shove.
27 a) Nixon shocked Ziegler.
b) Nixon gave Ziegler a shock.
28 a) *Being close to Nixon shoved. Ziegler.
b) *Being close to Nixon gave Ziegler a shove.
29 a) Being close to Nixon shocked Ziegler.
b) Being close to Nixon gave Ziegler a shock.
The analysis we have presented here accounts for these selection-
al dependencies in a straightforward and natural way. 27
Although the analysis we have presented here is a
descriptively adequate account of the cases at issue, it has the
drawback of being tailor-made for the cases in which the main
verb is give. Thus, it is difficult to see how to extend it to
cases in which the main verb differs from give (e.g. (19), for
example) in any but a piecemeal fashion. Insofar as the
Jackendoff-Higgins matching principle (21) shows promise of a
general theory of accomplishing this goal, it should be main-
tained. A consequence of this is, as I pointed out, that the
principle of invariance of thematic relations must be weakened:
in this case, we must say that give can occur with a variety of
pairs of thematic relations assigned to its arguments. But
perhaps this reflects the intuitive feeling that in such
constructions, the verb give is semantically empty.
3.2 We turn now to the case in which NPk is an expression
like 'a patron'. Consider sentences like:
30) Stravinsky has a book.
31) Stravinsky has a patron.
In (30) we understand Stravinsky to own a book or to have a
book in his custody. Sentence (31) can have corresponding
interpretations, say in discussions concerning slavery or
incarceration. But (31) has a further interpretation, which we
may paraphrase as 'there is a person who is Stravinsky's patron'.
In other words, on this latter interpretation, the logical form
of (31) is distinct from that of (30): we shall treat this
difference as stemming from the fact that 'a patron' is a
relational expression which, like the predicational nouns
discussed in the last section, lacks a specification of its
argument in the surface structure,28 whereas 'a book' is not a
relational expression. Thus, we represent the interpretation
of (30) in which Stravinsky has custody of the book roughly as
in (32). A formal representation of (31) on the interpretation
in which 'a patron' is accorded the relational interpretation
is given in (33).
32) (Ex)(B(x) & C(sx))
33) (Ex)(P(sx))
'B(x)' is interpreted as 'x is a book'; 's' represents
Stravinsky; 'C(s,x)' is the custody relation discussed in
section 1.1.2; 'P(x,y)' is to be interpreted as 'y is x's
patron'.
In support of the distinction between a book and a
patron in the environment 'x have ', we note that whereas
the argument in (34) is valid, the argument in (35) is not:
34) Stravinsky has a book.
All books are physical objects.
Stravinsky has a physical object.
35) Stravinsky has a patron.
All patrons are supporters of the avant-garde.
Stravinsky has a supporter of the avant-garde.
Note further that in order for a sentence like (31)
to have the interpretation given in (33), it is essential that
the relational expression lack its argument. If we fill the
argument-place, the sentence has only a reading appropriate to
slavery or incarceration:
36) Stravinsky has the patron of Hindemith.
Like the predicational nouns discussed above, we find
that when relational expressions occur without overt arguments,
their distribution may be restricted. Consider the fact that
although every person is the son or daughter of someone, it is
quite bizarre to say things like:
37) *A daughter will be chosen to succeed President Ford.
(37) is not strange because it is misleading or uninformative.
It is just as informative as (38):
38) A woman will be chosen to succeed President Ford.
What seems to be necessary in order to improve (37) is that some
specification of whose daughter it is be given, as in (39).
39) A daughter of the vice-president will be chosen
to succeed President Ford.
Consider further the sentences:
40) Harry is on his way to see a friend.
41) Harry was talking to a friend.
In these sentences, the final NP is construed as a friend of the
subject, not some individual characterized abstractly as "friend
(of x)"., where the variable is given no interpretation.
A strong claim here would be that these relational
expressions are constrained in their distribution by principles
of control, similar to those that apply to headless gerunds. It
is true that there are some similarities to be noted here. For
example:
42) A patron would have helped Stravinsky. 29
(= Stravinsky's patron)
43) Consulting a doctor would have helped Stravinsky.
( Stravinsky's consulting a doctor)
44) Stravinsky always deplored a patron.
(d Stravinsky's patron)
45) Stravinsky always deplored arriving at concerts
late.
(# Stravinsky's arriving at concerts late)
This partial similarity notwithstanding--and it is far from
overwhelming--it is clear that relational expressions must be
treated in a different way than headless gerunds, and in fact,
that relational expressions do not uniformly require the
specification of their argument. 30 For example, consider the
following contrast:
46) After lunch, John has to meet one of his clients.
47) After lunch, John has to meet a client.
(= his client)
48) After lunch, John has to meet one of his sons.
49) *After lunch, John has to meet a son.
I have no way of accounting for this difference, but it is
worth noting that in some cases relational expressions relax
the requirement that the argument-place be specified: thus, in
hospitals, for example, reference to 'patients' is quite common. 31
3.2.1 In those cases in which an expression has a 'relational'
interpretation as the direct object in the double object con-
struction, the interpretation of the sentence as a whole always
contains a 'causal' element. The role of the indirect object
and the relational expression is quite simple: there is an
individual such that he and the indirect object satisfy the
relation in question. The subject is interpreted merely as
having played a crucial role in establishing the relation. Thus,
50) Given a sentence of the form
NP. give NP. NP1 a k
if NPk is a relational expression connected to
the relation 'P(x,y)', then the sentence is true
if and only if
i) (Ex)(P(NP., x)
ii) S(NP1 , (Ex)(P(NP., x))), where ?S(y, W)t is
a 'causal' relation
Apparently, it is a requirement on this interpretation that the
argument of the relation (cf. footnote 28) be unspecified at
the time the rule applies. Otherwise, the rules of interpreta-
tion will treat e.g. NPk as a definite (or indefinite) descrip-
tion: the interpretation of (51) parallels that of (52):
51) The concert tour gave Stravinsky the patron of
Hindemith.
52) The concert tour gave Stravinsky Paul Smith.
Although there are cases in which the direct object can be a
proper name, the interpretation suitable to them is hardly
appropriate in these cases. 32
3.3 Inalienable possession.
I shall treat cases of inalienable possession in a
manner similar to the treatment I proposed for relational
expressions: namely, the question of control is crucial. A
clear illustration of why I think such a treatment is necessary
is found in cases in which an NP with only an inalienable inter-
pretation appears in subject position. Compare the following
cases:
53) John's illness hampered him.
54) An illness hampered John.
55) John's illness hampered the team.
56)??An illness hampered the team.
If an illness has only an inalienable interpretation, there is
no difficulty in accounting for the strangeness of (56) insofar
as we have a way of correlating the object of hamper with the
subject: a collective cannot have an illness. I won't take a
stand here on how the necessary correlation is to be established,
though several possibilities suggest themselves.33
In order to make precise the interpretation of
sentences in the double object construction where the direct
object has an inalienable interpretation, I shall again propose
a set of interpretive rules. The sentences concerned are of the
type exemplified below:
57) Hot food gives Reginald heartburn.
58) The constant chatter gave me a headache.
59) His pair of new shoes gave John a blister.
To see that the direct object in such cases is in fact interpreted
inalienably, it suffices to add to the direct object a possessive
pronoun whose reference is distinct from that of the indirect
object.
60) #Hot food gives Reginald my heartburn.
61) #The constant chatter gave me Arnold's headache.
62) #His pair of new shoes gave John Mary's blister.
I propose the following interpretation for these
sentences:
63) Given a sentence of the form
NP give NP. NPk
if NPk receives an inalienable interpretation,
then the sentence is true if and only if NP.
has the property denoted by NPk, and NP plays
a causal role in this fact.34
3.4 Summary.
In the three cases discussed in this section, we have
examined three rather special types of interpretation assigned
to give when the direct object of the double object construction
has certain properties. There is a common thread running through
the different cases: in each instance, it seems that the direct
object expression has the property that it requires 'control'--
similar but not identical to the control of infinitives and
headless gerunds, and that although in the case of predicational
nouns the subject may play a role in the control of the direct
object, the indirect object must play a role. A striking
syntactic fact concerning this class of cases is that the
prepositional dative construction by and large fails to occur.
It would be of interest if this fact could be made to follow
from the semantic properties of such sentences.
We proposed above in section 2 the following implica-
tion, repeated below:
64) If a verb occurs in the double object construction
and has the transferrance property, it occurs in
the prepositional dative construction as well.
If an expression denotes an inalienable property, by the very
meaning of 'inalienable', the denotation of the expression can
be a property of at most one individual.35 Therefore, in cases
of the double object construction, if the direct object is an
expression with an inalienable interpretation, it cannot satisfy
the definition of transferrance, since in order to do so, both
the referent of the subject and the referent of the indirect
object would have to both have (at one time or another) the
(same) manifestation of an inalienable property. But this is
senseless.
A similar argument holds for the, predicational nouns.
As we tried to demonstrate above, the truth-conditions for
double object constructions in which the direct object is a
predicational noun state that the predicate from which the
predicational noun is derived is true of the indirect object
(and possibly of the subject as well, in the case of predicational
nouns derived from two-place predicates): transferrance would
appear to be inapplicable to the role an individual plays in a
(single) action.
Such an argument can be extended only partially to the
case in which the direct object is a relational expression.
Only inalienable relations (like those based on genetic relation-
ships) can be handled. In the case of social relationships,
there is obviously a way in which transferrance could be satisfied.
In fact, there are sentences based on such transferrance:
65) Dr. Johnson bequeathed Dr. Smith his patients.
Roughly, (65) is true in cases in which those who were once
Dr. Johnson's patients became Dr. Smith's patients. I am not
sure how to treat such cases, however,
In any case, although the implication stated in (64)
is consistent with the observations made here, we would prefer
a generalization which would rule out the possibility of such
cases occurring in the prepositional construction. I shall
defer this matter until a fuller analysis of the prepositional
cases has been discussed.
3.4.1 We have postulated various ways in which sentences with
give are to be interpreted in the double object construction.
Thus, if the conditions under which one or another of our rules
of interpretation applies are met, the sentence in question
should have the specified interpretation. In cases in which
more than one set of conditions is satisfied, the sentence in
question should have more than one reading. This is in fact the
case, and our rules account for ambiguities like the following:
66) The doctor gave Mary an attractive skin.36
67) Dr. Frankenstein gave the monster a strange look.
Tn (66), 'an attractive skin''is either an expression with an
inalienable interpretation or simply an indefinite description
of a physical object, i.e., a piece of leather for example. In
(67), 'a strange look' is either an expression with an inalien-
able interpretation (cf. 'The monster has a strange look') or a
predicational noun (cf. 'Dr. Frankenstein looked at the monster
strangely').
Some idiomatic expressions.3.4.2
Before leaving the domain of the interpretation of
give in the double object construction, it is of interest to
observe some idiomatic cases which are assimilable to the treat-
ment we have suggested above.
Consider first a sentence like:
68) The doctor gave Jack a shot.
This sentence has several readings. On one it is paraphrasable
by 'The doctor gave Jack an injection'. On a second, it is
elliptical for 'The doctor gave Jack a shot at it', which is
roughly equivalent to 'The doctor gave Jack a try at it'.
In terms of our classification of expressions, both
of these readings ought to be generated as a result of the rule
which applies in the case in which the direct object is a
predicational noun. However, it is evident that although there
exists a verb to shoot and a noun shot, there is no very close
relation between these lexical items and the senses of shot in
(68).
Suppose we extend the theory in the following way: we
will say that the lexical range of the concept 'predicational
noun' includes nominals for which there is no corresponding verb
morphologically, but for which there is a semantically related
predicate. In other words, the lexicon will contain specifica-
tions for shot as follows:
69) [shot]N/ (predicational noun associated with the
predicatel'x inject y'...)
70) [shot]N, + [ at NP], (predicational noun,
associated with the predicate 'x try
(NP),12
By specifying that shot occurs as a predicational noun with vary-
ing argument-places, depending on the sense attached, we immediate-
ly account for certain aspects of its distribution, as well as
give the basis for the sort of interpretation it receives as the
direct object in double object construction with gave.
Such expressions are usually treated as idioms. In
constructions with give, what is idiomatic is in many cases
simply the interpretation of the direct object, and therefore
isolable. Consider such cases as:
71) The editor gave the manuscript a once-over.
(The editor inspected the manuscript in such and
such a way.)
72) Ford gave Rockefeller the nod.
(Ford chose Rockefeller)
73) Rockefeller gave Ford a tip-of-the-hat.
(Rockefeller acknowledged Ford in such and such a
way.)
74) The vacation gave me a break.
(The vacation let me rest.)
Although the glosses in parentheses are only intended as crude
indications of the interpretation of such sentences, it would
appear that we can assimilate all of these cases to the category
of predicational nouns. There are also clearly cases of idiomatic
expressions which receive an inalienable interpretation:
75) The movie gave me the creeps.
In certain cases, however, it is not so clear to what category
of our present inventory we should assign a given idiomatic
expression. For instance:
76) John has been giving me trouble.
The surprising thing about such cases, however, is the pervasive-
ness of idiomatic interpretations. For example, consider (77)
77) We sent the general a messenger.
Here we have an interpretation in which the general is sent a
messenger so that he has a messenger at his disposal. But there
seems to be a reading as well in which what is indicated is
merely that the general was sent a message. We may attribute
this second reading to the fact that 'a messenger' can be con-
strued as a predicational noun. But although we have a framework
in which to interpret such sentences, more general principles are
needed to account for when such interpretations are available.
4.0 A notable fact about what we have called the 'third
reading' of sentences with give is that the prepositional
dative construction is not available--or if so only in certain
rather special cases. It is, of course, of descriptive interest
to classify the various instances in which the 'third reading'
is available. A more satisfactory theory, however, would attempt
to relate the syntactic distribution of this reading more closely
to aspects of underlying structure.
We noted at the end of Section 3 that there are several
factors which distinguish the syntactic properties of the sentences
which can bear the third reading from those in which the first
two readings only are available. For instance, a common aspect
of the three special cases discussed in 3.1 - 3.3 is that whenever
the third reading is available, the direct object had the property
that it was not a common referring expression. We postulated
that in all of these cases, the direct object was 'incomplete'
and devised a set of rules--somewhat idiosyncratic for each case,
to be sure--which assigned a reading to the empty argument place.
But we also noted that the availability of the third
reading had other consequences--among them, a freedom of
selection with respect to the subject. If we want a comprehensive
theory of the occurrence possibilities available for each reading,
this fact should be taken into account. Yet, it is almost as if
we have a superfluity of properties on which to hang the non-
occurrence of both forms: the causal nature of the interpretation
assigned to the 'third reading'; the properties of the subject,
e.g. the freedom of selection; the properties of the direct
object, e.g. their 'incompleteness', properties of the indirect
object, i.e., relaxation of the condition of animacy.
First, I will propose that in all cases in which the
third reading is available, the double object construction is
base-generated, since to assume the opposite is to commit oneself
to the existence of some abstract form which distinguishes these
cases from the other cases which undergo the dative alternation.
I have mentioned some of the difficulties which arise if we
derive these constructions from a causative structure: we will
have an opportunity to consider this possibility in a slightly
different context (e.g. at the end of section 4.5), but there are
general considerations which militate against this whole approach
(cf. Fodor, 1970). If we generate such sentences in the pre-
positional dative construction, then we must postulate the
existence of a rich enough set of devices to distinguish the
sentences which have this third reading and map them obligatorily
into the double object construction. But such power is either
not available in present theories or else it is theoretically
undesirable: we must either be able to refer to the fact that a
phrase-maker has been assigned a certain interpretation, which
involves global rules or ad hoc features, or we must be able to
refer to various properties of the constituents of the sentence
in such a way that we increase the power of transformations.
The assumption that these sentences are base-generated
avoids such problems: there is no difficulty in accounting for
the syntactic form which these sentences take; and we have a
structural difference on which to hang the differences we find
in interpretation.37
In the ensuing sections, we will discuss other aspects
of the double object construction. First, we shall take up the
analysis of two other rather versatile verbs: teach and show.
Our purpose will be to show that on a variety of interpretations,
these two verbs are restricted to the doublie object structure,
and that in a general way, the interpretations at issue form a
natural class with those which we have discussed as the 'third
reading' of sentences with give.
4.1 In the case of give, it is a striking fact that in
almost all cases, certain aspects of the interpretation can be
roughly paraphrased with sentences employing have or get. I
will argue below that this is not a result of these lexical items
occurring in the derivation of sentences involving give, either
as part of the phrase-maker into which the lexical item give is
inserted or as part of the lexical representation of give.
Rather, I will propose a purely semantic account of this fact.
In the case of other verbs which occur in the dative
constructions, there are similar cases of a connection with
another lexical item. The two most striking cases of this are
the pairs teach and learn, on the one hand, and show and see,
on the other. But as with give and have/get, the correspondence
between the elements of each pair is far from perfect. We shall
see this below.
4.2 We base our remarks concerning teach on the following
32 sentences.
1) Faustroll taught.
2) Faustroll taught pataphysics.
3) Faustroll taught the sixth grade.
4) Faustroll taught the sixth grade pataphysics.
5) Faustroll taught pataphysics to the sixth grade.
6) Erwin taught the procedure to us for six weeks.
in six weeks.
7) Erwin taught us the procedure *for six weeks.
I in six weeks.i
8) John taught me the way to Inman Square.
9) *John taught the way to Inman Square to me.
10) John taught me what the way to Inman Square is.
11) John told me Harry's suggestion.
12) John taught me what Harry's suggestion was.
13) *John taught me Harry's suggestion.
14) John taught me Harry's solution.
15) *John taught the way to Inman Square.
16) Tomorrow, I'll teach *(the kids) that Shakespeare penned the
immortal lines: "If music be the food of love, play on,/
Give me excess of it...
17) Christ taught that the meek shall inherit the earth.
18) Jack taught me to swim.
19) Jack taught me not to make omelettes in oil.
never to smoke.
20) Jack taught me to use the Australian crawl in heavy seas.
[do
21) $Jack taught me how to uselthe Australian crawl in heavy seas.
[do
22) Peachum's treachery taught the gang to use more caution.
23) /Peachum's treachery taught the gang how to use more caution.
24) Peachum's treachery taught the gang not to gossip so much.
25)/*Peachum's treachery taught the gang how not to gossip so much.
26) Lestrade's trampling of the crucial footprint taught Holmes
that he was not a man of much sophistication.
27) The sheet music on the piano taught Holmes a few things
concerning the lodger's taste and general attitude toward life.
28) The Grundzu-ge teaches students an important approach to
phonological theory.
29) Katya taught me Russian.
30) Katya taught Russian to me.
31) Lipson's textbook taught me Russian.
32) *Lipson's textbook taught Russian to me.
It is evident that an attempt to derive all instances
of the dual-NP (or V NP S, V NP VP) type from some other structure
faces immediate difficulties of both a syntactic and semantic
kind. Note first of all that the distinction between the double
object construction and the to-dative construction is conditioned
by the subject (29-32), controls the choice of time adverbials
in some cases (6-7), and for the most part is not freely available.
As one can see from these examples, teach has two
prevailing senses: one is roughly equivalent to CAUSE X to
know/learn, the other corresponds to an activity associated with
this goal (in a not very direct way in many cases). These two
senses are related to the distinction between the first two
readings of give discussed in section 1 and the third reading.
We first systematize the data given above and then attempt to
explicate the relevance of the correlation with these two types
of interpretive schema.
33) TEACH
a) NP. V (cf. (1))
NP. is [+ human]
V predicates the (generic) activity of teaching
of NP.
1
b) NP. V NP (cf. (2))i k (c.()
NP. is [+ human]
NPk is an 'academic subject' (or a subject to
which some teaching procedure is associated)
V predicates the (generic) activity of teaching
of NP.
NPk specifies the content involved
c) NP. V NP. (cf. (3))
1 3
NP., NP. are [+ human]
V predicates the activity of teaching of NP
specifies the audience or goal
V NP.
ci NP,_ (cf. (4))
NP., NP. are [+ human]
is an 'academic subject' (vide supra)
i) prior to t
ii) at to, V predicates the activity of
teaching of NP , with the
specified by NPk
iii) NP. specifies the audience/goal
e) NP.
[same
V NPk to NP. (cf. (5))
as (d) above]
f) NP. V NP. NP
ij k
NP ,
NPk
NP
(cf. (6-16))
are [+ human]
denotes information not
'academic subject'
i) prior to to,
ii) at t0,
specific
-K(NP., NPk)
M(NP1 , K(NP , NPk)), where
'M(x,Y)' is interpreted as a 'causal'
relation
V k
that SJ
(cf. (17))
NP. is [+ human] or represents a literary work
is a set of religious, ethical, political,
S... maxims
NP.
d) NP.
NPk
content
to an
g) NP.
iNP k
that
0, -K(NP , NPk)
S
(b) above]
h) NP. V NP. VP
NP. is [+ human]
i) prior to
(cf. (18))
t0, -A(NP VP), where 'A(x,VP)'
is interpreted as x has the
capability to VP
M(NP1 , A(NP., VP)), where
is interpreted as a 'causal'
V NP.
3
VP
is [+ human]
i) prior to
relation
(cf. (19-25))
t0 , -W(NP , VP) where 'W(xVP)'
is interpreted either as 'x is
that x should VP' or 'x believes that
x should
ii) at t0,
V NP. NPk
that
M(NP
S}
VP? or 'x generically VP'
, W(NP . NPk
(cf. (26-27))
NP. is [+ human]
denotes
i) prior to
ii) at t0,2
an intellectual construct
(NP
t 0 that S
M(NP
~NP
, K(NP , k
,that S1
where
is interpreted as a 'causal'
relation
ii) at t0,
i) NP.
NP.
3
aware
j) NP.
i1
{NP k
that SI
[same as
'M(x,Y)'I
'M(x,9Y)' I
The distinction between the activity sense of teach
and its causal counterpart is crucial. The activity inter-
pretation is impossible if the subject of teach is [-animate].
Note then that whenever the subject is [-animate], the indirect
object is obligatory and the to-phrase is impossible:
34) a) The defeat taught (*to) the administration
that Congress was not to be fooled with.
b) *The defeat taught that Congress was not to be
fooled with.
35) a) Lipson's textbook taught me Russian.
b) *Lipson's textbook taught Russian to me.
c) *Lipson's textbook taught Russian.
In fact, the only cases in which a to-phrase is possible are
those cases for which an activity reading is possible, and the
activity reading, in turn, seems to be associated with the
tendency for the direct object to be interpreted as what I
called above an 'academic subject'. The concept 'academic subject'
is hardly a technical term, and what counts as one seems to be
a matter which purely grammatical considerations are ill-equipped
to settle. There seems to be only one constraint involved, and
that is that in order to generate sentences in which the activity
reading is permitted, the direct object must be an NP, not S or
VP. 39 But this single requirement is obviously too general, as
sentences like (9) illustrate.4 o
If more content could be given to this notion, then we
would have at least a descriptive way of accounting for when
the to-phrase is available. Finally, note that if the activity
interpretation is possible, then there is no implication that the
indirect object has actually learned anything. In every other
case, some effect on the individuals represented by the indirect
object is entailed.
The most problematic case, then is something like (33):
37) Max is teaching the class trigonometry.
Is this simply vague between the activity interpretation and the
causal interpretation, or really ambiguous? If the sort of test
based on conjuncippis valid, then I think that we have to side with
two distinct readings: the sentence below seems to me to have
two readings (which I try to bring out in the parenthesized
continuations):
38) Max is teaching the class trigonometry because
Harold wasn't able to.
a) he (Harold) came down with the flu)
b) he (Harold was incompetent--he couldn't tell
a sine from a cosine and the kids weren't
learning a thing.)
There is no ambiguity at all in (39), which has only the activity
interpretation.
39) Max is teaching trig to the class because Harold
wasn't able to.
The activity sense I am trying to convey here of course does not
entail the absence of learning.
A further indication of the existence of two readings
is the interpretation of the progressive aspect: in one case,
it simply indicates the extended nature of the activity; in the
other it indicates progress toward a goal, namely K(NP., X).
(cf. Vendler, 1967).
If all of this is correct, then we have a choice between
generating these-sentences in two structures: the double object
structure and the to-dative structure, assigning the first a
causal interpretation in every case, assigning the second an
activity interpretation in every case, and postulating a to-dative
rule; or we generate both syntactic types and add an interpretive
rule for the special case of school-room instruction which
optionally assigns an activity interpretation to an underlying
double object structure.
The relevant syntactic data (for this case) is the
following:
40) Max taught the children
*to the children
41) Max gave to the United Fund
*the United Fund.
42) Max paid 'the bank.
*to the bank.
off the bank.
*off to the bank.
43) Max wrote Henderson.
to Henderson.
off to Henderson.
*off Henderson.
(40) has only the activity reading. We can see that the deriva-
tion of (40) from a to-phrase is not a fact which is amenable to
general statement, unless we are willing to countenance obligat-
ory rule features to mark positive absolute exceptions. The
alternative is lexical specification. Neither alternative is
very elegant or appealing. But which we choose depends on the
type of transformational power we wish to allow. If we rule out
the exception features, we have either a theory in which the
appearance of to with the goal phrase can be accounted for by a
set of rules like the following:
44) to + 0/ teach NP
to + 0/ write NP (optional)
Or, we adopt the solut-ion based on lexical specification and an
extension of the interpretive devices.
One piece of evidence for the latter choice is that
pairs like:
45) I wrote to Henderson.
46) I wrote Henderson.
are somewhat distinct. With sentences like (45) it is possible
to append adjuncts like but I destroyed the letter. Adding this
to (46) produces a conflict of at least minor proportions. We
return to this problem later.
Independent lexical specification can at least describe
such situations in a way that is no different from the normal
case. One would like to be able to have a more general theory
however.
This concludes our discussion of teach.
4.3 I turn now to a brief discussion of the verb show. I
will first give evidence for the existence of a 'causal' inter-
pretation of the double object construction with show.
47) Attila showed me the destruction of Rome.
NP. show NP. NPk
i) at t0, R(NPJ, NPk), where R is interpreted
as 'NP. sees NP k
ii) at t0, M(NP1 , R(NP., NPk), where M is a
'causal' relation.
48) Reading the Bible showed me that I was a miserable
sinner.
NP. show NP. X, where X = syntactically NP, or S.
i) at t0 , R(NP., X), where R is interpreted
'NP. know X'
ii) at t0 , M(NP1 , R(NP., X), where M is a
'causal' relation.
These two interpretations of R, the visual and the cognitive,
provide an undercurrent of ambiguity in the 'causal' reading.
Thus, consider:
49) John showed me how to iron sheets.
(49) is ambiguous between the readings given in (47) and (48).
We may paraphrase the readings as follows:
50) John demonstrated to me how it is done (although
in spite of the fact that I saw him do it I still
don't understand how it is done).
51) John's demonstrations taught me how it is done.
One may be tempted to complain that these senses are not to be
distinguished semantically. Nevertheless, there are cases in
which only reading is available:
52) & John showed me the value of a good penknife.
Now I know why one comes in handy in the woods.
The tag read $4.98.
53) 9 Getting lost in the woods showed me the value
of a good penknife.
Now I know why one comes in handy in the woods.
??The tag read $5.98.
54) & The price tag shows the customer the value of
the penknife.
{The tag reads $6.98.
??Now I know why one comes in handy in the woods.
55) ?*Turning the tag over showed me the value of a
good penknife.
As in the case of many sentences with give, the possibility
of ambiguity is correlated with the ambiguity of the direct
object. The interpretation of the subject plays a role here
as well. We need to make a variety of distinctions. First,
concerning the subject, we set up three groups:
56) A.
B.
C.
Animates (agentive)
concrete objects.
abstracts (headless gerunds, NPs- denoting
experiences,...)
Concerning the direct object, we divide things into three groups:
57) A. visual events
B. visual objects
C. cognitive objects
The indirect object is always
This results in the
58)
1.
NP.
I
show
Animate
2. Concrete Object
3. Abstract
[+ animate].
following possible combinations:
NP.
Animate
Animate
Animate
X
a) visual event
b) visual object
c) cognitive object
a) visual event
b) visual object
c) cognitive object
a) visual event
b) visual object
c) cognitive object
Not all possibilities exist. Consider:
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59a) Attila showed me the destruction of Rome
his army destroying Rome
how to use a sword (though I
still don't understand how)
59b) Attila showed me his (rusty, chipped) sword.
59c) Attila showed me (the strength of his sword.
how to sharpen a sword (and
now I understand how)
60a) *The vantage point showed me the destruction of
Rome.
60b) The price tag shows the customer the value--$7.98.
60c) *The price tag shows the customer what a poverty-
stricken wretch he is.
61a) *Sitting at the top of the arena showed me the
execution of the bull.
61b) *Reaching the summit showed me the Eiger.
[*Standing on the summitl
61c) Watching Attila practice showed me
the strength of his sword
how to wield a short-sword.
First, a word about the good example in the second
category (60b), as examples of this type constitute a rather
interesting case. Notice that the indirect object is optional
in these constructions (but not replaceable by to + NP).
Second, there is a relation here between NP. and NP k--namely,
NPk is an intrinsic visual property of NP. Thus:
62) The steps of Building 20 show the marks of
hard wear.
63) #?*The steps of Building 20 show what the marks
of hard wear are.
Characteristically, such sentences do not describe an action,
but a state. Perhaps this accounts for their bias toward
generically-interpreted indirect objects:
64) ?*The steps of Building 20 show me the marks
of hard wear.
65) The price tag showed (?*only a few people'the value
customers
?me
Assuming that these generalizations are correct, we set up a
system of interpretation:
66) NP show (NP.) NPk, where NP is a physical
object.
i) NPk is an intrinsic visible property of NP
ii) at t0 , R(NP., NPk), where R is interpreted
'NP. see NP '3 k
iii) at t0, M(NP, R(NPJ, NPk)), where 'M(x,Y)'
is a 'causal' relation
Turning to the other examples, for the third category we set
up the following interpretive schema:
67) NP show NP. NPk, where NP is interpreted
abstractly
i) at t0, R(NP., NPk) where R is interpreted
'NP. know NP *'
3 k
ii) at t0, M(NP 1, R(NP., NP where M is a
'causal' relation.
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The first category is the most complex. We begin by
noting that a [+ animate] subject may be construed abstractly,
thus falling under the interpretive schema immediately above.
Perhaps we may incorporate examples like (59c) into this schema,
merely adding that an agentive interpretation is possible. An
agentive interpretation seems to entail that in e.g. (59c),
Attila undertook some action in order to bring about R(NP., NPk
I am not quite sure how to represent this and leave the problem
open.
Although we class (59c) with the third category, not-
ing that it differs with respect to the optional ascription of
agentivity, (59a) and (59b) differ in that an agentive inter-
pretation appears to be obligatory. Agentivity is to be
distinguished here from intention. In other words, both (59a)
and (59b) (as well as (59c) on an agentive reading) are compat-
ible with adverbs like unintentionally, inadvertently, and so
on. They are not compatible with adverbs like without doing
a thing. An interesting problem, then, is to characterize the
relation of the action undertaken by the subject and R(NPj, NPk).
I have in mind situations like:
LBJ showed a group of reporters his scars.
It happens to be the case that LBJ showed someone his scar.
Let us assume that it was a group of reporters. Further let
us assume that an industrious film crew videotaped the event
and it was shown on a network news broadcast. It would not
be appropriate then to say:
LBJ showed the American public his scar.
Is this merely the spectre of direct/indirect causation rearing
its meddlesom head again? In part, probably yes. But perhaps
not altogether. Perhaps we can contribute to the clarification
of this problem by representing this case as follows:
68) NP. show NP. NPk
Animate animate visual object, visual event.
i) at t0, V(NP ) where V is some action.
ii) at t0, R(NPJ, NPk), where R is interpreted
'NP. see NP 'i k
iii) M(V(NP.), R(NP., NP k)), where M is a 'causal'
relation.
This completes our discussion of the range of show
in the double object construction.
4.4 The discussion of teach and show above has attempted
to demonstrate the existence of other verbs besides give which
clearly have to receive multiple subcategorization in the
lexicon: in particular, a subcategorization for the double
object construction. Of particular interest is the fact that,
generally speaking, in the cases in which these verbs are
restricted to the double object construction, the interpreta-
tion associated with this structure is similar in certain crucial
respects to the 'third reading' of give discussed previously,
particularly with respect to its 'causal' character. In the
next section, we explore this similarity further.
4.5 We have assumed that the different interpretations
in the case of verbs like give, teach, and show are the mani-
festation of different semantic rules applying to structures
which contain these verbs. It is of interest to contrast this
approach with a transformational alternative, particularly in
cases in which the interpretation contains what I have called
a 'causal' relation. Basically, the transformational approach
will assign a structure like the following as the structure
underlying sentences (with a 'causal' interpretation) contain-
ing give, or teach, or show.
69) S
NP. VP
1z
V SM
NP. VP
J
VR NPk
In this structure, 'NP.', 'NP', 'NPk' represent the subject,
indirect object, and direct object of the double object con-
struction respectively; 'VM' represents a 'causal' verb, 'VR
represents an embedded verb associated with the verb of the
double object construction. There are several routes one can
now take to generate the appropriate range of sentences: one
involves predicate-raising; another would involve deletion
of V For our purposes these are equivalent.
The transformational analysis is based on two claims:
1) the selectional and subcategorizational properties of the
derived sentence are a consequence of the selectional and
subcategorizational properties of the underlying structure;
2) the interpretation of the derived sentence follows from the
interpretation accorded to the underlying structure.
I think that both of these claims are in fact not
borne out. To claim the above is to claim that the properties
of certain words follow from the properties of certain other
words. In the theory that has been employed here, the claim is
that the relation between the properties of some words and the
properties of other words follows from the intersection of the
sets of semantic relations that each word represents.
The difficulties in the way of a transformational
account of the 'causal' nature of the constructions we are
considering are quite serious. As is well-known, the lexical
item 'cause' does not adequately represent the concept of
causation which is usually called for. For example, although
one might say
70) The cat caused the soup to have a spicy flavor
by knocking 3 heads of garlic into it with
his tail.
one would hardly say (in such a circumstance)
71) The cat gave the soup a spicy flavor by knocking
3 heads of garlic into it with his tail.
It's sometimes proposed that one may avoid such
problems by postulating an abstract lexical item 'CAUSE' which
more closely resembles the desired semantic concept of causa-
tion. But this would apparently remove the empirical content
from the theory altogether, for then the second claim listed
above--that the interpretation of the derived sentence follows
from the interpretation accorded to the underlying structure--
follows by hypothesis, and the first is empirically vacuous as
well, since there is no way of determining the selectional and
subcategorizational properties of abstract lexical items
except by stipulation.
There are difficulties with the embedded predicate
as well, which is represented in (69) by 'V . For example,
compare the following sentences:
72 a) John has an ugly appearance.
b) The operation caused John to have an ugly
appearance.
c) The operation gave John an ugly appearance.
73 a) *John has his ugly appearance.42
b)?*The operation caused John to have his ugly
appearance.
c) The operation gave John his ugly appearance.
In the interests of symmetry, surely (72c) and (73c) should
receive parallel treatments. Yet in the absence of auxiliary
hypotheses to explain the badness of (73a), the causative
analysis will not generate (73c).
Another difficulty faced by the transformational
approach concerns the fact that there are well-formed sentences
with the verb cause and the embedded verb have for which there
is no corresponding sentence with give:
74) Ziegler's absent-mindedness caused him to have
an accident.
75) *Ziegler's absent-mindedness gave him an accident.
Evidently there is some property of sentences like John had an
accident which would prevent the causative construction in
which they are embedded from undergoing a transformational
derivation into the double object construction. 43 But it
seems extremely implausible to argue that a different verb
have is involved here: have often seems to play the role of
a syntactic place-holder and one may wonder whether it should
be treated as a lexical item at all. Furthermore, if we start
distinguishing different 'senses' of have, the one attractive
generalization about the 'causal' interpretation of double
object sentences with give that the transformational hypothesis
makes seems to disappear: for instead of having united a
disparate group of cases by referring to have, the transforma-
tional approach is back at scratch.
Still, even if the transformational approach is not
entirely satisfactory, it does seem to provide a means of
treating a large group of cases. If we want to replace the
transformational analysis, we shall have to suggest an alterna-
tive. It is at this point, I think, that a substantive theory
of semantic concepts would be useful. Such a theory might be
able to account for why it is often the case that if two words
represent related concepts, they exhibit semantic extensions
in similar ways. Although I am unable to present such a theory--
or even the main outlines of such a theory--I would like to
suggest here why its development would be useful.
It's a striking fact that the word see has both a
visual and a cognitive sense, and we find a similar range of
senses with show. But this is not a fact about English: in
the languages with which I have some familiarity, the word
corresponding to see has much the same semantic range. This
is also true for other areas of the vocabulary, especially with
respect to basic words like grasp. This seems to be the case
regardless of whether there is a genetic relationship between
the languages in question. Such considerations also play a role
in syntactic change. Isa~enko (1974) presents a compelling
illustration of this, in a paper devoted to a typological
distinction between what he calls 'have-languages' and 'be-
languages':
2. It is well-known that Indo-European was a [be-
language] and that the verbal stems *es- and *bhu-
very early merged into a suppletive paradigm pre-
served in most historically attested IE idioms. It
is also known that verbs meaning 'have' are secondary
acquisitions in all IE languages and that such verbs
stem from transitive verbs with the general meaning
'to hold, to grasp'. This is true of Greek EK)(S
'to have' (originally 'to hold'), of Latin habere
which is related to capere 'to catch, get hold of';
it is true of Germanic *habai- which yielded ME have,
Germ haben and is not related to Latin habere, but
to Goth hafjan, ME heave, Germ heben; the Slavic verb
*j~meti, 'to have' (R imet'/imeju, Cz miti/mam,
Slk mat'/mam, etc.) is formed from the root *jzm-
as attested in OCS jeti (from *jem-ti) 'to take'.
The semantic change 'take' + 'have' occurred in
historical times in Spanish, where tengo 'I have'
is derived from VLat tenire 'to holdTfootnotes omitted]
To deal with such facts, what one would like is a
substantive theory of semantic structure which would deal with
various degrees of paraphrase, semantic shifts, certain universal
aspects of metaphor, and so on. Note that the desideratum is
not a theory of words--the word itself is relatively arbitrary--
but rather a formal and substantive theory of what lies behind
the words. I have suggested above that to analyze words like
give as being composed other lexical items leads to the wrong
results. Perhaps a theory of the semantic structure of lexical
items along the lines suggested here would improve on this.
5.0 The final aspect of the dual-NP construction that I
want to touch on involves time and modality. In this section I
shall attempt to elucidate the relevance of these concepts to
the dative constructions.
We begin with the role of time. We distinguish two
relevant notions: first, the time to which the tense refers;
second, the temporal relations which take as their arguments the
tense referent and the time at which the various semantic
relations which are the basis of the interpretation hold. We
shall be concerned only with the latter.
In the simplest cases, the relation R(NP , NPk) holds
at t0, the tense-referent. It is probably a requirement on every
interpretive schema that some relation holds at t There are
other possibilities: R could hold prior to t0 (only), prior to
some t' prior to t0 (prior to t0 and discontinuous with it), at
t and after t,, at some t' after t0 (discontinuous with t3
both prior to t0 and after t . Schematically, we represent these
possibilities as follows, where the solid horizontal line repre-
sents time and t0 the tense referent. 4
1)t
TIME
R1
RR ..
R 2
R3
R4
R
5
R6 "
5.1 Thus far, we have encountered only instances of the
first two types (where Rn represents the different possibili-
ties schematized in (1)):
2) Ri: John gave Max a used copy of Aspects.
3) R2: John gave Max a kick.
5.2 Consider R3. With respect to NPs within the VP, R3
is appropriate in privative verbs. Williams (1974) has discus-
sed certain aspects of a very interesting phenomenon he calls
"negative dative movement." This involves syntactic (and some-
times lexical) alternations between of/from, particularly as
follows:
4) NP. V NP. of NPk NP. V' NPk from NP.
5) John emptied the tank of gas.
6) ?John emptied gas from the tank.
R3 is appropriate here, for instance in the interpretation of a
sentence like
7) Arnold robbed me of my wa11et.45
The R3 type also plays a role in the dual-NP construc-
tion. Consider the verb to lose, as it is used in the following
sentences (from Bowers, 1973):
8) That decision lost me a lot of friends
my reputation
my fortune
a valuable piece of land.
Let us suppose that the interpretation of lose is as follows:
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9) NP. lose NP. NP
i) prior to t0, R(NP., NPk)
ii) at t0, -R(NP , NPk)
iii) M(NP., -R(NP., NP k)
There are other analyses possible here. It is instructive to
compare the interpretations of rob and lose with that of cost
in sentences like:
10) The movie cost me $5.
11) The mistake cost me my chance.
12) Nixon's implication in an act of obstructing
justice cost him the presidency.
13) Eagleton cost McGovern the presidency.
14) Getting to work late cost Arnold his job.
The problem here is to determine what type of relation Rn holds
between NP and NPk. In particular, the choice is between the
following two schemata:
15) I. i) prior to to, R(NP , NPk)
ii) at t0, -R(NP , NPk)
II. i) at t0, -R(NP , NPk)
This is a factual question. We can test the claims of these
two schemata by contradicting the relations involved. Since
they both share one statement, the crucial aspect will involve
the claim that is stated in I(1). Thus, consider:
16) The revelations concerning Eagleton cost
McGovern the presidency.
17) ??The revelations concerning Eagleton lost
McGovern the presidency.
18) The revelations concerning the plumbers lost
Nixon the presidency.
19) The decision to fold cost me a good deal of
money that I would have won.
20) ??The decision to fold lost me a good deal of
money that I would have won.
21) The decision to fold lost me all the money I
had previously bet.
These judgments are rather subtle, I suppose. Assuming that they
are correct, however, we represent lose as containing a statement
of the type R3, whereas the interpretation of cost will include
either:
at to, -R(NP , NPk
or
at t0 , and immediately after T, -R(NP , NPk)
in other words, the negation of a relation of type R or R2'
The combination of -R and the causal
relation suggests that cost is similar to counterfactual
conditions. Thus the interpretation of
22) Eagleton cost McGovern the presidency.
is very similar in meaning to the sentence
23) If it hadn't been for Eagleton, McGovern would
have (won) the presidency.
I will not attempt to state this formally here, however.
Note that such a paraphrase fails for the use of cost
illustrated in (6):
24) The movie cost me $5.
25) /If it hadn't been for the movie, I would have
had (that) $5.
Thus, we must distinguish this sense of cost. Recall the dis-
cussion of the use of show in: The price tag shows (NP) the
(cf. section 4.3). There we claimed:
26) NP show (NP ) NPk, where NP. is a concrete object.
value.
i) NPk is an intrinsic visible property of NP
ii) at t0, R(NP , NPk), where R is roughly see
in the visual sense.
iii) at t0, M(NP1 , R(NP , NPk)), where M is
'causal'.
The interpretation of cost in (24) is similar. We represent it
as follows:
27) NP cost (NP.) NPk
1. At t0 P(NP ) = NPk, where P(x) is the
function 'the price of x'
2. R(NP., NP.)-+ -H(NP., NP k) where H(x,y)
is custody.
This schema leaves certain questions open, e.g. how to precisely
represent the fact that the loss of money is tied up with the
acquisition by NP. of NP.. Note that for the relation 'R'3 i
there doesn't seem to be a single English work which represents
the appropriate range of interpretations. The range is broad
and further specification is necessary:
28) The book
The vacation
Tuition cost me X dollars.
The operation
The fine
It will have been noticed that we have made some
innovations in our notation, adopting functions as well as
implication. The function P seems to be necessary to rule out
sentences like
29) *Eagleton cost McGovern $5.
30) *The decision to go costs $5.98.
5.3 Let us now consider R . This type represents the case
in which a relation holds both prior to and after the tense-
referent. This type is relevant to verbs like envy and forgive.
With both envy and forgive there is an implied (and pragmatically
specifiable) relation between NP. and NP .
Consider forgive. Here the relevant R(NPJ, NPk) is
roughly responsibility. Consider
31) God will forgive me my sins.
32) God will forgive me Harry's sins.
(2) may seem strange, but circumstances are easily constructible
in which its grammaticality is without doubt, though its truth
might be contested. All that is necessary is that the me of
(32) be responsible for Harry's sins. One needs to add of course
that what is represented by NPk here is considered counter to
a certain body of ethical or religious tenets. I will simply
smuggle this into the relation I adopt as holding between NP.
and the responsibility relation, which is absolution. We leave
as an open question whether absolution is construed as dissolv-
ing the responsibility relation. This is a matter for theologians.
We will assume that it is not the case.
We will treat envy in a similar way. In both cases,
there will be a relation R(NPj, NPk). Furthermore, there will
be a (mental, attitudinal, or what not) relation that holds
between NP and this relation. In other words, we will say
11that although there is a relation A holding between NP. and
R(NP , NPk), A does not materially affect R.
Compare the effects of negation on sentences whose
verb is forgive or envy with those in which the verb is give
33) God didn't forgive me my sins.
that mistake.
those inhumane acts of
omission.
34) I don't envy Gabriel the ability to fly.
35) I didn't give Mary a copy of Aspects.
36) I didn't throw Mary the ball.
In these cases, the relevant relations which are specified by
envy and forgive are not (in the simplest and most readily
available cases) called into question.
We represent forgive and envy as follows:
37) NP forgive NP NPk
i) for some span tm... t.0 *. tn R(NP , NP 0
where R represents responsibility.
ii) F(NP., R(NP., NPk), where F represents
absolution.
38) NP. envy NP. NP
1 j k
i) for some span tm ... t 0 . *tn R(NP , NPk)
ii) E(NP , R(NP., NP k), where E represents a
desire on the part of NP that R(NP., NPk)
hold.
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5.4 We now turn to the question of whether there exist any
examples which employ the types R5 or R Recall that these
represent the following temporal situations:
t0
39) time-----------------------------
R-5-------
R5
R6
I know of no case for which R5 is appropriate. This may not be
an accidental gap. In order to show that it is not accidental,
however, it would be necessary to argue that its non-existence
follows from more general considerations.
R6 seems to be appropriate for verbs like offer, verbs
like send, and dual-NP constructions which have a for-dative
paraphrase. Let's first consider the verb offer.
40) John offered Max a cigarette.
Here we are not concerned with the content of the relation which
holds between Max and cigarette. As in other instances of the
dual NP constructions, this may vary. The problem is how to
express the modality of offer properly. First, it is not a
consequence of the truth of (40) that the requisite relation
'R(NP., NP is in force. Therefore, we do not want to state
that 'R(NP., NPk)' holds at t0. Nor will it do simply to state
that 'R(NP., NPk)' holds at some t' after t0 , since it is not
a consequence of (40) that the requisite relation will in fact
ever hold. An alternative is to say that:
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41) i) at t0 , *R(NP , NP k) at t' after t0
ii) M(NP., (Q(R(NP., NPk) at t' > t0 ))), where
M is 'causal'.
Although this is becoming somewhat complex, it is still probably
not quite right. For instance, we probably want to add a
statement that at t0 , -R(NP., NPk), although if we specify 'M'
properly, such a statement may not be necessary. Furthermore,
we might want to make the relation 'N' stronger than stated:
for example, although I might convince Harry to hire Arnold in
a certain capacity, thereby making it possible that Harry have
a job, in doing so I do not thereby offer Harry a job. I leave
open exactly how this is to be done.
A more central question is how to deal with the fact
that an offer can be left open or retracted. This suggests
that we add a time operator to M. Thus we will way:
ii) At t0 and for some span of time t0 .*.tn
M(NP.,(YR(NP., NP k) at t' < t ))).
We will test this in the following way. Consider the sentence:
42) Access to the tapes offered Cox the best evidence.
Notice that (42) does not entail that Co xever had access to
the tapes. I will not take up this problem. On the other hand,
if Cox did in fact have access to the tapes, it might have been
the case that his access lasted only a specified period of time.
In view of this, I think we want to state that the "offer" here
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is limited (at the broadest) to that period in which Cox in fact
did have access. Furthermore, we want to add that the "offer"
expires upon the establishment of R(NP , NPk). But the "offer"
may be still further limited.
43) Access to the tapes offered Cox the best evidence
until it was revealed that a good deal of the
content had been erased.
In such a situation, the access may still hold, while the offer
does not. If this is correct, then, although offer contains an
instance of R the R6 type, this instance is embedded under the
relation 'M' which is actually an instance of R Schematically,
44)
to
time------------ --------------------------------
QO(R(NP , NPk0
t
n
M(NP., Q(R(NP. NP k)))
5.4.1 Compare offer to promise. The crucial distinction
seems to be here the difference between two modal notions:
possibility and obligation. For our purposes, then, the distinc-
tion is easily representable:
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45) NP promise NP NPk
k) At t0 and for some span of time t0.tn
M(NP ,(R(NP , NPk)at tn)), where 'M(x,Y)' is
interpreted 'x is obligated to make Y hold'
From this it cannot be deduced that R is true (at t or at t').
This is consistent with intuition.
5.5 The extension of the system to modal notions immediately
opens the way for an account of the dual-NP reflex of the for-
dative. The relevant modality here is intention. Two preliminary
remarks about the dual-NP reflex of the for-dative. First, as
far as I know, the relation R(NP , NPk) is never entailed; second,
there is always a direct relation between NP and NPk* In other
words, from the truth of the sentence
46) John baked Mary a cake.
it follows, first, that John baked a cake and second, I claim,
that John intends R (Mary, the cake). We represent this as
follows:
47) NP. bake NP. NP
1 .j k
i) At t0, B(NP1 , NPk), where B is bake
ii) At t0... tn, I(NPi, (R(NP, NPk) at t')),
where I = intend, R a relevant relation.
It is rather interesting that the relation I holds at t, rather
than at t'. There is data that supports this assumption.
Consider first the strangeness of a discourse like:
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5) I baked a cake. I think I'll give it to Mary.
No, I guess I'll give it to you. What actually
happened then was that I baked you a cake.
Another example involves the following contrast with an explicit
for-dative. Compare:
6) I bought my wife this tea-kettle, let me see,
back in 1952.
7) Originally, I bought this tea-kettle for my wife,
but I decided to keep it.
8) *Originally, I bought my wife this tea-kettle, but
I decided to keep it.
If we represent the intention relation as holding from the time
of the tense-referent until the time at which R(NP , NPk) holds
(or becomes impossible to establish), we have the basis of an
account for these problems: namely, there is an explicit
contradiction of the intention asserted of the subject that
R(NP., NPk) is to hold at some point.
5.6 In view of our discussion of offer, promise, and the
double-object reflex of the for-dative, it appears to be the
case that we can claim that there are no pure cases of the types
R5 and R . It is true that there exist relations which do not
hold at to. We have ample evidence of this, and they are all
instances of the type R6. Yet when they do occur, it is
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arguably the case that they always occur inside the scope of
a relation which is itself an instance of R 1 . In view of the
fact that an offer can be rescinded whereas a promise cannot
(ethically) be broken nor an asserted intention countermanded,
perhaps a distinction based on the content of the various
modalities is called for. Notice that all the modal notions
employed are future-oriented. Are there any retrospective modals?
If not, this suggests that the lack of any instance of the type
R5 may be due to the lack of retrospective modal notions.
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6.0 In this section, I shall take up the question of what
I call, for convenience, 'the prepositional dative constructions'.
My caution stems from the fact that it is an open question
whether we can construct a theory which renders this class well-
defined. For our purposes, we may begin with the following
necessary condition: a 'prepositional dative construction, is
a simple sentence whose VP (at some level) is of the form
X-V-NP-P-NP-Y, where the fourth term ('P') is either to or for.
I shall argue that in certain respects this definition is too
broad, as there are certain cases which meet the above criterion,
on the one hand, yet should be excluded from the domain of the
dative alternation in a principled way. In part, the principles
which underly this exclusion are the subject of the present
section. We obviously cannot in advance define the prepositional
dative constructions as just the cases for which the double
object construction is an alternative, since this is just the
question at issue. Until further discussion has clarified the
matter, I beg the reader's indulgence for my loose terminology.
Even by the above definition, there are at least two
prepositional dative constructions--one in which the preposition
is to and one in which it is for.4 I treat them together, how-
ever, since with respect to certain gross characteristics which
are of interest they are quite similar. In particular, I shall
try to demonstrate that in the case of both the 'to-dative' and
the 'for-dative' : 1) there are semantic distinctions to be drawn
(in some cases) between the prepositional dative and the corre-
sponding double object sentence; 2) the alternation in question
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(be it to-dative or for-dative) operates over several disparate
semantic domains; 3) the alternation in question is subject
to morphological conditions. At the end of this section,
following the discussion of these problems, we shall try to
assess their role in attempts to formulate the domain of the
alternation, particularly the role of semantic considerations.
6.1.0 For-datives
For-phrases have been investigated recently by
Williams (1974), and, more extensively, by Faraci (1974). They
point out that for-phrases occur as complements to NP's, VP's,
and some higher node, either PredPhrase or S. A variety of
interpretations are involved. According to Faraci's analysis,
for-phrases which have a 'dative' interpretation are a subset
of the for-phrases immediately dominated by VP. This conclusion
is helpful, as it places a syntactic limitation on which for-
phrases we can expect to find with verbs which occur in both
the for-dative construction and the double object construction,
a limitation which was reflected in our preliminary definition
of 'prepositional dative construction'. What does it mean for
a for-phrase to have a 'dative' interpretation, however?
Williams (1974) suggested that for is essentially a
marker of (thematic) Goal within the scope of an intention
operator. Regardless of whether this assumption can handle the
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variety of interpretations which for plays a role in, it
formed the basis of our analysis above of the double object
reflex of the for-dative construction, and it also serves as the
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basis of our interpretation of the prepositional for-dative.
Consider the sentence:
1) John baked a cake for Mary.
Ignoring irrelevant readings--i.e., those parallel to 'What
John did for Mary was bake a cake? and 'What John baked was a
cake for Mary'--we represent the reading of (1) as follows:
2) NP bake NPk for NP
i) at t0, B(NP., NP k)49
ii) at t0 , I(NP , (H(NP , NPk) at t' t0))
Interpreting 'B(x,y)' as 'x bake y', 'H(x,y)' as 'x have y',
and 'I(x,Y)' as 'x intend Y', we can account for two entailments
of (1), e.g.
3) John baked a cake.
4) John intended that Mary have the cake he baked.
Notice that there is no entailment to the effect that Mary has
the cake or anything of the sort. The crucial distinction be-
tween the representation of the overt for-dative and its double
object reflex lies in the treatment of the intention relation.
I claim that in the overt for-dative case, the intention is
asserted only at t0, whereas with respect to the double object
reflex of the for-dative, the intention relation holds not only
at t0 , but subsequently as well. Assuming such a distinction,
we can account for facts of the following kind, already noted
in part in section 5.5 above:
109
5) I baked a cake for Max, but now that you're here,
you may as well take it.
6) *~Ibaked Max a cake, but now that you're here,
you may as well take it.
7) John made the pancakes he gave Mary for Jack.
8) *John made Jack the pancakes he gave Mary.
I have tried to construct sentences which will be true only in
situations in which the intentions of the subject have changed.
Since this seems to be the distinctive factor involved in the
oddity of sentences like (6) and (8), this has been reflected
in the difference between the set of truth-conditions assigned
to (1) and the set of truth-conditions assigned to the double
object reflex of (1). (cf. §5.5 above).
6.1.1 Independently of whether or not the distinction that
we have drawn with respect to intention is the correct way of
accounting for the difference between (5) and (7), on the one
hand, and (6) and (8), on the other, the essential aspects of a
set of truth-conditions like (2) are first that there is a
relation between the subject and the direct object, and second,
that the subject intends that there will be a relation (of a
restricted sort) between the indirect object and the direct
object. Is this sort of structure adequate for all the verbs
which undergo the for-dative alternation?
Consider, for example, the classification of for-dative
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verbs proposed by Green (1974). Green divides the verbs in
question into five classes, as follows:
9) i) 'verbs denoting creative acts--acts in which
an object is created or transformed to
produce a certain effect: make, cook, boil,
roast, sew, knit, paint, draw, etc. ... '
ii) 'verbs denoting activities involving
selection, such as buy, purchase, find, get,
choose, pick out, gather, save, and leave ...
iii) 'verbs denoting performances considered
artistic: sing, chant, recite, play (instru-
ments and compositions), dance.'
iv) 'verbs that express a kind of obtaining;
earn, gain, and win are the most conspicuous
members.'
v) benefactive constructions such as rob me a
bank.
I shall assume that this classification is complete in the sense
that for any verb that occurs in both the for-dative construction
and the double object construction there is a class which includes
it. If this is correct, it is not difficult to see that two sorts
of problems prevent the extension of a semantic structure like
(2) to the remaining cases. Both of these concern the second
argument of the intention relation: 1) does the direct object
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play a distinctive role in the intention relation or not? 2)
what is the content of the second argument of the intention
relation?
6.1.2 Consider first what Green refers to as the 'benefac-
tive' construction. It is immediately obvious that a schema
like (2) cannot account for the interpretation of sentences of
this type, since evidently there is no relation whatsoever
which holds between the indirect object and the direct object
per se. In other words, in a sentence like (10),
10) All you have to do to gain my confidence is rob
me a couple of banks.
It is not being suggested by the speaker that the indirect
object of the verb phrase rob me a couple of banks should come
to have a couple of banks. Rather, it is suggested that the
indirect object will in some sense benefit from the robbing of
the banks. How the 'benefit' accruing to the indirect object
is to be characterized is far from clear.
It is conceivable that a characterization of the notion
'dative for' can be constructed which will comprehend both this
benefactive construction and the cases discussed earlier. In
terms of the semantic framework adopted here, however, such a
unified characterization would require a level of abstraction
so great that the notion would have little content left. I
shall therefore treat the benefactive construction as an
idiosyncratic case.
112
There is some evidence that such a treatment is
independently necessary, as the benefactive construction--at
least in its double object guise--is notable for several tendenci-
es not generally shared by other cases of the dative alternation.
Two factors stick out. The first concerns the fact that a
pronominal indirect object is far more acceptable in such
constructions than a non-pronominal one. The second concerns the
fact that this construction seems to be most felicitous in
sentences of a hortatory nature (and sentences reporting speech
acts of a hortatory nature) than elsewhere. Thus, contrast a
sentence like (10), in which both of these requirements are
fulfilled, with (11), in which they are both violated.
11) ??Six months later, John seems to have robbed
Frank a couple of banks.
Whether or not even rough limits on the domain of this
alternation can be set is not clear, particularly since in
contemporary literary English the construction is of a rather
marginal character and intuitions concerning the data tend to be
vague. Nevertheless, it seems to me that along with distinctions
like that between (10) and (11), we also find differences like
the following:
12) Do me just one more thing before you leave.
13) He did just one more thing for me before he left.
14) ?He did me just one more thing before he left.
15) He asked me to rob him a couple of banks.
113
16) He refused to rob a couple of banks for me.
17) ?He refused to rob me a couple of banks.
If the judgments assigned to these sentences are a reliable
indication at all of the appearance of the benefactive double
object construction, its appearance is dependent on far more
than merely the compatibility of the verb in question with a
benefactive for-phrase. It is for this reason that I have in-
voked the notion 'hortatory speech act', since this provides a
bridge between cases like (12) vs. (14), where the syntactic
distinction between imperative and declarative is relevant, and
cases like (15) vs. (17), where the locus of differentiation
involves the matrix verb.
How these constructions are to be generated hinges
primarily on how the constraint concerning the hortatory nature
of the sentence is to be dealt with. The pronominal restriction
can easily be handled either by a special transformation which
applies only to pronouns or by establishing a pronominal clitic
position to the right of (transitive) verbs.50 Assuming that
transformations do not have the power to distinguish between
different sorts of speech acts, the possibility of a transforma-
tional account of this alternation is contingent on whether
surface structure is the appropriate level to enforce this
constraint. The resolution of this question depends on the
power of surface interpretive rules: in particular, whether rules
of surface structure interpretation are able to distinguish
benefactive indirect objects from other indirect objects, since
in many cases of the double object construction, a benefactive
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interpretation is simply irrelevant. On either of these
hypotheses, however, the benefactive indirect objects are
accorded distinct treatment. This is necessitated by the
distinction concerning pronouns which holds between the bene-
factive cases and the other dative cases.
6.1.3 Analogous problems arise when we attempt to extend
our interpretive schema to Green's third and fourth classes.
For instance, consider (18):
18) Pinza sang us the Catalogue Aria.
It is difficult to see what sense can be made of saying that
the indirect object is intended to have (in some sense) the direct
object. In fact, one wonders whether it is appropriate to
specify any relation holding between the indirect object and the
direct object in such sentences: in this regard, they seem to
have more affinities with the sentences of Green's benefactive
construction, in that the performance of the action in question
is for the benefit of the indirect object, as opposed to the
referent of the direct object per se. And in sentences like
(19), which correspond to (18) with respect to the dative
alternation, it seems to do no violence to the intuition to
assi.gnthe for-phrase a 'benefactive' interpretation.
19) Pinza sang the Catalogue Aria for us.
What blocks the assimilation of this class to the benefactive
construction, however, is the lack of the two constraints dis-
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cussed above concerning pronouns and the 'hortatory' force of
the sentences in which the benefactive construction occurs most
idiomatically. Thus, in contrast to the distinctions noted in
the last section (cf. 10-17), the following sentences seem
perfectly fine:
20) Pinza sang the audience a medley of show tunes.
21) John refused to play me any Scriabin sonatas.
It is occasionally assumed that the double object
construction as it appears with the verbs of this class is in
fact a reflex of a prepositional to-dative construction. Note,
however, that the verb play does not occur with to:
22) John played us a sonata.
23) *John played a sonata to us.
24) John played a sonata for us.
It's not entirely clear that the prepositional for-construction
is an appropriate source for the double object construction in
the case of these verbs. For example, consider sentences like
the following:
25) Thelonius played a few traditional pieces for
the critics.
26) Thelonius played the critics a few traditional
pieces.
The problem here is that (26) seems to imply that Thelonius
was performing for an audience made up entirely of critics,
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whereas (25) has no such implication. It would be imprudent to
base any argument on these facts, however, since the putative
implication might simply arise from the different accentual
patterns usually accorded to sentences of these kinds: in
particular, it is easier to accentuate the critics when it is
the object of for than when it is the indirect object, thus
facilitating a contrastive interpretation.51
In short, the situation is this: for this class of
cases, the interpretation of both the for-phrase and the indirect
object seems quite similar to that of the benefactive construc-
tion; yet the indirect object is not subject to the constraints
which are common to the benefactive cases discussed above. Thus,
from the point of view of relating the for-construction to the
double object construction for these verbs, it is desirable to
treat the alternation for these cases in the same manner as we
treat the alternation for the first two classes, given the
similarity in syntactic behavior. A consequence of this, however,
is that no uniform semantic characterization can be given of the
domain of the for-dative domain.52
6.1.4 It is well-known that the preposition for has non-
dative interpretations as well. The most extensive work in this
area that I am aware of is that of Faraci (1974). Faraci points
out, for example, that sentences such as the following are
ambiguous:
27) Helmut built an electric chair for Himmler.
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Here we do not know whether Helmut intends Himmler to get the
electric chair or simply to have it. In the double object
construction, only one of these readings is available:
28) Helmut built Himmler an electric chair.
Evidently, the dative alternation is sensitive to this sort of
distinction.
Yet it is difficult to conclude anything striking from
this fact. If the argument in the last section is correct, there
is no uniform semantic characterization of the domain of the for-
dative alternation in terms of the semantic interpretation of
the for-phrase. On the other hand, there appear to be instances
of for-phrases that we would like to exclude on a principled
basis from the domain of the for-dative alternation, and the
interpretation of sentences in which such phrases occur is in
general quite distinct from the interpretation of sentences which
contain a 'dative' for.
What seems to be lacking here is a theory of preposi-
tions. Suppose we consider the question whether it is preferable
to postulate a single preposition for, for example, which is
subject to a variety of context-sensitive interpretive rules or
whether it is preferable to postulate many prepositions for, each
of which has a fixed semantic interpretation which is contributes
to the sentences in which it occurs. The difficulty in choosing
between these two hypotheses lies in the fact that they are
probably notational variants: each theory is able (in principle)
to account for the fact that the interpretation is context-de-
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pendent--one theory on semantic grounds, the other theory on
syntactic grounds. It is true that one theory purports to
account for the fact that there is a single preposition,
orthographic for, correlated with a variety of interpretations,
but this is a purely descriptive advantage, since we have no
account on this theory of why this should be the case as opposed
to any number of other possibilities.
It is possible of course that a theory which mixes
the two hypotheses suggested above may succeed in justifying a
single preposition for which correlates with the domain of the
for-dative alternation. Since a syntactic definition (in terms
of orthographic for) seems too crude, while a semantic definition
cuts too fine, there may be some intermediate level--the level
of thematic relations, perhaps--at which a precise characteriza-
tion of the domain of the for-dative alternation can be stated.
At the moment, however, I don't see how this can be
done. And as things stand now, we simply have to list the two
distinct interpretations of for which appear to be relevant.
Furthermore, as far as I can tell, very little hinges on whether
this list is stated directly in terms of semantic properties
or in terms of distinct prepositions for. One might argue, of
course, that if the basis for postulating distinct prepositions
for is the distinctions in interpretation that arise in various
contexts, one could do away with the excess baggage of multiple
prepositions for. Such an argument, however, provides no in-
sight into the characterization of the domain of the rule.
We have been considering the problem of stating the
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domain of the for-dative alternation from the point of view of
the semantic contribution of the for-phrase. Another possibil-
ity is to search for a property common to the set of verbs which
occur in both constructions. In fact, this is the way Green
(1974) approached the problem. But Green's efforts resulted
in five classes (cf. 9, above), and the prospects of reducing
these five classes to a single one seem remote at best, even
excluding the fourth and fifth classes from consideration. Thus,
regardless of whether we concentrate our efforts on the set of
verbs in question or the interpretation of the preposition for,
we seem forced to the conclusion that the for-dative alternation
operates on several distinct semantic domains. And as there are
a variety of ways in which such semantic generalizations as we
are able to extract can be implemented in the actual statement
of the alternation, we shall not pursue this question further.
6.1.5 Let us grant for the sake of -argument that it is a
necessary condition for a verb that occurs in the for-dative
construction to occur in the double object construction that it
meet such-and-such semantic conditions, and raise the question
of whether semantic considerations can in principle provide
sufficient conditions. In certain respects, one may wonder
whether it is possible to falsify the claim that semantic con-
siderations provide both necessary and sufficient conditions
for the applicability of the for-dative alternation (or any
other syntactic alternation for that matter), since in construct-
ing an argument against this position one is always open to the
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objection that one has formulated the semantic conditions at
issue incorrectly. But although it may be impossible to falsify
this thesis, it is possible to construct an argument which
demonstrates that it is extremely implausible that this claim
is true.
Note first of all that the for-dative alternation is
a productive one. An indication of this is the fact that the
addition of particles such as out and off to verbs which
ordinarily do not occur in either dative construction often
renders the new combination compatible with both dative con-
structions. Typical examples of this process are:
29) *John fished a trout for Mary.
30) *John fished Mary a trout.
31) John fished out an apple for Mary.
32) John fished Mary out an apple.
33) *John bit a piece of licorice for himself.
34) *John bit himself a piece of licorice.
35) John bit off a piece of licorice for himself.
36) John bit himself off a piece of licorice.
37) *John hacked a piece of steak for himself.
38) *John hacked himself a piece of steak.
39) John hacked off a piece of steak for himself.
40) John hacked himself off a piece of steak.
One may hypothesize that in these cases the combination of verb
and particle has the result that the new entity satisfies
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certain semantic conditions not satisfied by the verb alone.
Having established the productivity of the for-dative
alternation, it is obvious that semantic properties of a given
verb that occurs in the for-dative construction cannot provide
sufficient conditions for it to occur in the double object
construction. This follows from the fact that there are many
pairs of verbs which are roughly equivalent in interpretation
yet which display an asymmetry with respect to their occurrence
in the double object construction. I give examples below:
got
41) John obtained a ticket for Mary.
procured,
got
42) John *obtained Mary a ticket.
I*procured
43) Brahms {wrote a concerto for Joachim.
44) Brahms pwrote Joachim a concerto.
45) Wright burcted a house for Robie.
46) Wright er ed Robie a house.
Many such pairs exist. In principle, of course, it is possible
that a set of semantic properties could be devised such that for
each pair, one member of the pairs conformed to this set of
properties whereas the other member did not. Yet such an
accomplishment is extremely implausible. In particular, note
that the semantic conditions which specify when the dative
alternation is possible must be stated with sufficient general-
ity to let in a wide variety of cases. Thus, even assuming
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that it could be demonstrated that the members of the above
pairs are not synonymous with each other, such a demonstration
would not add much to the plausibility of the hypothesis that
semantic properties alone can provide sufficient conditions for
the operation of the dative alternation, since a general state-
ment of such conditions is likely to let in both members of each
pair if it lets in one. The same point can be made with respect
to acquisition: if semantic considerations alone provided
necessary and sufficient conditions for the operation of the
dative alternation, one would expect the above distinctions to
vanish virtually overnight. Yet they persist.
Let us consider the question of whether it is possible
to distinguish the members of the above pairs on non-semantic
grounds. There are a variety of ways in which this might be
done, most of which have been suggested in the past. For instance,
we might set up a distinction between words of Germanic origin
and words of Romance origin. Or we might distinguish them on
the basis of morphological structure. Neither of these alter-
natives is without weaknesses.
Yet before attempting to adjudicate between these
hypotheses, there are some remarks of a more general nature which
clarify the productivity of the for-dative alternation in general,
it's obvious that we would like to have a principled and general
basis on which to exclude certain words from the domain. Second,
if the argument given above is sound, it is quite implausible
that semantic considerations will be of much use in restricting
these cases from the domain of the rule. Thus, we can be
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reasonably sure that the property or set of properties which we
are looking for is to be found not in considering the concepts
involved but rather in considering the words themselves.
Consider now various ways of stating the constraint
in question. Green (1974), for example, suggests four possibilit-
ies (all of which she rejects--cf. Green, 1974, pp. 78-79).
These are: 1) 'a constraint on surface structures to the
effect that only one-syllable words may have internal indirect
objects', countered by words like promise, signal, guarantee,
etc.; 2) a constraint on surface structures to the effect that
only initial-stressed words containing less than three syllables
may internal indirect objects', countered by words like allow,
advance, deny; 3) a requirement that 'only [+ Anglo-Saxon]
words may have an internal indirect object', countered by the
fact that speakers need not have any historical knowledge of
the language in order to know the domain of the dative alterna-
tion, as well as by the fact that some words of Anglo-Saxon
origin do not occur in the double object construction while there
are words of Romance origin that do; and finally, 4) 'a re-
striction on the operation of the dative-movement rule, not on
surface structure; the rule applies only to words with initially-
stressed stems of two syllables or fewer', which is open to the
objection that words such as guarantee and telephone occur in
both constructions.
Green appears to be aiming for a phonological
characterization of the entire domain of the rule. It seems to
me to be profitable to consider a weaker theory, one which
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merely excludes from the domain a certain class of words. Suppose
we state the following constraint:
47) The dative alternation does not apply if the
verb in question has the internal structure
[X] . = s[Y]
prefix stem
Essentially, this constraint will only apply to words of Romance
origin, if, following Chomsky & Halle (1968), we restrict the
occurrence of the. '=' boundary to Latinate words with a prefix +
stem structure. This formulation has several advantages. First,
it excludes words like obtain and procure from the domain of
the dative alternation, since they evidently have the specified
structure. On the other hand, words like promise and offer are
not affected, since one of the effects of the specified structure
is to restrict stress to the stem (cf. Oehrle (1971)) and these
words do not have this characteristic stress pattern. Second,
we attempt to avoid the problem of the historical origin of words
in the English lexicon: an advantage since, although we cannot
expect speakers of English to have detailed knowledge of
etynology, there are grounds for thinking that speakers must have
some knowledge of the internal structure of some words.
Note, however, that the constraint as stated is
probably both too strong and too weak. It is too strong because
it wrongly excludes words like assign from the dative alternation,
and too weak because it fails to deal properly with cases which
are not of the specified structure. The best way of countering
this objection, however, is to point out that we come closer
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to descriptive adequacy by imposing the constraint than we would
without it, since without the constraint, we apparently have to
deal with all the words of this form in an ad hoc way, whereas
the exceptions to the formulation of the constraint are far
fewer.
Finally, note that the for-dative alternation is not
alone in being subject to a constraint of this kind. Not only
is the to-dative alternation constrained in the same way as well,
but the construction of verb + particle combinations also seem
to be subject to a constraint of this kind (cf. Fraser, 1965).
We shall return to this point briefly below in our discussion
of the to-dative alternation, and again in Part Three.
This ends our discussion of the domain of the for-
dative alternation. I have tried to make three points: first,
that there exist pairs of sentences related by the for-dative
rule which are not semantically equivalent; second, that although
on semantic grounds only a subset of the sentences of the form
X-V-NP-for-NP-Y are within the domain of the rule, there is
apparently no uniform semantic characterization of the domain
of the rule; and third, that the for-dative alternation is
subject to a morphological condition. In the next section,
I shall argue that these same considerations apply to the to-
dative alternation as well.
6.2 To-datives
The question of non-equivalence.6.2.1
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It is not difficult to find cases in which, given a
pair of strings which exhibit the to-dative alternation, one
is ambiguous and the other is not. In fact, we can show this
in both directions. Consider first:53
48) The doctor gave Mary an attractive skin.
49) The doctor gave an attractive skin to Mary.
The interpretation of (49) is consistent with a transfer of
ownership or custody of a certain physical object--for example,
the tanned hide of some animal. (48) has this interpretation
as well. But (48) also has an interpretation in which, in some
way in which the doctor played a role, Mary's complexion im-
proved. This reading is not available in (49). But such
sentences involve no more than a distinct interpretation in each
case for the expression 'an attractive skin'. And we can easily
handle the ambiguity of (48) according to the rules proposed in
sections 1-3. Nor is it terribly difficult to block the in-
alienable reading in (49): we merely need to find a way to rule
out expressions with an inalienable interpretation from occurring
in this position.
A more interesting example, perhaps, involves the verb
send. In one of its uses, send is a dative verb, and its set
of truth-conditions meets the transferrance criterion. On
another interpretation, send is used as a causative of motion.
For example:
50) John sent a letter to Mary.
51) John sent Mary a letter.
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52) The collision sent the car to the other side of
the gas station.
53) *The collision sent the other side of the gas
station the car.
Again, there is no difficulty in ruling out (53), since the
relation between the car and the gas station is a purely spatial
one. But consider sentences like:
54) John sent the ball back to the pitcher.
55) John sent the pitcher back the ball.
(54) is ambiguous, whereas (55) has only the dative interpretation.
I think that this can be brought out by adding more material, com-
patible only with the motional interpretation:
56) With one stroke of the bat, John sent the ball
back to the pitcher.
57) *With one stroke of the bat, John sent the pitcher
back the ball.
This case is more interesting than the case given in (48-49),
because here there is no question of a change in interpretation
of one of the noun phrases of the sentence. To block (57), we
must have a way of blocking the strictly motional reading in the
double object construction and ensuring that the phrase 'with one
stroke of the bat' occurs only when the motional reading is
possible. A number of ways of doing this suggest themselves,
but I shall not attempt to choose between them.
Now, in both of these cases, there has been a clear
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distinction between the interpretation of various constituents,
in the first case concerning the expression 'an attractive skin',
in the second case concerning the motional interpretation of
send. There are, however, cases in which a pair of sentences
which manifest the dative alternation apparently lack this
property, yet have distinct truth-conditions. Consider:
58) John threw the ball to the catcher, but the
throw went wide.
59) ??John threw the catcher the ball, but the throw
went wide.
In this case, unlike the previous cases, one does not have the
feeling that there are two distinct senses involved (with
respect to one of the constituents of the sentence), and that
the distinction between (58) and (59) is somehow related to this
sense-differentiation. In fact, without the added material
following but, there is virtually no way of distinguishing
the sentences at all. But if the distinction between (58) and
(59) is correct, we have an example of distinguishable ranges
of applicability concerning a pair of sentences related by the
to-dative alternation.
It is difficult to see exactly how to characterize
the distinction involved. Nevertheless, we make the following
attempt:
60) NP. throw NP. NPk
i) prior to t0 , H(NP1 , NPk)
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ii) at t0, I(NP., P(NP., NPk)) & A(NP., 
-H(NP,, NPk
& M(A(NP , -H(NP., NP k)), P(NP., NPk
Here, as mentioned in note 22;, 'H(x,y)' is interpreted as
'x hold y', 'I(x,Y)' is interpreted as 'x intends Y', ?P(x,y)?
is interpreted as 'x has physical control of y', 'A(x,Y)' is
interpreted as 'x acts (in a characteristic way) with the
result Y', and 'M(XY)' is interpreted as 'X is sufficient to
cause Y'.
The heart of this representation is the clause that
states that the action of NP. suffices to bring NPk into the
sphere of NP.'s physical control. In the case of the to-dative
structure, as opposed to the double object structure, we can
account for the distinction between (58) and (59) by weakening
this relation slightly, so that it is interpreted roughly as
'the action of NP is of a kind that is normally sufficient
to bring NPk into the sphere of NPj s physical control'.
Regardless of the adequacy of our representation, we
are faced with the problem that such distinctions are possible.
Let us use the term 'success condition' as a way of talking
about the minimal criteria which the set of truth-conditions
assigned to a given verb set up for the relation between the
direct object and either the indirect object or the prepositional
dative. We now want to ask whether for any given verb which
undergoes the to-dative alternation the success conditions for
the double object structure differ from the success conditions
for the prepositional dative structure.
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In general, I think, the success condition does not
change. For example, in cases where the ownership of an object
is transferred, i.e., where social relations are changed by
mutual consent, no such distinction seems to be possible. In
other words, there seems to be no distinction whatsoever between
sell x to y and sell y x. Among communication verbs, the
distinction appears more as a typological one than as a differ-
ence in dative pairs. Thus, we find differences between tell x S
and say to x S like the following:
61) I ?*told Baravelli that Flynose had won,
said to Baravellij
but he was already out of earshot.
62) I *told noone in particular that Flynose
said to noone in particular)
had won.54
If the distinction we have suggested above to account for the
difference between (58) and (59) is on the right track, the cases
in which we would expect to find differences in success condition
are just those in which the action of the subject does not
immediately bring about the specified result. Thus, the relevant
class will include verbs like throw, send, toss, kick, and so on.
But I think one must be sanguine about the possibilities of find-
ing real distinctions in truth-conditions between the two dative
manifestations of these verbs. It is possible that there are
distinctions to be drawn between the pairs of sentences below:
63) After I wrote a few words to him, I tore the
letter up.
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64) ??After I wrote him a few words, I tore the
letter up.
65) I handed the sandwich to him--but he couldn't
take it because his hands were tied.
66) ?I handed him the sandwich--but he couldn't take
it because his hands were tied.
In fact, the stability of interpretations for these verbs in the
two different structures is somewhat surprising. If there are
in general two distinct ways of interpreting double object con-
structions (cf. sections 1-3), then we might expect to find
more cases in which there is variability in interpretation. 55
Most of the cases of non-equivalence arise, however, not because
of distinctions between the two structure per se, but rather
because of the ability of various verbs to occur with noun
phrases which, because of properties of their own, do not occur
as the direct object in the prepositional construction (cf. 48-
49). It seems to be a property of human languages that the
ability to alter the linear structure of a given message is
highly-valued (though not without limits), and one may speculate
that this property renders the dative constructions by and large
semantically stable.
6.2.2 The domain of the to-dative alternation.
In this section, I shall attempt to demonstrate that,
as in the case of the for-dative alternation, although there are
instances of the structure X-V-NP-to-NP-Y which we would like
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to exclude from the domain of the to-dative alternation, it is
difficult to give a unified semantic characterization of the
domain of the rule. Furthermore, I shall argue that the
morphological constraint on the operation of the for-dative
alternation that was formulated in section 6.1.5 holds for the
to-dative alternation as well.
We have seen that with the possible exception of a
few cases if a verb appears in both manifestations of the to-
dative alternation, the semantic properties of the pairs of
sentences related by the rule are invariant (at least with
respect to properties relevant to the truth value of the
sentence with respect to a given model). In sections 1-2 we
tried to formulate sets of truth-conditions which would account
for the interpretation of double object sentences which have
corresponding to-dative forms, and these formulations seem
adequate in general for the prepositional to-dative construction
as well. Recall that in that discussion, I tried to resolve
some of the difficulties that came up because different sub-
stantive notions of possession are involved for different verbs
within the domain of the dative alternation by giving a formal
definition of the notion 'transferrance'. Furthermore, we stated
an implication using this notion which was meant to characterize
the class of verbs occurring in the double object construction
which also occur in the prepositional dative constructions. One
of the problems that arose with this implication was the fact
that we had to weaken the definition of transferrance so that it
involved the notion of subordinate relations. Let us now con-
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sider the consequences of turning the implication around in
order to see if it provides any insight into the problem of
which verbs that occur in the structure X-V-NP-to-NP-Y also
occur in the double object structure. To facilitate discussion,
we repeat the definition of transferrance and reformulate the
implication so that it operates in the opposite direction.
63) If the set of truth-conditions assigned to a
verb contains the following propositions and
either R and R' are identical or R' is sub-
ordinate to R, then the verb has the trans-
ferrance property:
i) prior to t0 , R(NP , NP k
ii) at t0 , R'(NP., NPk
(where 'NP ' represents the subject of the
simple sentence containing the verb in question)
64) A verb occurring in the structure X-V-NP-to-NP-Y
occurs in the double object structure only if it
has the transferrance property.
Although (64) is not strong enough to tell us exactly which
verbs occur in both structures, it still does some work,
since it excludes those verbs which lack the transferrance
property from occurring in both structures.
Consider some cases of the structure X-V-NP-to-NP-Y
which do not undergo the dative alternation:
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65) John credited the success of the mission to
Kissinger.
66) John attributed the success of the mission to
Kissinger.
67) We owe the success of the mission to Kissinger.
68) John attached the picture to the wall.
69) John nailed the medal to the floor.
70) The turned the guns to the sea.
71) They pointed the guns to the sea.
For each of these cases, I think that it is possible to show
that the transferrance criterion is not met. In the case of
(65-67), the subject (crudely speaking) places the responsibil-
ity for the success on Kissinger, a situation which does not
require any relation at all to hold between the subject and the
direct object. In the case of (68-69), an action is said to
take place which results in a certain fixed physical configura-
tion; again, there is no necessity for any physical configura-
tion to hold between the subject and the direct object. Finally,
in the case of (70-71), an action is said to take place which
results in the referent of the direct object's having a certain
orientation in space, and again there is no particular orienta-
tion that holds between the subject and the direct object. In
other words, if we can define the domain of the to-dative
alternation in terms of transferrance, we can exclude cases
like (65-71).
Consider now whether such a characterization can
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succeed. In section 2, we noted the fact that in order for this
characterization to get off the ground, we had to allow for a
hierarchy of possessive relations, which we did not attempt to
justify. If we extend this sort of hierarchy to other sorts of
relations as well, it is possible that our characterization will
cover verbs like assign which (at least in some cases) do not
deal with 'possession' but with responsibility, as in:
72) John assigned the task of cleaning the latrine
to Arnold.
73) John assigned Arnold the task of cleaning the
latrine.
A more difficult problem, it seems to me, concerns
verbs which are associated with linguistic acts, such as tell
(a joke), read, and so forth. Consider a sentence pair like
the following:
74) John read the paragraph to Edward.
75) John read Edward the paragraph.
With a verb like hand, it is a relatively straightforward task
to determine the various relations that hold of the subject, the
direct object, and the indirect object. When the direct object
denotes linguistic material, however, this becomes more difficult.
Suppose that we( could agree that sentences like (74-75) are true
in cases where certain linguistic material is 'transferred'
from John to Edward (or intended to be so transferred). Even if
this were the case, it seems unlikely that this 'transfer'
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could be characterized in such a way that our definition of the
transferrance property would be satisfied, simply because it
will be necessary to say John utters the linguistic material
and Edward hears (or is intended to hear) it--or something of
the sort--and these relations are neither identical nor sub-
ordinate.56 Of course, we could extend the notion of trans-
ferrance to include this case, but this constitutes a further
weakening of an already dangerously vague concept.
However this particular problem is to be dealt with,
it should be clear that the 'transferrance property' that we
have tried to define is not really a single concept but a
collection of concepts, in spite of the fact that we have tried
to minimize our reliance on the substantive aspects of the
semantic relations employed in the characterization of the
interpretation of various verbs. I think the same point will
carry over to any attempt to provide a unified characterization
of the domain of the to-dative alternation. Thus, again we are
faced with the same problem that arose in trying to characterize
the domain of the for-dative alternation: a syntactic definition
of the domain in terms of the preposition to is too crude, in
that it fails to exclude cases which one feels ought to be
excluded in a principled way, whereas our attempt to characterize
the domain in terms of certain properties of the sets of truth-
conditions assigned to the various verbs fails to achieve the
desired generality, and we are left with a set of distinct cases
which in principle might have been some other set altogether.
Now it may be the case that there simply is no uniform character-
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ization of this domain. On the other hand, we might construe
this result--if it is correct--as a simple demonstration of
the failure of a semantic theory based on truth-conditions to
come to terms properly with this range of linguistic data.
In any case, a purely semantic characterization of
the domain of the to-dative alternation is unlikely to be
forthcoming, for precisely the same reasons that semantic
properties in general fail to provide sufficient conditions
for the operation of the for-dative alternation: namely, the
to-dative alternation seems to be subject to the same morphologi-
cal constraint as the for-dative alternation. As the argument
is precisely the same as in the case of the for-dative cases,
I shall not repeat it here. Some examples of verbs which are
correctly excluded by this constraint from the domain of the
to-dative alternation are given below:
76) return
transfer
convey
deliver
reveal
explain
report
submit
restore
exhibit
In addition, there are a variety of morphologically complex
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cases which might be excluded on other grounds (e.g. the
typological distinction among communicative verbs mentioned
above in section 6.2.1).
Both the transferrance property and the constraint
on morphological complexity limit the domain of the to-dative
alternation. It would be an illusion to think that even in
combination they adequately specify it, however. Many cases
remain which we have nothing to say about. For example, why
does the verb lower undergo the dative alternation whereas the
verbs raise and lift do not? Why does the verb get in the
double object construction have a paraphrase in the for-dative
construction but not in the to-construction, although it occurs
with to as well? The theory outlined above does not treat such
cases correctly, but this is a defect common to all theories
of the dative alternation of which I am aware.
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7.0 Summary.
In sections 1-6 we have been concerned with two related
problems. One is to construct a semantic description of the
dative constructions. The other is to investigate the role
semantic considerations play in determining the domain of the
dative alternation. In this section we summarize our results.
Note that it is trivial to write a grammar which
generates the correct range of data. All that is required is
that we subcategorize all verbs which undergo the alternation
for the structure NP for NP NP; postulate a transformation
fto
(ordered before Heavy-NP Shift) which optionally deletes the
preposition; if this rule does not apply, an obligatory trans-
formation postposes the prepositional phrase to the right of the
NP flanking it. But as there is no independent evidence for
such a hypothesis, it is totally ad hoc and provides no insight
into the problem of why some verbs occur in both the preposition-
al construction and the double object construction and why some
verbs occur in only one of these structures.
Although I have spent a good deal of time discussing
the domain of the dative alternations, I have not as yet for-
mulated a rule to actually carry out the alternation. I will
now remedy this defect. I will assume that the rule maps
instances of the prepositional construction into the double
object structure, for the simple reason that if the mapping
is formulated in this way, we do not have the additional
problem of specifying which preposition is called for.517 Thus,
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we write the rules as follows:
1) To-dative
SD: X-V-NP-to-NP-Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
SC: 125306
conditions: 1) Term 2 has the transferrance
property
2) Term 2 does not have the morpholog-
ical structure [XIPrefix = EStem
2) For-dative
SD: X-V-NP-for-NP-Y
1 2 3 4 5 6
SC: 125306
conditions: 1) The set of truth-conditions
assigned to term 2 (in the
structure NP NP for NP.)
contain one of the following sets
of statements:
a) at t0, R(NP , NPk) &
I(NP1 , (R'(NP . NPk) at t'>t0
where 'I(x,Y)' is the intention
relation and 'R(x,y)' is an
action and 'R'(x,y)' is a
'possessive' relation
OR
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b) at t0 , R(NP1 , NPk) &
I(NP., Ben(NP., R(NP.,NP ))
where again 'R(x,y)' is an
action, 'I(x,Y)t is the
intention relation and
'Ben(x,Y)? symbolizes the
benefactive interpretation
accorded to certain for-phrases.
2) Term 2 does not have the morpho-
logical strucure [XPrefix = EY1Stem
We leave several things open in this formulation: first, the
derived structure--i.e. is the indirect object a daughter of
NP or is it Chomsky-adjoined to V; second, we have not attempted
to account here for the distinctions in truth-conditions noted
in section 6; third, as stated the formulation of the for-dative
rule will cover the benefactive cases discussed in section 6.1.2--
if these cases are accorded a separate treatment as the pronomin-
al and 'hortatory' constraints suggest, we can exclude them
from the domain of the for-dative rule by restricting TR(x,y)'
in condition (lb) to actions involving artistic performance.
Consider now the distributional facts concerning the
dative constructions. There are a variety of cases.
Case 1: sentences which occur only in the double
object construction.
3) John envied Mary her talent.
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4) The debacle cost McGovern the election.
5) The priest forgave him his sins.
6) Lipson's textbook taught Arnold Russian.
7) John gave Max a kick.
8) Craft brought Stravinsky a patron.
9) The examination gave Frank a headache.
All of these cases will be subcategorized for the double object
construction, where they will remain untouched, as there is no
rule which operates on this structure. One would of course like
a principled explanation of why such sentences have no preposi-
tional dative form. We note that in none of these cases is the
transferrance criterion satisfied. One reason for this is that
for the most part there is no relation needed between the sub-
ject and the direct object. If it could be shown that all
simple sentences of the structure X-NP.-V-NP NP.-Y have
the semantic property that there exists a relation R(NP NPk
then we would have a principled reason to exclude such verbs
(on the given interpretations) from the prepositional dative
constructions. At the moment, however, such a conjecture
faces problems that I am not able to pursue here.5 8 The account
we give of these sentences is descriptively adequate, and that
is enough.
Case 2: sentences which occur only in the prepositional
constructions.
A) 10) Reagan built a prison for his opponents.
(on the reading in line with Reagan's
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intention to incarcerate his opponents)
11) The collision sent the car to the other side
of the gas station.
12) John attached a new significance to Kissinger.
13) John credited the success to Kissinger.
These sentences are properly excluded from the domain of the
dative alternation because of their failure to satisfy the
semantic conditions on the rules.
B) 14) John obtained a car for Mary.
15) John purchased a present for Mary.
16) John transferred the stock to Mary.
17) John conveyed the sandwich to Mary.
These sentences are properly excluded from the domain of the
rules as formulated because of their failure to meet the
morphological condition as stated, although they satisfy the
various semantic conditions.
C) 18) John raised the bucket to Max.
19) John got the message to Mary.
20) John carried the bucket (over) to Mary.
21) John floated the canoe (down) to Mary.
22) John turned the gun over to the police.
23) Mary trapped a wolf for Frank.
Most of these cases will have to be treated as ad hoc exceptions
to the rules as formulated. One might claim that in a sentence
like (20) the to-phrase does not have a 'dative' interpretation,
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but simply a locative one, or that verbs like float are
characteristically used of situations in which the subject's
action is not 'normally sufficient' to bring about the desired
relation between the indirect object and the direct object.
But such minor adjustments do not affect the point that many
counterexamples to the semantic characterization of the domain
that we have arrived at remain.
Case 3: prepositional sentences for which there is a
reflex in the double object construction.'
24) John gave a book to Mary.
25) John bought a book for Mary.
26) John kicked the ball to me.
27) John played a tune for Mary.
28) Mary mailed the letter to Frank.
For the central cases of the dative alternation, the characteriza-
tion we have given of the domain of hte rule seems adequate,
i.e., our characterization--though too broad to handle all
cases (cf. 18-23)--does not seem to exclude any of the central
cases of the alternation.
Certain marginal cases remain, however. Consider the
possibility of dative pairs like the following:
29) They denied us admission.
30) ?They denied admission to us.
31) They denied me my chance.
32) *They denied my chance to me.
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33) The act earned Mary a lot of money.
34) ?The act earned a lot of money for Mary.
These verbs evidently do not have the transferrance property.
On the theory outlined here, they have to be treated idio-
syncratically. Perhaps future research can clarify the relation
of these cases to the more familiar cases of the dative alterna-
tion that we have concentrated on.
The major result of this section has been to isolate
some of the semantic properties of the verbs that occur only in
the double object construction, properties that in general are
not shared by either of the prepositional dative constructions.
This distinction in semantic properties strongly suggests that
these verbs are generated in the base in the double object
construction and not derived from either prepositional construc-
tion. Such a conclusion will play a role in some of the
arguments to follow in later sections. Although we have not
succeeded in adequately characterizing the domain of the dative
alternations, we have tried to constrain it by playing both
semantic and morphological limitations on the operation of the
rule. Neither type of condition by itself will suffice.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This ability is not without limits. There are difficulties
involving vagueness, 'open texture', and literalness, among
others. Cf. Austin (1963a, 1963b), for example, for discussion.
In some cases, however, such problems can be kept to a minimum.
2. Cf. Quine (1953), Katz (1972) for further discussion.
3. In cases of ambiguity, more than one set of truth-conditions
is assigned.
4. In some cases, a higher-order calculus might be more appropri-
ate. Compare section 3, below. Such problems are external to
our main interests here, however.
5. As pointed out above, cases of ambiguity will be dealt with
by the assignment of multiple sets of truth-conditions.
6. This condition is necessary so that the reading of e.g. 'These
men own these cars' in which each man owns one car will not be
blocked. (Cf. Fiengo, 1973, for comments on this and similar
problems.) On the notion 'scope component', cf. Kroch (1974).
7. The notion of 'uptake' on the part of the indirect object's
referent should be extended to verbs of ownership in some cases
at least, i.e., sell, which describes a contractual situation.
In other cases--those involving gifts, for instance--it seems
to be irrelevant.
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8. In the interests of conciseness, I shall often use the
expressions 'subject', 'direct object', and 'indirect object'
to refer to the referents of the subject, direct object, in-
direct object (respectively) of the sentence under consideration.
The context makes clear the way in which these expressions are
used in any given case.
9. It is Sometimes claimed that semantic representations take
the form of trees. As Chomsky (1972) has pointed out, this
would not be surprising, "given the enormous descriptive power
of the [concept]." If the notion 'uptake' is important for this
class of cases, then it would appear that a representation in the
form of a tree would require at least that the tree contain a
coordinate structure, since there are two actions and neither is
within the scope of the other.
10. Note in this example that the for-phrase specifies a temporal
limitation on the custody relation. Such modification also plays
a role in the semantic interpretation of verbs like lend.
11. We discuss the verb offer in more detail below in section
5.4.,
12. Note that (13) does not satisfy the criteria we have
established for 'O(x,y)' or 'C(x,y)': in both cases, the first
term of the relation must be animate.
13. Higgins (1973, pp. 86-87) discusses a similar case, involv-
ing the construction 'What A did to B was...', noting that a
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wide variety of material can replace the gap indicated, but just
so long as there seems to be some 'intrinsic connection' between
the object of to and the material that fills in the gap. I have
borrowed the term 'intrinsic connection' from this source.
14. The fact that the truth-conditions contain no such statement
does not, of course, imply that there could be no relation hold-
ing of the referent of the subject and the referent of the direct
object: merely that any relation that does hold of these two
individuals is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the sentence
at issue.
15. We shall see later that qualifications are needed in several
ways here: first, as pointed out earlier, the notion of the
tense-referent as a point in time is an idealization; second,
further qualifications are needed that necessitate the incorpora-
tion of modal notions. See below, section 5.
16. There are a number of other distinctions between own and
possess which have some intrinsic interest. One has to do with
the fact that when possess has a direct object which refers to
a physical object (rather than an abstract individual or social
property), indefinites are far better-sounding than definites:
i) Does he still possess a ranch?
ii) ??Does he still possess the ranch?
Second, the behavior of temporal adverbials is distinct:
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iii) *He's always possessed a ranch.
iv) He's always owned a ranch.
Finally, as I think Lakoff (1965) has pointed out, own undergoes
the passive transformation, whereas possess does not. But the
passive seems to apply to own only if its object is definite:
v) The ranch is owned by Nelson Rockeloafer.
vi) *A ranch is owned by Nelson Rockeloafer.
How does the relation between (ii) and (vi) bear on the contrast
of passivizability of own and possess, if at all?
17. The verb bequeathe raises an interesting problem with respect
to time. Does the tense refer to the time at which the subject
makes a decision as to the disposition of his property posthumous-
ly, or to the time at which the property is finally disposed? If
the sentence is uttered after the death of the subject, this
question is difficult to determine. But if the sentence is
uttered while the subject is still alive, I find a ptrongpprefer-
ence for the use of the aspectual auxiliary have. Compare:
vii) ?I bequeathed the piano to Marthe.
viii) I have bequeathed the piano to Marthe.
I don't know why this should be, but it strikes me as related to
the way in which sportscasters announce football-passes or
baseball-throws while the ball is in flight. In such circum-
stances, one would clearly say (ix), not (x):
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ix) Unitas has thrown a beautiful pass downfield to
Berry.
x) Unitas threw a beautiful pass downfield to Berry.
Perhaps this distinction has something to do with the fact that
the role of the subject in the action is completed, while the
action as a whole is not.
18. The problem is not only to give an account of the similarities
between buy and sell but to deal with the differences which are
to be found between them concerning such things as agency, their
behavior in generic contexts, etc., as well.
19. Not that our approach is immune from criticism, particularly
from those iho have philosophical scruples about semantic concepts.
Yet if we wish to develop a theory of semantic abilities, there
is no real alternative.
20. The prepositional dative construction with respect to these
verbs is considered in section 6 below.
21. One of the difficulties inherent in descriptive semantics
is that we are able to formulate sharper questions concerning
semantic data than we may be able to answer. For example, it
might be desirable to specify, in the case of the verb hand, that
there is a point at which both subject and indirect object
simultaneously grasp the direct object. My intuitions concerning
this vary to some extent according to the circumstances in which
sentences involving hand are tested.
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Another question that arises in this context is
whether the particular conditions specified would follow from
general characteristics of actions. If the variability concern-
ing, say, the uptake on the part of the indirect object is actual,
one might be inclined to think that the general theory of action
would have to be quite rich in order to account for it. On the
other hand, it is worth pointing out that there are many cases
which seem to be most easily definable with respect to some result,
although it may not in fact be necessary for that result to hold
in order for the case at issue to be felt to be true. For example,
we have claimed (cf. 33) that for the conditions associated with
hand to be satisfied, a certain relation, 'H(x,y)', must hold of
the indirect object and the direct object. Yet there are uses
of hand which we might well take to be true, in spite of the fact
that this condition is patently not satisfied:
x) I handed him the platter: it's not my fault that
he didn't take it.
If the conditions that we have set down are correct, then a more
general theory of the linguistic description of actions might
well account for the deviation of such sentences from the
stipulated conditions.
22. Thus, for throw, we write:
xi) NP throw NP. NPk
i) prior to t0, .H(NPi, NPk)
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ii) at t0 , I(NP., P(NP., NP k))-&A(NP., -H(NP., NPk))
& M(A(NP 1' -H(NP, NPk), P(NP., NPk
Here, 'H(x,y)' is interpreted 'x holds y in the hand'; 'I(x,Y)'
is interpreted 'x intends Y to be true at t' t0.'P(xy)l is
interpreted 'x has y within physical control'; 'A(x,Y)' is
interpreted 'x acts with the result Y'; and 'M(X,Y)' is interpret-
ed 'X normally suffices to bring about Y'.
23. In fact, we argue below that such a theory is necessary:
cf. section 4.5.
24. For the most part, I will ignore here what can be termed
verb-internal features relevant to manner or instrument, e.g.
the distinction between toss and throw. In this particular case,
the distinction seems to be a kind of gestalt difference based
on the casualness with which the action is performed. As far as
I have been able to determine, beyond the possibility of affect-
ing the variation of the 'uptake' condition, differences in
manner are simply irrelevant to the present inquiry.
25. See section 3.4.2 for some independent support for a lexical
treatment of these derived nouns. On some difficulties for one
formulation of a transformational treatment, cf. note 27,below.
26. By using the word 'permit' in the gloss of the relation
'E(x,Y)l we do not mean to restrict the interpretation to the
deontic sense of permission only. In some cases, 'enable' might
be an improvement. This interpretation of the role played by
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the subject seems to be a fact with more general application than
just the predicational noun cases. In fact, it may be correlated
with the notion of agency applied to the indirect object in any
relation between the indirect object and the direct object. Thus,
roughly the same interpretation might be said to hold in the
'causal' interpretation of 'Nixon gave Mailer a book'. Since
writing books is something which requires individual initiative,
perhaps the interpretation of Nixon's role in Mailer's enterprise
is limited.
27. One might suppose that sentences like 'John gave the table
a kick' could be derived from 'John gave a kick at the table'.
Yet the sentences are not equivalent: in particular, the first
entails that the table was kicked, whereas the second does not.
28. Note that the relation 'P(x,y)'--interpreted as 'y is x's
patron'--has two argument places. The first argument place is
associated with the complement of the noun 'patron': in other
words, with respect to a referring expression of the form 'the
patron of Stravinsky', the first argument is associated with
Stravinsky. The second argument place is associated with the
referent of the expression, namely that person who is the patron
of Stravinsky. Since the second argument place has no syntactic
manifestation in expressions of the form 'patron of x', when we
speak of specifying the argument or filling the argument--place
of the relational expression, it is to be understood that we
are referring to the first argument or argument-place.
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29. Sentence (42) is actually ambiguous, due to the modality
of would. One reading is roughly 'Having a patron would have
helped Stravinsky'; the other is 'If Stravinsky had had a patron,
that patron would have helped him'. It is the latter reading
that is of interest to us.
30. Cf. Ross (1974).
31. The grammatical properties of relational expressions are not
based strictly on what we take to be their logical properties.
Cf. Sapir (1917), who notes that in languages that have a
morphological marker for relational expressions, the use of the
marker varies from one language to another, although there do
seem to be implicational generalizations to be made, e.g. kinship
terms are marked before other relational terms.
32. The sort of circumstance that I refer to here involves
choosing sides for games, trading sports stars, and so forth.
Thus, we find sentences like
i) The luck of the draft gave the Celtics Cowens.
Sentences like (51) and (52) do not easily adapt themselves to
such an interpretation.
33. One transformational approach would postulate a rule of
Having-deletion, thus deriving (54) from
ii) Having an illness hampered John.
But this raises difficulties in cases like:
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iii) His illness hampered John.
*Having his illness hampered John.
iv) The old illness hampered John.
*Having the old illness hampered John.
34. There are difficulties in formulating a notation here, based
on the uncertain status of the reference of expressions with an
inalienable interpretation. Do such expressions denote properties?
If so, does this fact throw any light on how best to provide a
representation for them? I leave this question open.
35. The term 'inalienable' is not altogether appropriate. For
instance, it seems to me that one can 'inalienably possess' a
wooden leg. Cf. note 10 above.
36. Sentence (66) is an example- from Cattell (1970).
37. It's still the case that on the interpretive approach, how-
every, we might find it necessary to postulate various rules of
interpretation which apply to the same underlying structure, thus
generating more than one reading. One would prefer to have the
grammar be such that for each underlying structure there would
be only one reading.
38. By a strong sense of 'has the ability', I mean to distinguish
here between capacity and capability. The sense involving
tcapacity' can be illustrated by 'All human beings are able to
swim', by asserting which one hardly commits oneself to the belief
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that every person has in fact demonstrated his swimming ability.
In a sentence like 'John is able to swim', it is unlikely that
the speaker is trying to convey the information that John--like
all humans--has the capacity to swim, but rather that John in
fact swims or has swum. It is this latter interpretation which
demonstrates what I mean by the strong sense.
39. The one exception to this is the rather special sense of
teach from which the nominalization teachings is derived. This
is also an exception to the claim that if teach has a [-animate]
subject, the indirect object is required:
i) The Bible teaches that the meek shall inherit
what's left.
40. A way to block such sentences is to derive such noun phrases
as the way to Inman Square from indirect questions, as suggested
by Baker (190?). Thus, the underlying structure for (8), for
example, would be something like (10), and a transformation would
remove the complementizer and the copula. Now although the fact
that the indirect object is obligatory would then follow, it is
difficult to write a transformation which would distinguish (20)
from (12), and (13) shows that the transformation in question
cannot apply to the structure underlying (12). What would apparent-
ly be necessary would be to identify certain NP's which allow the
transformation to operate. Yet we have the alternative of simply
generating NP's with this property as the direct object of teach
(and know and other epistemic verbs). A principled way of
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accounting for the positioning of the indirect object is still
necessary.
41. Cf. Fodor (1970), Chomsky (1972).
42. I have no explanation that is sound for why (73a) sounds so
bad. This is not a general fact about have:
ii) (As we all know) John has his problems.
I have a feeling that this difference is somewhat parallel to
the use of definites and indefinites in existential sentences
with there, but I don't see how the difference between (ii) and
(73a) would follow from such a claim.
43. This property is apparently shared by noun phrases which
seem to form a natural class with accident:
iii) John's stupidity caused him to have a mishap.
*John's stupidity gave him a mishap.
iv) Their common interests caused them to have a
chance meeting.
*Their common interests gave them a chance meeting.
I do not know how to explain these facts, however.
44. In this table, we make two idealizations: 1) the tense-
referent is always a point on the line; 2) the relation 'R'
is never discontinuous. Both of these assumptions are probably
false.
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45. Williams (1974) points out that rob and steal differ in
an interesting way. One can be robbed of inalienable properties,
for example, although it is impossible to steal inalienable
properties from anyone:
i) The defeat robbed John of his pride.
ii) *The defeat stole his pride from John.
Similarly, the subject of rob can be [- animate], as (i)
illustrates, whereas the subject of steal must be [+ animate].
In both of these respects, rob is like the double object con-
structions discussed in section 3, whereas steal is like the cases
discussed in section 2, which have corresponding forms with the
prepositional dative. A more general treatment of these parallel-
isms is clearly called for.
46. We are not concerned here with the occurrences of lose in
sentences like I lost the hand to Tom, who was holding a full
house or The money was lost to me. In correspondence, Dwight
Bolinger has pointed out to me the ambiguity of this last
example: it is either the passive of a sentence of the first
type, or analyzable as 'NP be ADJCOMPT .
47. It is occasionally suggested that the preposition with
also be included. As there appears to be only one example of the
alternation applying in such cases, i.e., play me a game of
chess/play a game of chess with me, we exclude this marginal
case from consideration.
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48. See Faraci (1974) for a clear exposition of the variety of
interpretations assigned to for-phrases.
49. I have represented 'x bake y' as the relation 'B(x,y)'
only for expository purposes. The fact that the object represent-
ed as 'y' only comes into existence as a result of the action
involved poses a severiproblem for such an analysis, a problem
that we shall not attempt to deal with here.
50. I know of no examples of a sentence of the form NP-V-for-NP
where the for-phrase has a ?benefactive' interpretation which
undergoes deletion of the preposition. Thus we have (i) but not
(ii):
i) Laugh for me.
ii) *Laugh me.
There are further constraints on the appearance of a benefactive
indirect object which I have no idea how to even describe. For
example, (iii) seems clearly impossible, although we have (iv).
iii) *Stamp me your foot again.
iv) Stamp your foot again for me.
51. Thus, although (v) seems alright, I find (vi) virtually
impossible (with accentual prominence as indicated):
v) After Playing the audience a series of hard-bop
tunes, Thelonius played a few traditional pieces
for the critics.
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vi)??After playing the audience a series of hard-bop tunes,
Thelonius played the critics a few traditional
pieces.
This is somewhat surprising, as the double object construction
does not in general bar the indirect object from having accentual
prominence. Compare (vii):
vii) You want to know what I bought for whom? Is that it?
Well, I bought Mary a new hat and I bought Alberg a
bowtie. Is that alright?
52. Is is worthwhile at this point to say something about the
members of Green's fourth class. I will take earn to be typical
of this class. Consider the sentences below:
viii) John earned a lot of money for Mary.
ix) John earned Mary a lot of money.
The interpretation of (ix) is roughly: Mary got a lot of money
because of John. Sentence (viii) has this interpretation, it
seems, but it has another interpretation as well: namely, John
earned a lot of money which he intends for Mary. The surprising
thing about this is that it is the latter interpretation which
conforms to our characterization of the domain of the alternation,
and not the former, which is actually the one preserved in the
alternation. Thus we actually have two problems: one is to
exclude earn on the latter interpretation from the domain of the
alternation; the other is to generate (viii) on both interpreta-
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tions. A possible way to deal with the latter problem is to take
the double object structure as basic, and write a rule which
converts it to the prepositional for-construction. Such a rule
would require careful formulation, however, for it would be
necessary to distinguish cases like (ix) from a large variety of
other sentences occurring in the double object structure, including
sentences whose verb is earn:
x) Success earned a man I know many friends.
xi) ?*Success earned many friends for a man I know.
Even if it is possible to write such a rule, this approach leaves
the first problem untouched. I have no better account of these
facts, however.
53. These sentences are from Cattell.
54. One might be tempted to claim that tell requires that the
communicative act be successful, but this would be too strong.
Sentences like the following would then be ruled out:
xii) I told Sam that it was raining, but I guess he
didn't hear me.
Rather, I think that what we want to say is that in using the
verb tell to report a communicative situation, the speaker claims
that what the subject did was sufficient under normal circum-
stances to assure the success of the communicative act.
55. In fact, along with give, teach, bring, and show, discussed
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earlier, there are many verbs which develop senses in which they
are restricted to the double object structure. As far as I can
tell, however, these extensions always fall roughly into the class
of interpretations discussed in section 3. Examples of this are:
xiii) Running the traffic light got John a speeding ticket.
xiv) *Running the traffic light got a speeding ticket for
John.
xv) The game offered the team the possibility of a
championship.
xvi) *The game offered the possibility of a championship
to the team.
A reliable indication of this shift in interpretation is the
ability of these verbs to take a non-animate subject.
56. In the case of possession, the notion of subordination has an
intuitive appeal, in that ownership of an object seems to give one
more rights over its disposition than does mere custody. The
existence of chains of responsibility renders the extension of
subordination to these cases not totally implausible. Even these
cases make one somewhat uncomfortable, however. But I see no
intuitive way in which to extend this notion to speaking and hear-
ing. Rather, it seems as if we are dealing here with two sides
of the same linguistic coin.
57. The problem is non-trivial, since for many of the to-dative
cases the role of the intention relation in the set of truth-
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conditions will be indistinguishable from the for-dative cases.
58. For instance, consider a sentence like (i):
i) John showed the picture to Mary.
Sentence (i) does not meet the transferrance criterion, since
evidently the sentence can be true if John merely ushers Mary
into a room in which the picture is hanging: thus, there is no
relation between John and the picture. If our arguments con-
cerning the necessity of an independent double object subcategoriza-
tion for show in section 4.3 are correct, however, the fact that
show apparently does not meet the transferrance criterion does
not affect our analysis in a serious way. It is a problem for
the conjecture stated in the text that the verbs of Case 1 do
not occur in the prepositional construction because they fail
to meet the transferrance criterion.
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II. Syntactic Aspects of the Dative Constructions
a. Introduction
In Part One, certain semantic aspects of the dative
constructions have been discussed, and we have suggested
formulations of the dative alternations which account for
certain aspects of the domains in question. The question now
arises as to the status of the dative alternations in a
grammar of contemporary English. Are they transformational
rules which map phrase-markers onto phrase-markers, or are
they rules of lexical redundancy? Solid support for the
transformational alternative would exist if it could be
shown that the postulation of a dative transformation pro-
vided some insight into some of the syntactic idiosyncrasies
of the dative constructions. As an illustration of this type
of argument, consider the interaction of the there-insertion
transformation and the passive transformation: there-
insertion applies to the output of the passive, which in turn
operates on the output of there-insertion. If a similar
interaction with transformational rules could be found, it
would support a transformational account of the dative
alternation.
In the sections that follow we shall not deal with all
the problems that arise in giving a complete description of
the syntax of the dative constructions. The reason for
this is that if no standard account of the problem exists,
165
and it seems unlikely that a transformational account of the
dative alternations will provide insight into the problem,
then solutions to these problems--although of interest--do
not bear on the choice between alternatives that we are
considering. Rather, we will concentrate on cases for which
there is some initial plausibility to the value of a trans-
formational account. The cases we have chosen involve
pronominal restrictions on the second object in the double
object construction, the interaction of the passive and the
dative constructions, the interaction of the dative con-
structions with particles, and movement constraints on the
double object construction. For each of these cases, we
shall argue that a transformational account of the dative
alternation provides no insight into the syntactic problem
at issue. Since for the most part we take up each question
in isolation, Part Two has a certain fragmentary character.
But it is important to decide each case on its own merits,
and the conclusion that we arrive at plays an important role
in Part Three, where we take up the status of the dative
alternation in more detail.
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1. Pronominal Restrictions on the Double Object Construction.
1.0 It has often been noted that double-object constructions
in which the second object is an unstressed definite pronoun
are ungrammatical. Thus, contrast (1) and (2):
1) John sent it to Arnold.
2) *John sent Arnold it.
In this section, we will consider two ways in which to
account for the deviance of (2): one based on a transform-
ational account of the dative alternation; one based on an
output filter. I will argue that the output filter is
superior to the transformational account in several respects.
1.1 Pronominal instances of the second object.
Under certain conditions, the second object may be
pronominal. Note first of all that if a pronominal second
object bears stress, a situation compatible with a contrast-
ive, emphatic, or deictic interpretation, sentences like (3)
are much improved. It is necessary to change the pronoun in
question, however, since it is incapable of bearing stress.
3) I know you had to send her something, but why did
you send Mary them?
Second, what happens in a case in which both NP's are
pronouns? In my speech there is a hierarchy of acceptability
based on two parameters: greater reduction of the first
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pronoun increases acceptability; greater prominence of the
second pronoun increases acceptability.
In (4) below, I have constructed a table based on four
distinct phonetic realizations of the pronoun them: EM, cE
3iiv Aw.31
S1 v 4M~
Ranking all of these combinations in a precise way is a
task for which I have neither the talent nor the patience.
Nevertheless, I think the point is clear: the crucial aspect
of this problem has to do with the relative prominence of
the pronouns involved. Furthermore, as it happens, pronouns
differ from one another with respect to factors like re-
duceability, the ease with which they cliticize to the verb,
and so forth. Compare the following cases, for example:
5) Gimme it (back)!
6a) *He didn't give you it, did he.
b) ?*He didn't give ya it, did he.
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Note as well, that when the pronoun is indefinite, violations
comparable to (2) do not exist:
7) The reason you didn't get one was that I never sent
you one.
8) I sent Arnold one as well.
With respect to full NP's, there seem to be no restrictions
at all:
9) I sent John the package.
10) I sent John a package.
11) I handed a man a leaflet.
12) I handed an usher the ticket.
1.2 Two accounts of the pronominal restriction.
1.2.1 A surface filter
We may describe the above array of facts in terms of a
surface filter stated as follows:
13) The following surface structure is ungrammatical
if NP1 is higher on the scale of prominence than
NP2 -
VP
.. V NP1  NP2 '''
'Prominence' is defined with respect to the
following hierarchy: a lower number reflects lower
prominence.
1. cliticized pronouns
2. me, it
3. us, you
4. other third person pronouns
5. everything else.
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Such a filter or output condition is a descriptive device.
It is possible that future insights into the English in-
tonational system may allow us to dispense with it.
1.2.2 A transformational account.
If the data presented in section 2 are correct, it is
incorrect to include in the specification of the structural
description of the dative movement transformation, as is
sometimes done, a requirement to the effect that the direct
object must be non-pronominal. Furthermore, assuming that
our hierarchy of prominence is in fact correct, it is not
clear that the sort of conditional dependency which this
hierarchy reflects can be formulated in any simple way in
terms of conditions on analyzability. Ignoring such details,
however, and assuming for the sake of exposition that a
transformational account takes the prepositional dative form
as basic, we may formulate the transformational rule as
follows:
14) X-V-NP- tor -NP-Y
1 2 3 4 5 6 --- 1-2-5-3-0-6
condition: term 5 is not higher on the hierarchy
of prominence than term 3.
1.3 A comparison.
In the cases so far discussed, the transformational
account and the output condition are equivalent. Yet there
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are two ways in which the different theories have different
consequences. First, on the transformational account, any
application of rule (14) is subject to the stated condition.
Therefore, no derivation may include an application of (14)
which violates this condition. On the output-condition
theory, such applications are allowed just so long as the de-
rivation in which they occur does not result in a structure
which violates the output condition stated in (13). Second,
on the transformational account, the deviance of sentences
like (2) is incurred as a result of the misapplication of
(14). Thus, if the structure ruled out by the output con-
dition (13) should be generated independently of the appli-
cation of (14), the output condition (13) will rule it out,
whereas the transformational account based on (14) will take
no stand on the grammatical status of such a structure. On
both these counts, the theory based on the output condition
is superior.
1.3.1 The Passive
We may determine the status of the first difference
between the two accounts by considering the passive trans-
formation. Given standard formulations of the passive trans-
formation, it is obvious that the dative transformation (14)
--or at least that branch of it which contains to in the
fourth term--may only apply before the passive: otherwise its
structural description will not be met. Furthermore, this
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ordering, as is well-known, is necessary in order to generate
sentences such as
15) John was offered the job.
Now, if the condition on rule (14) is correct, the subject of
passives like (15) should never be higher on the hierarchy of
prominence than the direct object (in (15), the job). The
output condition (13) is irrelevant to the grammatical status
of such sentences, since it is applicable only to different
surface structures.
In this case, the transformational account is clearly
falsified. Consider cases like the following:
16) --Did John take the job?
--John was never offered it: how could he take it?
17) --What did the judges think of Harry's etchings?
-- I don't know; for some reason, the judges were
never shown them.
1.3.2 Although the above argument provides sufficient justi-
fication to adopt the account based on (13) over the account
based on (14), there is a more general reason to do so as
well: this is because (13) offers an account of a broader
range of facts than does (14). As I argued in Part One, there
are numerous instances of double object constructions which
do not plausibly undergo rule (14) or something like it in
the course of their derivation. Yet the condition on pro-
minence formulated in (13) holds for these cases as well.
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An account of the deviance of these sentences based on rule
(14) is impossible in these cases, since the application
(or misapplication) of rule (14) is simply irrelevant to
their generation. A few examples:
18) Max sure has an ugly scar. Where did he get it?
*What gave him it?
I*What gave it to him?
19) As for John's talents, I envy them.
20) *As for John's talents, I envy him them.
21) As far as his fortune is concerned, he earned it.
22) *As far as his fortune is concerned, his diligence
earned him it.
In short, the output condition offers a more general state-
ment of these facts than is possible on an account based on
(14).
1.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have attempted to formulate more
precisely the conditions under which a pronominal direct
object affects the grammatical status of double object con-
structions. Furthermore, I have tried to show that the
appropriate way in which to account for the deviance of
sentences like (2) is by means of an output condition. As I
mentioned in section 1.1, it is to be hoped that the
particular features of this output condition will follow from
more general considerations on the properties of English
intonation. One indication of this is that verb-particle
constructions manifest similar restrictions.
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Regardless of whether the output condition (13) follows
from a more sweeping theory of English intonation, however,
if the arguments presented above are valid, then it is clear
that the constraints on pronominal occurrence offer no support
whatsoever to a transformational theory of the dative
alternation.
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2. On the application of the passive transformation to the
double object construction.
2.0 In his classic treatment of the dative constructions,
Fillmore (1965) noted two peculiarities concerning the inter-
action of the passive transformation and the double
object construction. One concerns the fact that some double
object constructions related to 'to-datives' have two
passives; the other concerns the fact that double object
constructions related to 'for-datives' do not normally under-
go the passive at all. In this chapter, I shall present a
theory which accounts for certain hitherto unnoticed proper-
ties of the second passive in double object constructions
related to to-datives. And although I have no completely
satisfactory account of the failure of the passive in the
double object construction related to 'for-datives', I shall
call into question the appropriateness of treating this
problem on the basis of rule-ordering, as Fillmore suggests.
2.1 The problem of two passives.
Fillmore noted the existence of the following paradigm:
1) He gave a book to me.
2) He gave me a book.
3) A book was given to me.
4) I was given a book.
5) A book was given me.
The existence of sentences like (5)--which I refer to as the
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'second passive'--is somewhat problematic. Are we to extend
the passive in some way so as to derive (5) directly by the
passive's application to the structure underlying (2)? Or is
it possible to maintain the form of the passive rule intact,
perhaps by adding a rule deleting to, as suggested in
Jackendoff and Culicover (1971)? Another alternative would
be to monkey around with rule ordering and allow the passive
to apply after the to-dative rule in some derivations
(yielding (4)), and in other derivations allowing the passive
to apply first and fixing up the dative rule somehow so as
to derive (5).
Fillmore's account of allthis is as follows: his
grammar contains the base rules:
6) V -+4 Vtr Nom (Man)
Vtr 
t
Vt A Ac
V A Vtiot
Vtiot Ac -> Vtiot TO Nom
These rules generate trees like his (70), the relevant
details of which I reproduce below:
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7) S
Nom VP
MV
Vb
V
Vtr Nom
Vt
V Ac
Vtiot TO Nom
To generate sentences like (2), Fillmore postulates a rule
deleting 'TO'. If this rule does not apply, the constituent
'AC' is postposed to the right of 'Nom, generating (1).
The passive is formulated:
V tr
8) SD: Nom-(Prev)Aux- -Nom'-Y
Vtiot
1 2 3 4 5
SC: 4-2-BE-EN-3-5-(BY-1)
In other words, phrase-markers like (7) which have undergone
the rule of TO-deletion satisfy the structural description of
(8) in two different ways, thus generating two kinds of
psssives. Although Fillmore's account is adequate to des-
cribe the paradigm presented in(1-5), there are considerations
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concerning the second passive which he failed to address. We
shall propose an alternative account, which, however, is
similar in spirit to the one Fillmore presents.
2..l.1 The most striking aspect of the sentences which
exhibit the second passive is that in virtually all the
examples I have encountered, the indirect object is a pronoun.
For example, of the numerous citations offered by Jespersen
(111.15.22; 111.15.5), only one--from the fifteenth-century
writer Malory--contains a non-pronominal indirect object.
Nor have I found such examples among the extensive data cited
by Poutsma, Similarly, I have encountered examples of this
construction among Mark Twain's letters, on the Op-Ed page
of the New York Times in recent months, and on the CBS
Evening News: in every case the indirect object is a pronoun.2
Compare the following examples:
9) No explanation was given them.
10) The job was offered him.
11) Fake documents were given him.
12) *Who were fake documents given?
13) *Who was the job offered?
14) *The job wasn't offered Max, it was offered Harry.
15) *The tuba was given John Phillips Sousa.
I will offer two ways of treating this phenomenon without
choosing between them. In the first, we postulate a cliti-
cization or restructuring rule which optionally incorporates
the first of two noun phrases to the right of the verb (if
it is a definite pronoun) in s-uch a way as to make a single
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constituent of the verb and pronoun. This rule is written:
16) Cliticization:
SD: X-V- NP - NP - Y
4-pro
+de r
1 2 3 4 5
SC: 1-2+3-4-5
Assuming that the passive transformation preposes the first
NP following V, if (16) applies, then the passive rule will
generate sentences like (5) automatically, since the verb
and the pronominal first object will be analyzed together
as V.
An alternative analysis assimilates the second passive
to the pseudo-passive, which allows a preposition to inter-
vene between the verb and the noun phrase preposed by the
passive transformation. On this formulation, the passive is
written as follows (ignoring details irrelevant to our
purpose):
17) Passive:
SD: X-NP-V- P -NP-Y
NP
+pro
def
1 2 3 4 5 6
SC: 1-5-BE+EN-3-4-6-BY+2
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A question that arises with this formulation, however, con-
cerns the fact that under the usual conventions--in which the
parenthesized material is obligatorily included in the
analysis of the phrase marker if possible--the passive could
never apply to a pronominal first object: obviously a bad
result in view of sentences like (4). If this is correct,
the analysis based on the cliticization rule (16) is to be
preferred.
Ignoring this problem, however, we may see that either
analysis is superior to several possible alternatives. It
is difficult to see how the pronominal restriction could be
incorporated into the passive rule as Fillmore has formulated
it. Furthermore, both of the formulations presented above
differ from accounts which, like that of Jackendoff and
Culicover, are based on a rule of to-deletion applying after
the passive. A consequence of either of our formulations
is that the second passive applies only to cases which occur
in the double object construction. Accounts based on to-
deletion fail to express this dependency and are consistent
with the existence of paradigms which would parallel that
given below with the exception that the sentence corres-
ponding to (20) would be grammatical:
18) Karl reported the news to me.
19) *Karl reported me the news.
20) (*)The news was reported me.
No such paradigms exist, however, and it is a point in
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favor of the analyses we have suggested that they are both
inconsistent with this possibility.
Furthermore, we expect to find sentences like:
21) My sins were forgiven me.
Although judgments here are not notable for their reliability,
I believe that (21) is easily possible, whereas (20) is
quite impossible. The point is that there is no evidence to
suggest that (21) should be derived from either of the sen-
tences in (22):
22) *NP forgave my sins to me.
NP for gave my sins for me.
If this is correct, it provides further evidence for the
superiority of either one of our formulations over a rule of
to-deletion.
2.1.2 A digression.
If this account of the second passive is correct, it
might be of interest to consider how it developed during the
course of the history of English. Although I have not been
able to undertake this task with any thoroughness, the
examples cited by Jespersen suggest the following conjecture.
At the initial stage at which we are interested, the
English passive was defined over the case system, the
accusative becoming the derived subject. There was also a
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rule fronting the dative to the initial position. (An alter-
native here would be to consider the fronting process a
single rule, operating on both cases; the distinction be-
tween the two cases would lie in the fact that only the
accusative became nominative and triggered subject-verb
agreement.) This system is essentially the same as the
present German system.
Gradually, however, the passive was restructured so that
it applied only to the first NP following the verb. This
restructuring was probably intimately tied up with the loss
of case-marking. It is well-known that the pronominal
system was (and is) the last bastion of case distinction in
English. Therefore, we might expect that the pronominal
dative might be the final holdout in the struggle between
the case-defined passive and the order-defined passive. In
the transition from the one to the other, the addition of
the cliticization rule (16) or the modification of the pas-
sive transformation suggested in (17) would facilitate things
by keeping the data base more or less homogeneous.
2.2 The interaction of the passive and 'for-datives'
Fillmore also noticed the difference reflected in the
following paradigms:
23 a) Nelson gave a ranch to Max.
b) A ranch was given to Max by Nelson.
c) Nelson gave Max a ranch.
d) Max was given a ranch by Nelson.
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24 a) Nelson bought a ranch for Max.
b) A ranch was bought for Max by Nelson.
c) Nelson bought Max a ranch.
d)?* Max was bought a ranch by Nelson.
He proposed to account for this difference by ordering the
rule of for-dative movement, a necessary preliminary to the
generation of (24d) after the passive transformation, thus
blocking the generation of (24d). This proposal has also
the advantage of blocking what we called above the second
passive from applying in the case in which the first object
is related to sentences with for-datives, and in fact there
appear to be no sentences of this type. Yet there are
grounds for wondering whether ordering is in fact the correct
way of handling this problem.
2.2.1 First, there are sentences which involve the
application of the passive to cases which would be derived
from for-datives in such a system which are better than we
would expect on such an account.
25) ?I don't see how you can be gotten any more money than
we've already found for you.
26) ?After a great deal of trouble on the part of the
organizers, John was finally found a place
to stay in a fraternity house several blocks
away from the building in which the meetings
were to be held.
27) ?Hearst had himself built a fantastic and opulent
mansion along the coast to the north of
Los Angeles.
Such sentences are stylistically complex, to be sure, and in
ways which probably favor the order of constituents which
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the application of the passive produces. But such sentences
do not exhibit the striking ungrammaticality which is in-
volved in cases of ordering violations where the ordering
of two rules is known to be essential, e.g. the ordering of
passive and subject-verb agr-ement, for example:
28) The police were arresting me.
29) *I were being arrested by the police.
It would be rash to claim any sort of special intuition as
to the kind of ungrammaticality which is produced by dif-
ferent sorts of violations of the structure of the grammar.
Nevertheless, we note the possibility that ordering arrange-
ments which are necessary for the production of certain
grammatical sentences have a different theoretical status
than ordering arrangements which are postulated to block the
generation of certain ungrammatical sentences. The justi-
fication for this distinction is that in the one case, the
postulated ordering is essential, whereas in the latter case,
there are other means available to block ungrammatical cases.
2.2.2 Acquisition of ordering
Let us assume that Fillmore's ordering is correct. It
follows that those who know the language will not produce
sentences like (24). Further, let us assume that a child is
presented with data similar to (23-d) and (24-c), but nothing
corresponding to (24-d). And let us suppose that the child
never utters a sentence like (24-d)--or, if so, that the
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lapse goes uncorrected. Now, given this situation, how can
Fillmore's system account for the fact that children become
adults who reject sentences like (24-d), even when they hear
such sentences for the first time (as often happens in
introductory syntax classes, one may suppose). Or, to put
it another way, on what basis will the child assign the proper
ordering to the for-dative rule? We must assume that the
child has a principled way of assigning the correct ordering
to these two rules in the absence of data which bears on the
problem--in this case it might be something like "assume
bleeding order unless presented with evidence to the con-
trary". However, if the ordering principles suggested in
Williams (1974) are correct--they basically extend the cyclic
principle to phrase nodes beneath the sentence level--, then
such a principle is incorrect, and in fact, the ordering
suggested by Fillmore would be impossible.
2.2.3 Williams (1974) has pointed out that there exist
cases in which indirect objects related to to-phrases fail
to undergo the passive transformation. 3 Some cases of this
are:
30) John slipped a $5 bill to the usher.
John slipped the usher a $5 bill.
?*The usher was slipped a $5 bill.
31) If I shove the salt to you, will you stop crying?
If I shove you the salt, will you stop crying?
?*If you're shoved the salt, will you stop crying?
(cf. If you're passed the salt, will you stop crying?
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Although such examples do not directly falsify Fillmore's
ordering hypothesis, taken together with the examples in 3.1,
they do cast doubt on the claim implicit in Fillmore's
analysis that there is a strong distinction in kind to be
made between the passivizability of the double object con-
structions related to to-datives and those related to for-
datives.
2.2.4 In fact, the examples cited directly above are re-
lated to a larger problem. It is known that there are ex-
ceptions to the passive transformation for which there can
be no solution based on the ordering of transformations.
Jackendoff (1972) has pointed out cases for which Gruber's
system of thematic relations provides a promising analysis.
For example, in some cases (but not all), the notion of
agency is apparently relevant:
32) The police neared the house (*carefully).
33) The police approached the house (carefully).
34) *Let's near the house.
35) Let's approach the house.
36) *The house was neared by the police.
37) The house was approached by the police.
In terms of thematic relations, the subject of the verb near
is Theme, its object is Goal. As the absence of manner
adverbials and the non-occurrence of near beneath the hor-
tatory let's indicate, the subject of near cannot be inter-
preted agentively. Approach differs from near in this regard.
Approach is like near in that its subject is Theme, its object
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Goal. But if the tests given are a reliable indication, it
allows an agentive interpretation of its subject. This
difference correlates with the passivizability of approach
and the non-passivizability of near. Note in particular that
when the subject of approach cannot be interpreted agentively
(i.e. when it is inanimate), it too refuses to passivize:
38) The tornado approached the town.
39) *The town was approached by the tornado.
with
It is/respect to examples like this one that the Thematic
Hierarchy Condition proposed by Jackendoff is of interest.
Suppose we modify Jackendoff's hierarchy in the follow-
ing way. We set up a new Thematic Relation called (following
Williams) Intentional Goal, and place this Thematic Relation
at the very top of Jackendoff's thematic hierarchy. Assuming
the validity of Jackendoff's framework, this further as-
sumption would block the passive from applying to cases in
which the left-most NP is related to for-datives. In fact,
there is some indication that this speculation is not al-
together ad hoc. The Thematic Relation 'Intentional Goal'
would subsume more cases than simply the for-datives, for
instance various motional cases. Thus, the (pseudo-) passive
in the following cases would be blocked correctly.
40) The group headed for Los Angeles
41) *Los Angeles was headed for by the group.
42) John reached for the money.
43) *The money was reached for by John.
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Whether or not an account of the difficulty of passiviz-
ing indirect objects related to for-datives based on Jacken-
doff's Thematic Hierarchy can be given adequate justification,
it is not implausible to suppose that a more adequate account
of the passive transformation in general might include the
lack of passive subjects related to for-datives as a special
case.
2.2.5 Summary.
Although we have not succeeded in formulating a satis-
factory account of the relation between indirect objects
with a for-dative interpretation and the passive transforma-
tion, I have tried to present several arguments to show that
a skeptical attitude toward Fillmore's ordering hypothesis
is clearly warranted. We have tentatively suggested an
alternative to Fillmore's theory based on Jackendoff's them-
atic hierarchy condition. Other promising lines of research
also exist which are consistent with the position that the
ungrammaticality of (2d) is not due to the violation of two
extrinsically ordered rules (e.g. Fiengo's (1974) notion of
'property-interpretation'). Given this state of affairs, we
may conclude that the evidence which Fillmore's ordering
hypothesis provides for a transformational account of the
dative alternation is far from overwhelming.
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3. An analysis of particles and their interaction with the
dative constructions.
3.0 Emonds (1971)has proposed an account of the interaction
of the dative constructions and particle movement which, if
correct, would be a strong argument for a transformational
account of the dative constructions, since no simple alter-
native treatment seems to be available. Emonds argues further
that his account of the dative alternation lends support to
his "structure-preserving" hypothesis, since, as he puts it,
"for reasons which have nothing to do with what I call the
"structure-preserving constraint on transformations", we are
led to formulate the indirect object movement rule or rules
as structure-preserving." Implicit in this statement is the
claim that the structure-preserving hypothesis is of ex-
planatory value, since it forces the grammarian/language-
learner to choose automatically the most highly-valued
analysis. On the other hand, Emond's conclusion has an un-
fortunate consequence: if his statement of the rules is the
most highly-valued, then it is necessary to add permutations
to the set of transformational operations--an increase in the
power of transformations.
In spite of the attractiveness of Emonds's solution, I
do not think that it can be right. I shall first sketch the
fundamental points of Emonds's account. I shall then criticize
it and propose an alternative account.
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3.1 Emonds's account.
The grammar that Emonds proposes has the following base
rules and transformations:
1) PP -+ P (NP)
2) VP -+ V (NP) (PP) (PP)...
3) Particle Movement:
X+V- [NroI [P1P - Y
1 2 3 4 --* 1-3-2-4, where 1234 is a VP
4) Dative Movement
X+VNP PP or -NP] - YX~~I-prol-(PpL foJ
1 2 3 4 5 6 --* 1-5-3-0-2-6
In other words, in this grammar, particles are analyzed as
intransitive prepositions, the base position for particles
is to the right of the direct object, particle movement is
stated as a transformation which moves the particle from
right to left, and dative movement is a transformation which
permutes the direct object and the NP complement of to or for
around an optional intervening preposition, erasing the pre-
position to or for in the process.
The argument that particles are in fact intransitive
instances of prepositions is based on a variety of evidence:
190
5) i) lexical overlap
ii) simplification of subcategorization with respect
to verbs which take directional complements
iii) the distribution of the word right
iv) simplification of the statement of the formation
of a certain "expletive construction"
v) simplification of the statement of the rule of
directional adverb preposing.
With respect to the prepositional dative construction, Emonds
claims that the particle can appear freely in either the
post-verbal or the post-object position:
6) V-NP-P-PP: The treasurer
the members.
7) V-P-NP-PP: The treasurer
the members.
With respect to the double object
sent the schedules out to
sent out the schedules to
construction, Emonds claims
that there are three dialects:
8) Dialect A: V-NP-P-NP
V-P-NP-NP
*V-NP-NP-P
Dialect B: V-NP-P-NP
? *V-P-NP-NP
*V-NP-NP-P
Dialect C: like Dialect A with respect to to-datives;
like Dialect B with resDect to for-datives
In Dialect A, dative movement is ordered before particle
This generates the appropriate range of structures:
9) V-NP-P- to-NPfor
V-NP-P-NP
V-P-NP-to rNPfor
(neither rule applies
(dative movement only)
(particle movement only)
movement.
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V-P-NP-NP (dative movement, then particle
movement)
Tn Dialect B, particle movement is ordered before dative
movement. Since the application of particle movement
destroys the structural description of dative movement, there
can be no derivation in which both rules apply.
10) N-NP-P- to -NP (neither rule applies)
f or (particle movement applies; the
structural description of dative
movement is not met)
V-NP-P-NP (particle movement has not applied;
dative movement has applied)
Finally, for Dialect C, the order of rules is taken to be:
first, to-dative movement; then particle movement; and
finally for-dative movement. This order yields the results
Emonds desires.
3.2 Critique of Emonds's account
We note first of all that it is of fundamental im-
portance to Emonds's account that there be only one base
position for particles (especially with respect to the dative
constructions). The reason for this is that if there is more
than one base position, then there is likely to be more than
one rule which affects particles; and since Bmonds's argu-
ments for formulating dative movement as a permutation
transformation are based primarily on the fact that, given
his assumptions about dialects, alternative formulations
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introduce ad hoc complications. But as we will show, Emonds's
account already contains rather ad hoc complications, at
least some of which can be avoided.
3.2.1 Consider the sentences
11 a) Give that book back to me.
b) *Give that book to me back.
12 a) Give that book right back to me.
b) *Give that book to me right back.
13 a) Give me back that book.
b) Give me that book back.
14 a) *Give me right back that book.
b) Give me that book right back.
On Emonds's assumptions, the underlying structure of the sen-
tences in (13) must be the structure underlying (lla);
similarly, the underlying structure of (14b) must be the
structure underlying (12a). Emonds notes the existence of
double-object constructions in which the particle occurs
finally, but he dismisses them as "unsystematic and quite
limited in number",, and his grammar does not generate such
constructions. In order to generate (13b), we might add to
his grammar a rule which shifts the particle (in some cases)
to the right. But in order to generate (14b) we must in-
corporate more radical changes, for the presence of right in
the underlying structure of (14b)--compare (12a)--has the
effect that the structural description of his dative movement
rule is not satisfied. This may be accomplished by allowing
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the dative permutation rule to operate around more than a
single particle. Note, however, that the rule apparently
may not operate if the only intervening material is the word
right.
15 a) John tossed the ball right to me.
b) *John tossed me right the ball.
c) *John tossed me the ball right.
Moreover, we must either make the right-left particle move-
ment rule obligatory when we have the combination right+par-
ticle or add a surface condition to govern the distribution
of right. 5 In short, Emonds's account as it stands needs
considerable ad hoc patchwork if it is to attain descriptive
adequacy.
Emonds's arguments against two alternatives to a per-
mutational account of dative movement--one which the direct
object moves to the right of the indirect object, and one in
which the indirect object moves to the left of the direct
object--are both based on the putative fact that such ac-
counts necessitate ad hoc complications in the rules which
generate what he takes to be the correct particle positions.
However, in either case, one could just as easily come to
the opposite conclusion: namely, we may attempt to formulate
the rule which accounts for the final position of the particle
in (13b) and (14b) in such a way as to ensure that it will
generate what is presumably the correct class of cases.
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Let us see whether this can in fact be done. Consider
again the structural analysis of the dative rule as Emonds
presents it (his (27)):
16) X+V - NP - (P) - [ for - NP1 PP fr 2
-pro
The first alternative is that NP2 moves to the left over NP .
Then it would appear, as Emonds points out, that "an optional
position for particles will be after two object NP's,...no
matter what order is used for particle movement and indirect
object movement." Since Emonds thinks that such a position
is ungrammatical except for a "quite limited" number of cases,
he argues that this can be avoided only by adding an ad hoc
condition to the particle movement rule making the rule ob-
ligatory in a second environment N-NP-NP-PRT. Furthermore,
the adoption of such a solution destroys the possibility of
using particle-movement to describe the dialectal differences
which Emonds assumes.
The existence of such "dialects" is, as far as I can
tell, extremely dubious. Although I have undertaken no
systematic study of this question, everyone I have questioned
about the different types of sentences used to differentiate
these dialects accepts a mixture from all the different
sentence types. I think it is correct to say, as Emonds does,
that the most favored position for the particle in the double
object construction is medially between the two NP's. As
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far as the other positions are concerned, there is consider-
able variability: thus, although a given speaker may accept
sentences of the form V-PRT-NP-NP (whether the inside NP is
a 'to-dative' or a 'for-dative') in every case there will be
sentences whose derivation is the same but which are unac-
ceptable. For instance, with respect to 'to-datives', it
seems to me that facts like the following pertain:
17) Can't you send me some over right away?
18) Can't you send me over some right away?
19) ?*Can't you send Jefferson some over right away?
20) Can't you send Jefferson over some right away?
21) ??Can't you send over Jefferson some right away?
22) Hand me over your gun, Cafone.
23) ?*Hand the cop over your gun, Cafone.
24) ?*Hand over the cop your gun, Cafone.
In other words, although the data are themselves far from
clear, it would not appear that Emonds's account goes very
far in giving us a workable account of the variation we en-
counter in this area. Thus, those of his arguments based on
"dialectal" evidence seem to be of little value.
If we disregard the dialect argument, then, we are still
left with the problem of adding a new environment to the
particle movement rule, and furthermore, of stating conditions
of applicability on this rule. But on this count, it should
be noted, the added rule is no different from the other rules
in Emonds's system, for his particle rule will also have to
be supplemented either by a more subtle set of conditions on
applicability or by elaborate exception mechanisms. We find
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cases in which the particle can occupy only the inside
position:
25) That solution of yours is giving off a terrible
odor.
*That solution of yours is giving a terrible odor
off.
26) The factory turns out lathes and dies.
*The factory turns lathes and dies out.
27) I've given up going.
*I've given going up.
We also find cases in which the particle must occur to the
right of the object in simple cases:
28) Keep your head down.
*Keep down your head.
29) That dog's barking his head off.
*That dog's barking off his head.
30) The waves knocked our boat about.
*The waves knocked about our boat.
In other words, the question of dialects aside, the addition
of the extra condition on the particle movement rule is not
an ad hoc amendment, but necessary to the grammar in order to
generate (13b), (14b), (17), etc. And in fact some rule of
this kind is needed independently to account for sentences
like the following, which have neither a 'to-dative' nor a
'for-dative' source:
31) Max gave Harry a kick, so Harry gave Max back a
kick.
32) Max gave Harry a kick, so Harry gave Max a kick
back.
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On the theory we will develop below, the underlying structure
for both sentences will be (32) and we will need a rule which
generates (31).
Thus, the only ad hoc complications which are neces-
sitated by the first alternative (leftward movement of the
dative NP) involve an account of the dialect differences
which Emonds sets up, and these distinctions are of dubious
value. The second alternative is to move the direct object
to the right of the indirect object. Again, one may question
the strength of the argument, since it is based, like the
argument against the first alternative, on the fact that
ad hoc complications are necessitated by adding a rule. But,
as in the first case, one can claim with equal justification
that an extra rule is independently necessary, and thus this
argument also fails.
3.2.2 There are further respects in which Emonds's
account lacks the means of accounting for certain distinctions.
Some of these will be seen in later sections. But I think
that it is clear that in its primary goal--the attempt to
account for the three postulated dialects--Emonds's theory
is directed at a misconceived aim, since it is highly un-
likely that such dialects exist in anything like the form
that Emonds suggests. And apart from arguments based on
these dialectal distinctions, the arguments simply do not go
through.
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3.3.0 An alternative: multiple base positions.
In attempting to construct a more viable theory of
particles in English, we are faced, as I see it, with two
basic problems, and several ancillary ones. First, the
problem of generating the particles in the base: here there
are two interrelated aspects. One concerns what category to
assign particles, the second conerns the position or positions
in the base to which the phrase-structure rules assign
particles (or the category to which they belong). The second
problem is to devise a set of rules which generate the cor-
rect set of surface structures from the assigned base
positions. Among the ancillary problems we include such
matters as productivity.
In certain respects, the account which I shall outline
here is very close in spirit to those of Fraser (1965) and
Williams (1974), in particular with respect to the fact that
I shall argue that the base contains at least two particle
positions. In order to develop the argument for this, how-
ever, I should like to leave temporarily in abeyance the
status of the directional particle.
Although most of Emonds's arguments for the pre-
positional nature of the particles are based on directional
particles only (cf. (511-v), I have no quarrel with his
conclusion that particles be assigned to the category P
(reposition). But I think it is salutary to survey a few
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other environments in which particles appear.
3.3.1 First, we note that particles (along with other
prepositional phrases) appear to the right of the copula:
33) The doctor is out.
The party is over.
The parts aren't together.
The cars are off.
The race is on.
The shades are down.
All bets are off.
Livingstone is back.
The final returns from the second ward aren't in
yet.
A convenient way to express this fact is to have the copula
generated between NP and a node PRED, which in turn can be
rewritten in a variety of ways: either AP, NP, or PP. An
alternative, to analyze these particles as adjectives, is
open to the objection that particles do not occur prenominal-
ly. The convenience of this account is in part due to the
fact that PRED is optionally generated at the end of the VP
under certain conditions.7
Now, if the foregoing is correct, and particles are
generated under the node PRED in copular sentences (pre-
sumably with an intervening PP node, then we ought to expect
that particles may be inserted at the end of the verb phrase
when PRED is generated there. Evidently, this mode of
introduction is to be distinguished from that which Emonds
suggests via directional and other prepositional phrases.
200
3.3.2 Second, it appears to be the case that members of
each of the major lexical categories noun and adjective may
have the morphological form X+PRT, where we leave 'X' un-
specified. In particular, I have in mind such words as
[hard-up]A, [stand-off]N, [well-off]A, [hard-on], [bang-up]A,
etc. Such morphological structures are especially prevalent
in forms derived from verbs, it is true, but such forms
exist independently as well, as I think the examples given
show. Now, if categories are represented as feature-complexes
of some sort, as suggested in Chomsky (1970) and supported
by some recent work (cf. particularly Bresnan, 1975), we
might expect that it would be a more general fact if verbs
exhibited the same morphological characteristics. Although
such reasoning is not a compelling argument for the acceptance
of such a proposal, the advantages of accepting the hypo-
thesis that verbs of the form V+PRT also exist are not
trivial: on the basis of this extra position, we can approach
with better accuracy a satisfactory account of several
interrelated phenomena.
3.3.3 Consider the case of count out. We have:
34) We counted out some money.
35) We counted some money out.
36) We can count John out.
37) *We can count out John.
Let us suppose that the difference between (34-35) and
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(36-37) is in fact a case of structural ambiguity and that
the underlying structures assigned are as follows:
38) S
VP
NP V P NP
we counted out some money.
39) S
NP VP
V NP PRED
we counted John out
Now note two further facts: the first concerns accent, the
second morphology. If we compare (35) and (36), we find
that whereas in (36) the nuclear accent falls on out, in
(35) it falls on money. In section 4.5 we will propose a
rule which derives (35) from the structure given in (38) by
means of a rule which moves the particle to the right of an
adjacent NP. Clearly, then, the surface structures of (35)
and (36) will be distinct, since (36) contains the node
PRED. There are several ways in which this structural
distinction can be used to determine the difference in
accentuation: one is to order the particle movement rule
after the nuclear stress rule has applied (at either the
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VP-level or the S-level); another is to let the nuclear
stress rule apply to primary stresses only if they are
dominated by either a major lexical category (N,V,A) or by a
phrase node within the relevant domain; another is to let
stress be assigned to the node which dominates the lexical
material rather than the lexical material itself. I shall
not attempt to choose among these alternatives here, as they
take us far afield from the domain of this inquiry. Of
importance here, however, is the fact that the distinction
in structures provides a sound basis for a distinction in
accentual properties, and the difference in accentual
properties is correlated with different positional possibili-
ties.
3.3.4 The second fact of interest concerns the so-called
action nominal. It has been noted in the literature that
nominals do not allow the node PRED to be generated in the
complement:
40) *the painting of the house red (took seven hours)
41) *the killing of heretics dead (is no longer
practiced in Spain)
We would presume, then, that there is no action nominal
corresponding to (36). Yet we might expect that there
would be one corresponding to (34). This is in fact the
case:
42) the counting out of the money (took seven hours)
43)*the counting of John out (was a mistake)
44)*the counting out of John (was a mistake)
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Thus, our hypothesis is consistent with two facts which
are difficult to handle in the framework which Emonds presents,
and our hypothesis would seem to follow from rather trivial
observations about the properties of the base as they are
currently understood.
It should be noted incidentally that there is some
semantic support (for whatever it is worth here) for con-
sidering (36) to be an instance of a particle in the predicate
position. This has to do with the interpretation of out. We
simply note that there does exist a use of out to the right
of the copula which has roughly the interpretation "not
involved", which is more or less the contribution of out to
the interpretation of (36).
3.3.5 If what has been said about base positions above is
correct, then we have the following situation: particles can
be generated as immediate adjucnts to the verb, and they can
be generated under the node PRED. In fact, I also agree with
Emonds that particles can be generated as 'intransitive'
prepositional phrases (especially directional phrases) in
positions normally filled by full prepositional phrases. For
convenience, we shall refer to those particles which originate
in the first way as 'verbal particles', those that originate
under PRED as 'predicational particles', and those that take
the place of full PP's as 'surrogate-PP particles'.
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Given these underlying structures, we can now address
ourselves to the problem of providing appropriate trans-
formational mechanisms to account for the surface distri-
bution.
The first rule we shall need is a rule which shifts the
verbal particle to the right of the first NP to the right,
a rule which is needed to map count out the money onto
count the money out. This rule we write as follows:
45) Particle Movement (left-right)
X-V+PRT-NP-Y
1 2 3 4 5 -4 1-2-0-4-3-5
With respect to the predicational particle, we need
say nothing: the only re-ordering possible will be carried
out by the perhaps infelicitously named rule of Heavy-NP
Shifts:9
46) Heavy-NP Shift
X-NP PREy
1PP
1 2 3 4 -- s 1-0-3-4-2
On independent grounds, this rule will also move (as noted
in the above formulation) an NP to the right of an adjacent
PP. Thus we predict two positions for the surrogate-PP
particle.
Summing up this discussion briefly, we have postulated
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three separate sources for particles with respect to the
cases with which we are concerned. Furthermore, we have
postulated a left-right particle movement rule and have In-
voked the rule of Heavy-NP Shift to account for the surface
distribution of particles. Schematically, then, we have
the following options:
47) base positions possible derived structures
i) verbal particle
VP VP
V PRT NP V NP PRT
ii) predicational particle
VP VP
V NP PRED V PRED NP
PRT
iii) surrogate-PP particle
VP VP
V NP PP V PP NP
PRT PRT
Note that we have as yet no rule to move the particle
to the left. If this is correct, then we might expect that
surrogate-PP particles could only appear to the right of the
direct object, unless Heavy-NP Shift applies (in one of its
two guises; cf. n. 9). In some cases, at least, this appears
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to be the correct result, although it is difficult to make
hard and fast discriminations between the predicational
particle and the surrogate-PP particle. Consider the fol-
lowing case:
48) John helped the man out.
This sentence is ambiguous between a reading on which John
aided the man and a reading on which John was of some
assistance in manoeuvering the man outside some area or en-
closure. Putting the particle to the left of the object
disambiguates (48), as does placing heavier than normal
stress on out:
49) John helped out the mn (aided the man)
50) John helped the man out.
A similar case is
51) John got the horse back.
Either the custody or ownership of the horse was returned to
John, or he brought the horse back (to some designated
location). Placing the particle to the left of the object
again disambiguates in favor of the former reading. Whether
stress also disambiguates this case is not clear as in the
former case.
52) John got back the horse. (=the horse is again
John's)
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53) John got the horse back.
3.3.6 We have seen that the positional properties of the
particle are most significant in assigning it to one or the
other of the various base positions. The accentual proper-
ties of the particle have also been relevant. It should be
noted, however, that semantic criteria do not provide a very
accurate way of telling what the underlying structure is.
There is no reason to expect, for instance, that a verbal
particle may not contribute a 'directional' aspect to the
interpretation of the V+PRT constituent of which it is a
part. For example, in the following cases, the particle
away might loosely be classified (semantically) as 'direction-
alt in both cases, but the syntactic properties of the two
cases differ, suggesting that a distinction in underlying
structure will be of use:
54) John drove the wolves away.
55) John drove away the wolves.
56) John drove the car away.
57) *John drove away the car.
In this case, the stressability criterion seems rather in-
conclusive. But stressability, fortunately, is not the sole
criterion. There are other advantages to assigning these
cases to distinct underlying structures: consider the place-
ment of adverbs.
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58) John drove the wolves away slowly.
59) *John drove the wolves slowly away.
60) John drove the car slowly away.
61) John drove the car away slowly.
A reasonable way to handle this difference is to claim that
in the 'wolves' case, the particle away is a verbal particle,
which can move to the right only over an adjacent NP: this
blocks the generation of (59). Of course something more
must still be said about (60), even under the hypothesis that
it is predicational particle, but I shall not discuss the
variety of alternatives which suggest themselves.
In any case, the postulation of (at least) two under-
lying positons for particles provides a basis for an account
of this behavior. And in fact we should be able to observe
the distinction in intransitive cases as well, the various
ways of generating the particle being independent of the
existence of one (or two) objects. Thus, consider examples
like:
62) The parade passed by quickly.
63) The parade passed quickly by.
64) Max passed out quickly.
65) *Max passed quickly out.
Such differences lend support to the underlying distinction
between inside and outside particles--verbal particles as
against either predicational particle or surrogate-PP par-
ticle--, and provide further evidence against theories like
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Emonds's in which there is only one base position available.
3.3.7 Complex cases.
3.3.7.1 In certain cases, the verb phrase contains
both a particle and a prepositional phrase, or a particle
and a predicate adjective or nominal. Such cases have im-
portant consequences. Consider first the following case:
66) John pushed away the place.
67) John pushed the plate away.
68) John pushed the plate away from him.
69) *John pushed away the plate from him.
Within the theory being developed here, we have a choice: we
can maintain that in (66-67), away is a verbal particle; or
we can allow the rule of Heavy-NP Shift, as formulated above
in (46), to apply more readily in the case that PP dominates
only P than is usual. On the first alternative, we must
assume that the verbal compound push away is not subcate-
gorized for- directional prepositional phrases in order to
block (69). On the second alternative, which seems prefer-
able, we need only make the rather natural assumption that
away from him forms a single prepositional phrase. Since we
have at our disposal no rule which moves particles (or
prepositions) to the left, (69) will not be generated. If
Heavy-NP Shift applies, by the A-over-A principle we will
only generate sentences like (70); sentences like (69) and
(71) are ungenerable:
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70) John pushed away from him all dishes containing
meat.
71) *John pushed away all dishes containing meat from
him.
In comparison with the case just discussed, it is
instructive to consider cases like the following:
72) John handed off the ball to his fullback.
73) John handed the ball off to his bullback.
In this case, our theory forces us to assume that hand off
is an instance of V+PRT. Whereas in (68) the sequence away
from him forms a deep structure constituent PP, in (73) the
sequence off to his fullback is a derived form, arising from
the application of left-right particle movement, as formulated
in (45).
We may test these consequences of our theory by exam-
ining the placement of adverbs: if our conjectures are correct,
then we should not expect to find adverbs situated between
away and from him in sentences corresponding to (68), whereas
in the case of sentences corresponding to (73) we should
expect that adverbs could occur between off and to his
fullback. What justifies this expectation is first, that
adverbs occur more or less freely between the direct object
and prepositional phrases that follow it, as in (74).
74) Max poured the fat slowly into the fire.
Second, if we have base-generated complex PP's like from
211
under the porch or off the bridge, 10 it is impossible to
place an adverb between from and under, or off and of. Thus,
75) The noise came, evidently, from under the porch.
76) *The noise came from, evidently, under the porch.
77) The soldiers ran quickly off of the bridge.
78) *The soldiers ran off quickly of the bridge.
Tn some cases, we find a particle interacting with a complex
PP:
79) John drew out a knife from within his coat.
80) John drew out a knife swiftly from within his coat.
81) John drew a knife out swiftly from within his coat.
82) ?*John drew a knife swiftly out from within his coat.
83) From within his coat, John drew out a knife.
84) ??From within his coat, John drew a knife out.
85) *Out from within his coat, John drew a knife.
Apart from the questionable status of (84), this range of
facts is precisely what we should expect if draw out is an
instance of the verbal particle.
Returning to the examples given in (66-73), we find the
following kind of interaction with adverbs:
86) John pushed the plate slowly away from him.
87) *John pushed the plate away slowly from him.
88) John had handed the ball off secretly to his
fullback.
89) ?*John had handed the ball secretly off to his
fullback.
These judgments, if they are correct, are roughly in line
with our expectations, given the hypothesis that away from
him is a base constituent, while hand off is a base
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constituent.
3.3.7.2 Jackendoff (1974b) has pointed out that par-
ticles do not move to the right around predicate nominals. 11
90) John grew up a Catholic.
91) *John grew a Catholic up.
We have already noted (cf. n.7) that there is in some cases
a curious relationship between the presence of particles and
the possibility of generating material under the node PRED.
Thus, contrast the above examples with
92) *John grew a Catholic.
Equally striking is the fact that in many transitive cases,
the particle is fixed between the object and the predicate
nominal. Consider the following case:
93) Stanley brought Livingstone back a hero.
We are concerned here with the interpretation which is
related to
94) Livingstone came back a hero.
This reading is not available if we move the particle to the
left of the object (Livingstone).
95) Stanley brought back Livingstone a hero.
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Compare:
96) Stanley brought Livingstone back exhausted.
97) Stanley brought back Livingstone exhausted.
98) Stanley brought Livingstone back a present.
99) Stanley brought back Livingstone a present.
In (96), exhausted may be predicated either of Livingstone or
Stanley; in (97) exhausted is predicated only of Stanley.
In (98-99) Livingstone is interpreted as a 'for-dative'
(which is why (95), parallel to (99), is somewhat bizzare).
In other words, in some cases at least, the particle
is fixed between the object and the predicate modifier. A
set of similar cases:
100) They sent the missionary out rested.
*They sent out the missionary rested.
John put the book down flat.
*John put down the book flat.
Pull the wire out straight.
?*Pull out the wire straight.
There are cases, however, in which the object can
separate the particle and the predicate modifier. Thus
consider:
101) The clerk sent out the check unsigned.
The student handed in the paper late.
This distinction receives a natural formulation in terms of
the system we have set up: the particles which can occur on
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the inside will be generated as verbal particles; those which
appear only on the outside will be generated as predicate
particles. In accordance with the rules we have postulated,
the predicate particle will be fixed, whereas we should
expect (ceteris paribus) that the inside particle should be
able to move. This latter expectation is borne out:
102) The clerk sent the check out unsigned.
The student handed the paper in late.
Thus, with respect to accentuation, the positioning of
adverbs, the behavior of complex cases, the theory being de-
veloped here offers a greater promise of descriptive ade-
quacy than does a theory in which there is only a single base
position for particles. Furthermore, thus far we have not
extended the base rules in any fundamental respect: we have
merely tried to point out ways in which the existing base
rules may be construed as generating particles in more than
one position. Again, a theory based on a single base
position must resort to ad hoc devices in order to account
for such differences.
3.3.8 Analysis, productivity, and compositionality
Given the three possibilities of base generation which
we have postulated, we might expect there to exist, at least
in a gross way, a distinction between the verbal particle,
on the one hand, and the other two types, on the other. The
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basis for this expectation is that the surrogate-PP particle
and the predicational particle should be subject to the same
general mode of interpretation that full prepositional
phrases and other predicate modifiers are respectively subject
to. In other words, although the occurrence of the pre-
dicational particle in a given expression is no guarantee
against idiomaticity (witness our initial example--count NP
out), the lexical association of verb and verbal particle
should be especially conducive to both semantic opaqueness of
the root interpretation of both the verbal stem and the
affixal particle and the possibility of rather radical changes
in the selectional and subcategorizational properties of
the stem verb.
Williams (1974) has pointed out a number of minimal
pairs which may be distinguished according to the base
position of the particle. For example, the particle together
is often used (predicatively) where the contiguousness of two
or more objects is in question; as a verbal particle, on the
other hand, it occurs as a verbal particle where it is the
construction of an object that is in question:
103) John nailed the boards (tightly) together.
104) John nailed the bookcase (*tightly) together.
In other cases, we find more radical changes. Consider
the the various uses of turn down:
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105) The proximity of water turns the dowsing rod down.
106) *The proximity of water turns down the dowsing rod.
107) John turned down the offer.
108) John turned the offer down.
In (105), down is presumably not a verbal particle, as it
cannot occur to the left of the object. Here the selectional
properties of turn (in at least one of its senses) are not
affected; one may turn a dowsing rod. In 9107-108), down is
a verbal particle, which combines with turn with the meaning
'refuse'. In this case, the combination has selectional
properties quite distinct from those of turn.
Similarly, we find cases in which subcategorization is
affected. For example, the particles off and out often
combine with verbs in such a way as to yield new environ-
ments for 'for-datives'.
109) John bit a piece of licorice (*for himself).
110) John bit off a piece of licorice for himself.
Although I shall make no thoroughgoing attempt to
analyze such cases, it seems plausible that the greater
richness of the theory outlined in the above sections offers
a more promising framework for the analysis of such cases
than does a theory in which particles are treated structural-
ly in a single way.
3.4.0 Preliminary recapitulation.
It is useful at this point to summarize briefly the
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basic points of the theory of particles which I am attempting
to set forth.
First, from general considerations about the distri-
bution of particles, it has been suggested that particles can
be generated in three different environments: as adjuncts to
the major lexical categories N, V, A; as intransitive pre-
positional phrases; and, as a result of this latter feature,
as (prepositional) expansions of the node PRED. A conse-
quence of this distribution is that particles can originate
in various places beneath the node VP. Schematically, the
positional possibilities for the base-generation of particles
are as follows:
111) VP
(NP)...PP.. .PRED
V PRT p PP
P
Second, it has been suggested that only those particles
which originate beneath the phrase node PP can bear the
nuclear accent if the verb is transitive.
Third, two rules have been invoked which change the
relative order of the particle and the direct object: the
first is a left-right particle movement rule which separates
the verbal particle from the verb and moves it to the right
of the direct object. The second is the rule usually referred
to as Heavy-NP Shift.
218
Fourth, it has been suggested that this system of base
positions and movement rules is able to account for at least
some problems of adverb placement which are incapable of
solution in a theory which, like that of Emonds, contains only
one base position for particles.
Fifth, by postulating an inside position, we may also
account for the distinction between complex prepositional
phrases complex.predicate modifiersand surface sequences of
the form PRT-PP and PRT-PRFD respectively. Again, adverb
placement is relevant to this inquiry, as well as the pos-
sibility of multiple positions for the particle.
3.4.1 Although in comparison with a theory founded on a
single base position, the theory just outlined, if successful
in treating all of the above areas, appears better-equipped
to achieve descriptive adequacy, it is certainly not without
problems. In particular, it is difficult to account for the
non-proliferation of cases in which more than one particle
occurs, a fact which would appear to be a natural consequence
of a theory based on a single base position.12 Apparently,
although one finds complex particles of the type back up, as
in
112) Toss me back up that wrench, will you Mike?
it is difficult to find cases in which two particles occur
discontinuously, i.e. a putative case analogous to
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113) *John handed back his paper in.
On the account we are considering, we can deal with this lack
of separation only if the particles are both generated to the
right of the direct object. However, we have no principled
way of accounting for the apparent lack of such base
structures.
It should be pointed out, however, that it is not clear
that Emonds's theory fares any better in this regard. Since
it is necessary to generate in some fashion sentences of the
form V-PRT-NP-PP, like (73) above for example, there seems to
be no principled way to exclude the case in which the final
PP contains only an intransitive preposition.
3.4.2 Condition on the particle movement rule.
If the particle movement rule we have postulated were
always applicable, we should never come across cases in which
the particle is fixed to the left of the direct object. As
we-have seen, however, such cases in fact exist.
114) The solution was giving off a terrible stink.
115) *The solution was giving a terrible stink off.
Here we might say that give off is simply marked as an ex-
ception to the particle movement rule. Such a solution is
not terribly illuminating: it provides a way of classifying
the data but is incapable or providing any insight. Further-
more, in this case, I believe that it can be shown that this
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mechanism is inadequate in principle, for such a marking
predicts that verb+particle combinations which exhibit a
fixed position in some cases will exhibit the same fixed
position in all cases. Such a claim is false.
3.4.2.1 The most famous restriction on particle position
concerns the fact that unstressed definite pronouns may not
follow the particles.1 3 Other similar restrictions exist,
however. Consider the fact that when backward pronominali-
zation applies, the antecedent is de-stressed. (Under-
scoring indicates an anaphoric relation below.)
116) After he arrives, I'll have to meet John,
I suppose.
In (116), if he and John refer to the same person, the nuclear
accent is placed on meet; concomitantly, if the nuclear
accent falls on John, he refers to someone else. Now consider
cases like the following:
117) Mary tossed in the suitcase.
118) Mary tossed the suitcase in.
119) After dragging it down to the lake, Mary tossed
the suitcase in.
120)*After dragging it down to the lake, Mary tossed in
the suitcase.
121) I'll call up John.
122) I'll call John up.
123) If you introduce him to me, I'll call John up.
124)*If you introduce him to me, I'll call up John.
In cases like (119) and (123), in which the direct object is
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the antecedent of a pronoun to its left, it cannot receive
the nuclear accent and occurs to the left of the particle
only. 1 4
This constraint is based primarily on the accentual
properties of the sentence--not directly on the fact that
the direct object is the antecedent of an NP to its left.
That this is so can be seen by looking at questions corres-
ponding to the sentences above:
125) After dragging it down to the lake, did Mary
(actually)toss in the suitcase?
126) If I introduce him to you, will you call up John?
In these cases, the pitch rises on the particle and stays
high until the sentence-final rise.
It seems rather implausible to attempt to incorporate
such restrictions into the particle movement rule. An alter-
native is to place the onus of accounting for these sentences
either on the rules which assign intonation to these sen-
tences or on a surface filter which is able to take account
of intonational properties. If this is correct, then, factors
independent of the statement of the particle movement rule
itself play an important role in determining the well-formed-
ness of sentences in which the particle appears in one position
rather than another.
3.4.2.2 In other cases, the particle is fixed on the
inside. At times, this position is mandatory, as with
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give off. There are some other verbs, however, which manifest
more complex behavior. Consider the verb turn out in the
sense in which it means roughly "produce".
127) West Point turns out generals.
If we shift the particle, this interpretation is lost:
128) West Point turns generals out.
The normal interpretation of (128) is that generals are
denied admittance. Another example, in which this interpre-
tation of turn out is not available, has already been
mentioned.
129) The factory turns- out lathes and dies.
130) ?*The factory turns lathes and dies out.
Note that with a few alterations, however, the particle can
appear on the right:
131) The factory turns three lathes out per month.
If these judgments are correct, we shall have to formulate
more general conditions which govern the positioning of the
particle.
It is sometimes suggested that contexts like (127) and
(129) are 'presentational', presumably meaning that like
existential sentences such sentences introduce new material
into the discourse in which they occur. Although such
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nomenclature is too vague to be of much assistance, neverthe-
less it does seem that for certain verbs (apparently only
some verbs are relevant) some distinction along these lines
is appropriate. In support of this conjecture, I cite a few
examples in which a distinction between definiteness and
indefiniteness plays an important role:
132) The discovery of a new continent opened up
unlimited opportunities.
?*The discovery of a new continent opened unlimited
opportunities up.
133) The slaughter of the Indians really opened up
the West.
The slaughter of the Indians really opened the
West up.
134) This treaty will only bring about war.
*This treaty will only bring war about.
135) That's what brought the war about.
136) That's what brought about the war.
3.4.2.3 Summing up this section briefly, we have seen
that the rules which we have proposed to account for the
surface positioning of the particle are not, as they stand,
completely adequate. Nor is it evident how to give a pre-
cise formulation of the conditions which seem to be ne-
cessary. The difficulties involved here are not, however,
confined to the theoretical framework which I have tried to
develop: they are problems for any theory of particles.
In a broader perspective, I have tried to show that
although the theory developed in section 3.4.0 is not free of
problems and fails to settle the question of the positioning
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of the particle completely, it is possible to develop a
theory of particles which has a good deal of empirical content
nevertheless. In the next section we shall extend the domain
of our inquiry to the dative constructions. And, as in the
case of single object constructions, I shall try to show
that although the theory developed here is not strong enough
to account for all aspects of the behavior of particles, it
is not weak enough to lack empirical content and be devoid
of interest.
3.5.0 The particle in the double object construction
We now turn to the dative constructions, particularly
the double object construction. There are two major problems
here. The first concerns determining the conditions under
which we find a given verb occurring with a given particle
in both the prepositional dative construction and the double
object construction. The second concerns the positioning
of the particle.
3.5.1 Our investigation will be conducted on the premise
that the double object construction is base generated in
all cases, Although I shall argue on independent grounds
that this is in fact the case below in Part Three, nothing
crucial hinges on this assumption for this discussion. As
far as I have been able to tell, a transformational account
of the dative alternation which is formulated within the
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general framework for particles adopted here makes essentially
equivalent claims. 15
3.5.1.1 We start with the fact that we are given two
obvious positions for the particle, one to the left of both
NPs, one to the right of both NPs.16 Schematically,
137) VP
? NP NP
V PRT
138) VP
(PRED)
V NP NP PP
P
The rules we have already postulated will operate on both
structures to produce the order V-NP-PRT-NP.
In most cases, this seems to be the preferred position
for the particle. The theoretical status of this preference
is far from clear, however. Judgments are notoriously weak
in this area, not least because it is unclear that the
preference for the medial position is based on grammatical
factors or stylistic ones. Furthermore, we have already
seen cases in which the positioning of the particle seems to
depend in part on such factors as intonation, as well as
factors tied in with 'presentational contexts'. It makes
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no sense to construct a theory whose only purpose is to
account for a range of facts whose status is unclear.
The rules already given suffice to generate the appro-
priate range of surface positions. If it is found that the
conditions of applicability can be formulated in a way which
turns out to be inconsistent with the rules as stated, a con-
sequence of our theory is that new rules would have to be
stated to deal with these cases. As we shall see below, how-
ever, our theory does not stand or fall solely on the basis of
its treatment of the positioning of the particle.
3.5.2. It appears to be a fact of English that we never
find directional phrases (full prepositional phrases)
co-occurring with the double object construction. In other
words, although sentences like (139) exist, there are no sen-
tences of the form V-NP-NP-PP, as in (140), where the PP has a
directional interpretation.
139) John threw the ball down the field to Max.
140) *John threw Max the ball down the field.
On a transformational theory, this fact can be handled in a
number of ways. One is to write the dative movement rule, as
Emonds does, in such a way as to allow the rule to operate
only in case the dative NP is separated from the direct object
by the preposition to (or for) and at most one or two parti-
cles: the presence of an intervening full PP blocks the
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application of the rule.
There are two major drawbacks to this account. First, it
has to see how this theory can block the generation of cases
like the following:
141) ?*John kicked me in the soccer ball.
The source for (141) on a transformational theory of the
dative alternation is the well-formed (142):
142) John kicked the soccer ball in to me.
The difficulty arises from the fact that neither kick nor in
can be marked as exceptions to the dative transformation.
Nor is it likely that kick in can be so marked, since by our
criteria, kick in is not even a lexical item: in constitutes a
surrogate-PP particle in this case as the following examples
indicate.
143) ?*John kicked in the soccer ball to me.
144) John kicked the soccer ball slowly in to me.
The second drawback to the transformational account of
the lack of directional PP's in the double object construction
is its essentially ad hoc character: there is no reason why
the restriction might have been completely different.
Consider the fact that directional phrases in combination
normally have a canonical linear order, roughly corresponding
to (iconic) order source-path-goal. Thus, although we find
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sentences like
145) John threw the ball down the field past the 50-yard
line to the tight end.
we cannot meddle with the order of the PP while maintaining
the directional interpretation (as opposed to a reduced rela-
tive interpretation):
146) *John threw the ball past the 50-yard line down the
field to the tight end.
147) John threw the ball down the field to the tight end
past the 50-yard line. (relative interpretation
only)
148) John threw the ball to the tight end down the field
past the 50-yard line. (again, only relative
interpretation)
149) *John threw the ball to the tight end past the
50-yard line down the field.
150) John threw the ball past the 50-yard line to the
tight end down the field. (again, relative in-
terpretation only)
If our conjecture above is correct, that the order source-
path-goal is the only one possible, then a special case of
this is the fact that in the double object construction, there
can be no PP to the right of the indirect object which has a
directional interpretation. A consequence of this theory is
that there can be no surrogate-PP particle originating from a
directional PP in the double object construction.
3.5.2.1 Recall the discussion above in section 3.3.7.1 of
complex prepositional phrases, where we claimed that cases in
which the particle could not appear next to the verb but could
229
appear as an (initial) element in a complex prepositional
phrase were not to be generated as verbal particles. Thus, we
found a contrast between cases like
151) John pushed the plate away from him.
152) *John pushed away the plate from him.
and cases like
153) John handed the ball off to the fullback.
154) John handed off the ball to the fullback.
We assigned the particle off in the second case to the verbal
position, whereas away was generated as part of the direc-
tional phrase. And it was found that this decision had a
favorable correlation with the placement of adverbs.
In line with the fact that directional surrogate-PP
particles are banned from the double object construction,
then, we ought not to find particles in the double object con-
struction which in the corresponding prepositional construc-
tion have only the status of directional particles. There is
some evidence, at least, that such a decision is correct.
Consider:
155 a) The umpire threw the ball out to the pitcher.
b) ?*The umpire threw out the ball to the pitcher.
c) The umpire threw the ball swiftly out to the
pitcher.
d) *The umpire threw the ball out swiftly to the
pitcher.
e) *The umpire threw the pithcer out the ball.
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Compare the following case:
156 a) The secretary sent a messenger over to me.
b) The secretary sent over a messenger to me.
c) ??The secretary sent a messenger quickly over to
me.
d) ?The secretary sent a messenger over quickly to
me.
e) The secretary sent me over a messenger.
Since out cannot occur next to throw, we have to say that it
is a (directional) instance of the surrogate-PP particle. On
the other hand, over, at least in accordance with the criteria
we have at our disposal, is an instance of the verbal parti-
cle. Interestingly, only send over occurs in the double
object construction, as evidenced by the contrast between
(155e) and (156e).
3.5.2.2 A fairly representative group of particles is
given in the following list:
157) about, across, along, around, aside, away, back,
by, down, forth, in, off, on, out, over, through,
up
Although a few of these do not seem to occur in the preposi-
tional dative construction with to (e.g. about, aside, by,
forth), among the remainder we find a set which occurs in the
prepositional dative construction but not in the double object
construction. For example, consider the following set of
verbs--a representative cross-section of those verbs which
occur in both dative constructions.
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158) give, offer, pay, pass, read, rent, sell, send,
show, take, throw, toss, write, yell
In the following table, we list these verbs which occur in the
prepositional dative construction with to, along with the par-
ticles which appear with them. A (*) to the left of the par-
ticle indicates that there is no corresponding double object
construction containing the particle.1 7
159) give:
offer:
pay:
pass:
read:
rent:
sell:
send:
show:
take:
throw:
toss:
write:
yell:
back, *up
*around, back, *up
back, *in, *off, *out, *over
*across, *along, *around, back, down,
in, *off, out, *over, *through, up
back, *down, *in, off, out, *through,
*up
*back, *out
back, *off
*across, along, *around, back, down,
in, *off, out, over, *through, up
*around, *off
*across, along, back, down, in, *off,
out, over, up
*across, back, down, ?in, *out, over,
up
*across, *around, back, down, ?in,
*out, over, *through, up
back, *in, *off, out
*across, back, down, ?in, ?out, *over,
*through, up
Our theory predicts, then, that in all cases in which we find
particles occurring in both constructions, we should find the
particle moveable in the prepositional construction. Concomi-
tantly, if the particle is not moveable in the prepositional
construction, then it should not be found in the double object
construction.
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The following data are relevant.
160) John gave back the money to Jake.
*John gave up the money to the police.
John offered some candy around to his friends.
*John offered around some candy to his friends.
John offered sacrifices up to the gods.
?John offered up sacrifices to the gods.
-John paid back the loan to the bank.
*John paid in the money to the teller.
?John paid off the loan to the bank.
*John paid out the money to his creditors.
*John passed
?*John passed
??John passed
John passed
John passed
John passed
*John passed
John passed
*John passed
*John passed
John passed
across the salt to Harry.
along the news to his family.
around some candy to his friends.
back the candy to me.
down the hammer to me.
in the hammer to me.
off the ball to Frazier.
out the tickets to his friends.
over the salt to Arnold.
through the salt to Arnold.
up the hammer to me.
John read back the figures to me.
*John read down the announcement to the crowd.
*John read in the figures to the secretary.
John read off the figures to the crowd.
John read out the figures to the audience.
*John read through the figures to the secretary.
*John read up the figures to the guest (on the
second floor).
*John rented back the house to us.
?*John rented out the house to them.
?John sold back the house to the former owner.
?*John sold off the house to the government.
*John sent across the salt to Mary.
?John sent around tickets to his friends.
John sent back the tickets to the owner.
John sent down three books to me.
John sent in a manuscript to the magazine.
*John sent off the manuscript to the magazine.
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*John showed around the goods to his financial
backers.
*John showed off his diploma to his family.
*John took across the message to the enemy.
*John showed off his diploma to his family.
*John took across the message to the enemy.
?John took back the records to the COOP.
?John took down the hammer to Arnold.
John took in the measage to his boss.
*John took off the message to the enemy.
John took out a tip to the garbageman.
?John took over the book to Marcia.
John took up the news to the chief.
*John threw across the ball to Arnold.
?John threw back the ball to Max.
John threw down the leaflets to us.
?John threw in the leaflets to us.
John threw out the ball to the pitcher.
*John threw over a couple of sandwiches to us.
*John threw through a couple of sandwiches to us.
John threw up a hammer to me.
?*John wrote back a report to his superiors.
*John wrote in a letter of protest to the paper.
*John wrote off a letter to his parents.
John wrote out a check to us.
*John wrote out a letter to his fans.
*John yelled across the news to us.
John yelled back the score to those in the rear.
John yelled down the score to those below.
?John yelled in the score to those inside.
John yelled out the score to those outside.
?John yelled over the score to those on the other
side.
*John yelled through the score to those above.
The correlation here is not perfect. But in some inter-
esting cases, it appears that our theory does make exactly the
right predictions. For instance, the verb read seems to
behave precisely along the lines that we would expect: namely,
there is a perfect correlation between the possibility of the
inside position and the occurrence of the double object
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construction. Furthermore, the particles like around, across,
through, away, etc., which never appear in the double object
construction also never appear to the left of the direct
object in the prepositional construction. Note that in this
regard, our theory is clearly superior to that of Emonds,
since his theory lacks the power to express this correlation
except by brute force: in particular, these particles can
occur as verbal particles in some cases:
161) John got across his point forcibly.
162) John got his point across forcibly.
163) The majority whip was able to push through the
bill in a matter of weeks.
164) The majority whip was able to push the bill
through in a matter of weeks.
In short, the banning of the particle which originates as a
surrogate directional PP has interesting consequences in the
framework developed here.
3.5.2.3 Another aspect of our theory which deserves atten-
tion is the fact that we are able in principle to make a
distinction between the verbal particle and the predicative
particle: a consequence of this is that our theory will not
allow predicative particles to occur initially and will not
allow verbal particles to occur finally, given the current
formulation of the rules and base structures. As an illustra-
tion of the possible utility of this distinction, consider the
following cases:
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165) ?Pass over Mary the salt, would you please?
Pass Mary over the salt, would you please?
?*Pass Mary the salt over, would you please?
166) While you're at it, why don't you
*send over John some of those cigars?
send John over some of those cigars?
send John some of those cigars over?
Again, it is difficult to make confident judgments in this
area. However, we might expect it to be the case that such
distinctions exist. On the other hand, we may find that there
are cases in which the particle can occur only medially,
cases in which the particle can occur medially and (weakly)
initially, cases in which the particle can occur medially and
finally, and perhaps even a few cases in which the particle
can occur only finally (take.. .along). In any case, insofar
as such differentials can be found, they support a theory in
which there are multiple base positions over one which treats
all particles as originating in a structurally similar way.
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4.0 Movement constraints on the indirect object
4.1.0 The problem.
Fillmore (1965) noticed that when wh-movement applied
to the indirect object of a double object construction, the
resulting sentence was ungrammatical.
1) *Who did Max tell a joke?
He proposed that the generation of sentences like (1) be
avoided by placing a restriction on the rule of wh-attachment,
Kuroda, however, in his 1968 review of Fillmore's book, showed
that this solution was inadequate on two grounds. First, in
circumstances which do not require the movement of the wh-word,
such as echo questions, the attachment of wh to the indirect
object is permissible. Thus, given the proper intonation,
(2) is grammatical.
2) Max told who a joke?
Second, and more importantly, Kuroda demonstrated that the
ungrammaticality of (1) follows from a more general constraint
which prohibits the movement of the indirect object over
material which is represented in the structural description of
the rule by a variable. Thus, not only is (1) bad: so are
(3-6) as well:
3) *Your upstairs neighbor, I told a joke yesterday.
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4) *It was your upstairs neighbor that I told a joke.
5) *Your upstairs neighbor is hard to tell a joke.
6) *Your upstairs neighbor is the person who I told a
joke yesterday.
That the constraint in question be formulated in such a way as
to mention the variable which these rules involve is impor-
tant: it is this property which separates these rules from the
passive--which does not contain a variable and whose applica-
tion does not in general produce the violation evidenced in
(3-6).
4.2.0 The only way such factors would follow from a transfor-
mational account of the dative alternation is if the dative
rule or rules were ordered after all of the rules which pro-
duce the sort of violation seen in (3-6). Such an ordering is
clearly impossible, however, since it can be shown that the
dative rule must precede the application of such rules as
Wh-Movement, Clefting, and Relativization.18
The simplest way to show this is by considering the
interaction of the above-mentioned rules with the passive.
Obviously, if sentences like
7) Someone gave the diplomat the pouch of documents.
are derived by means of a dative transformation from sentences
like
8) Someone gave the pouch of documents to the diplomat.
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then the dative transformation must precede the passive in the
derivation of
9) The diplomat was given the pouch of documents.
But rules containing a variable may apply to the derived sub-
ject of (9):
10) Who do they believe was given the pouch of docu-
ments?
11) It's the diplomat that they believe was given the
pouch of documents.
12) The diplomat who they believe was given the pouch of
documents turned up in Tangier.
Therefore, in such derivations, the dative movement rule would
have to apply before the rules which move the diplomat in
(10-12). Therefore, rule ordering cannot be invoked to block
the generation of the ungrammatical (13-15):
13) *Who do they believe Max gave the pouch of documents.
14) *It's the diplomat that they believe Max gave the
pouch of documents.
15) *The diplomat who they believe Max gave the pouch of
documents turned up in Tangier.
The same point can be made with regard to deletion (or
interpretation in infinitival complements of too and enough.
16) John is too much of a loud-mouth to tell our secrets
to.
17) *John is too much of a loud-mouth to tell our
secrets. (on the reading in which John is con-
strued as the indirect object of tell)
18) John is too much of a loud-mouth to be told our
secrets.
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If the rule responsible for the deletion or interpretation in
these cases is the same (or applies at the same point in deri-
vations), it is clear that it must be able to apply after the
passive has had a chance to apply in the embedded infinitival
sentence. Thus the dative movement rule must also have had a
chance to apply. Therefore, the ordering of the dative trans-
formation cannot be a factor in the ungrammaticality of (17).
4.3.0 It is occasionally suggested that the type of violation
exhibited in (3-6) could be blocked by a global derivational
constraint. For instance, Langendoen, Kalish-London, and Dore
(1973) suggest that such a constraint "would be formulated
along the following lines. In a derivation, a noun phrase
that has been moved by Dative may not be moved again by any
unbounded rule" (footnote 6, pp. 454-455). Besides being theo-
retically undesirable, such a constraint is inadequate in two
ways.
First, as we saw in the last section, unbounded move-
ment rules may freely move an NP that has been moved by the
putative dative transformation, but just in case the passive
rule has moved the NP from the indirect object position to the
subject position.
But even if we improve the descriptive adequacy of this
derivational constraint by including this information, it is
clear that this approach suffers from a further, fatal inade-
quacy. If the constraint is formulated along the lines
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suggested by Langendoen et al,, then the structural properties
of the double object construction are irrelevant: what is
relevant whether or not an NP has been affected by the dative
movement rule. On the other hand, if it is the structural
properties of the double object construction which are rele-
vant, then a global condition is otiose, and a non-global con-
straint may replace it. Since, as we saw in Part One, there
are principled reasons for generating at least some instances
of the double object construction in the base, we can test
whether it is derivational properties or structural proper-
ties which are relevant to the formulation of the constraint.
If only structural properties are relevant, then the rules
which produce the violations instanced in (3-6) will produce
violations when applied in a similar way to base-generated
instances of the double object construction; the global deri-
vational constraint as formulated by Langendoen et al. is con-
sistent with any array of judgments in such cases. Therefore,
consider the sentences below, in which the application of a
dative movement rule has played no role.
19) The last hand oost someone a steak dinner.
20) *Who did the last hand cost a steak dinner.
21) *It was John that the last hand cost a steak dinner.
22) *The man who the last hand cost a steak dinner will
be hungry in no time.
Such examples show that the violations in question are based
on the structure involved, not on the particular course of the
derivation that gives rise to it.
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4.4.0 It is sometimes suggested that what is at issue con-
cerns structural ambiguity (cf. Hankamer, 1973). There are
two good reasons why such proposals, as currently formulated,
are inadequate to handle the facts in question.
First, there is a distinction in grammatical status
between cases in which the first NP is moved or deleted and
those involving the second NP (of the double object construc-
tion). For example, in contrast to (3-6) and (20-22), the
following sentences are all good.
23) What did the dinner cost John?
24) The results aren't important enough to tell the
President.
25) That isn't the method I taught them.
26) Look at the beautiful bouquet Mary brought your
brother.
27) That's too frivolous a present to give your father
on such an important occasion.
These cases are also structurally ambiguous; yet there remains
a contrast in grammaticality between cases in which the second
object is affected (which are good) and those in which the
first object is affected (which are no good). Since the
notion structural ambiguity is relevant to both cases, struc-
tural ambiguity alone cannot account for the ungrammaticality
of (3-6).
Second, for many other cases, constraints based on
structural ambiguity predict the wrong results. For example,
the sentence below is structurally ambiguous--yet both read-
ings are possible.
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28) Who do you want to choose?
To this question, one may answer in two ways:
29) I want you to choose.
30) I want to choose Wilt.
Sentences of this kind also provide evidence against
the perceptual strategy suggested in Jackendoff and Culicover
(1971), which is based on the general perceptual problem of
recovering the deep structure grammatical relations on the
basis of surface structure evidence. Their account of the
ungrammaticality of sentences like (3-6) would also rule out
(28), and must thus be rejected.
4.5.0 Langendoen et al. take the novel approach of claiming
that sentences like (3-6) are in fact not ungrammatical at
all; they are merely unacceptable. Furthermore, they claim to
have established the existence of a group of English speakers
living in the Greater New York area for whom such sentences
are both grammatical and acceptable. They hypothesize that
these speakers use a different set of perceptual strategies
than do those who find (3-6) unacceptable. I'm not convinced
that for this case at least there is any more at issue than a
merely terminological question.19 For our purposes, what is
important is that the violations exhibited in (3-6) be given a
uniform treatment.
I shall formulate the constraint which blocks (3-6) as
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a constraint on variables, thus providing a uniform mechanism
which blocks the generation of sentences like (3-6). Although
I imagine that this constraint can be formulated in terms of
perceptual strategies, the formulation given by Langendoen
et al. is presented only for the case which involves Wh-Move-
ment, and a general reformulation raises questions which go
beyond the scope of our inquiry here. 20
I state the constraint below in (31):
31) Given a structure of the form 21
VP
V (PRT) NP (PRT) NP ...
if the string'V (PRT)' is represented by a vari-
able in the structural description of a transfor-
mation, the string1V (PRT)NP (PRT)' must also be
represented by that variable.
This formulation raises several issues. First, as it
stands, the constraint is language-specific. If a formulation
is to be given which is independent of any particular lan-
guage, it will be probably have to be formulated with refer-
ence to certain typological properties of the languages for
which it is found to hold (if any besides English exist), for
it is unlikely that such a constraint would apply if e.g. the
two NP's mentioned in (31) are marked morphologically for dis-
tinct cases. I don't see that an account based on perceptual
strategies fares any better here, however.
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Second, it may be that the constraint as formulated is
too weak. In particular, there are difficulties with respect
to extraction manifested by several of the (few) verbs which
occur with the so-called 'naked infinitive' (modals aside).
Thus, there seems to be a distinction in acceptability between:
32) Who did you see Liston fight?
and
33) ?*Who did you see fight Liston?
A problem here is that the difficulties involved in extraction
do not seem to be uniform across the various cases of this
structure. Whereas extraction of the NP to the right of watch
(in the naked infinitive structure) seems totally impervious
to movement rules, in the case of let, it is sometimes possi-
ble:
34) *Who did you watch cross the street.
35) The man you just let slip from your grasp, Watson,
is the most diabolical criminal mind in all of
England.
Nevertheless, it may be the case that a general formulation of
the constraint given in (31) would cover both the double
object construction and the relevant cases of the naked
infinitive construction.
Finally, we note that a formulation of this constraint
in terms of perceptual processing rather than as a constraint
on movement might be preferable for the following reason:;
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some violations of the kind produced in (3-6) seem to be worse
than others; furthermore, I have the feeling that there is a
difference in the degree of ungrammaticality of sentences of
this type and the degree of ungrammaticality involved in the
violation of Ross's (1967) island constraints. A reformula-
tion of (31) in terms of perceptual processing may provide a
natural framework in which to account for this difference.22
4.6.0 Summary.
If an unbounded movement rule applies to the first of
two NP objects, violations are produced. A transformational
approach to the dative alternation cannot account for such
violations. Nor is the postulation of global derivational con-
straints of any help, since the violations in question are
related to a certain structure, independent of the origin of
that structure. Accounts based on structural ambiguity also
fail, for they are unable in principle to deal with the asym-
metry between movement of the first NP of a double object
structure and movement of the second.
I have proposed a constraint on the conventions for
analyzing phrase-markers in terms of variables which will
account for these violations. Whether this constraint can be
given a language-independent formulation, and the exact rela-
tion of this constraint to perceptual strategies for sentence-
processing are matters which I leave to future research.
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5.0 Summary.
The phenomena investigated in this chapter provide no
evidence in favor of a transformational theory of the dative
alternation. In some cases, our results are not entirely
unanticipated. Thus, the output condition on pronouns dis-
cussed in section 1 can be traced back to a proposal made by
Ross (1967), and our discussion of the movement constraint on
the indirect object is based in part on facts originally noted
by Kuroda (1968). Insofar as I have made use of previous pro-
posals, however, I have tried to strengthen existing arguments,
and where I have been able to, I have constructed new ones.
Although the main burden of this chapter has been to dem-
onstrate the lack of any non-semantic evidence in favor of a
transformational theory of the dative alternation, the argu-
ments I have given bear on wider issues in linguistic theory.
We will consider two: the 'accessibility hierarchy' proposed
by Keenan and Comrie (1972); and the theory of relational
grammar proposed by Perlmutter and Postal in various lectures.
5.1 Keenan and Comrie (1972) claim that there is a universal
hierarchy of NP positions as follows, where '>,1 is interpreted
as 'greater than or equal to inaccessibility' to rules such as
relative clause formation, WH-movement, clefting, and so on:
1) Subj >, DO' 10 t OPrep >: Poss-NP7g 0-Comp-Particle
Essentially, their claim is that if a given NP position is
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accessible to extraction, then any NP position which is great-
er than or equal to the given NP position in accessibility is
also accessible to extraction. For example, if the position
they identify as 'OPrep' is accessible to extraction, then,
according to their theory, the indirect object ('10'), the
direct object ('DO') and the subject ('Subj') must be as well.
But this claim is clearly falsified by the English facts
concerning the accessibility of the indirect object: in
English, objects of prepositions ('OPrep') are accessible to
extraction although indirect objects are not. Thus, either
the hierarchy must be revised in some way or the claim that it
has universal application must be weakened.
5.2 Consider now the proposals of Perlmutter and Postal con-
cerning what they call 'relational grammar'. One of the cen-
tral claims of this theory is that cyclic rules are defined in
terms of grammatical relations such as subject ('I'), direct
object ('II'), and indirect object ('III'). (There is the
possibility of terminological confusion here: throughout this
work I have used the term 'indirect object' to refer to the
first NP in the structure X-V-NP-NP-Y, whereas Perlmutter and
Postal use this term to refer either to this NP position or to
the objects of various prepositions where a 'dative' interpre-
tation is involved.) Thus, the passive is formulated as the
rule 'II-+I', and the dative movement rule is formulated as
'III-+II'. Furthermore, they propose that if an NP. fulfilling
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one of these grammatical relations is replaced in the course
of a derivation by some NP., then NP. ceases to bear any gram-J 1
matical relation to the sentence, This analysis is inconsis-
tent with the treatment of the passive proposed in section 2,
and if my arguments for the formulation of the second passive
are correct, they provide a serious counterexample to Perlmut-
ter and Postal's theory.
To see this more clearly, consider two possible deriva-
tions within this theory of sentences like (1):
1) A book was given him.
On a relational theory, this sentence will have an underlying
structure roughly corresponding to 'PRO gave a book to him',
in which the grammatical relations are as follows: I='PRO';
II= Ta book'; III='him'. If the dative rule applies before the
passive rule, (1) is ungenerable, since the dative rule is
stated as 'III--*II' and a consequence of this is that 'a book'
ceases to be the direct object upon its replacement by 'him'.
Thus if the dative rule applies first, the application of the
passive rule can only produce the sentence
2) He was given a book.
Consider the alternative application of the rules, however.
Applying the passive rule first, we get the right NP into the
subject position. But what do we do about the preposition?
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If we now allow the dative rule to apply, serious problems
arise. First, the pronominal restriction that we noted in
section 2 must be dealt with--i.e. it's not clear that the
usual dative rule will suffice. Second, this theory offers no
way to account for sentences like My sins were forgiven me,
whose derivation does not involve the dative rule. Further-
more, it is not at all clear how to avoid generating sentences
like (3b) from (3a) on this account, since presumably the same
structural considerations apply:
3a) As far as the United Fund is concerned, I think
everyone should give to them.
3b) *As far as the United Fund is concerned, I think
everyone should give them.
In short, the problem of the second passive is not only not
resolved by the theory of relational grammars; the existence
of such a phenomenon poses a very serious problem for this
theory.
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Appendix to section 3: A speculation on some observed tenden-
cies.
An alternative to the generation of the verbal particle in the
double object construction is the following.
1) Vt
Vt  NP
V NP PRT
There are several reasons for considering such a possibility.
An obvious advantage is that it generates immediately
the preferred surface structure particle position, and the
more marked order will arise through the application of a rule
which shifts the left-most NP to the right of the particle (we
still want to avoid the postulation of a right-left particle
movement rule).
2) Whip me such honest knaves. (Othello)
3) Rob me a couple of banks, my boy, and I might con-
sider your proposal.
In that discussion, we pointed out two peculiarities of this
construction, or at least two tendencies to be peculiar.
These were concerned with the fact that in such examples the
dative NP is restricted to pronominal form and the fact that
such constructions seem to occur with far greater ease in sen-
tences with what we called a 'hortatory' illocutionary force
(and reports of such speech acts) than in sentences with
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different illocutionary forces. A sentence like the following,
which violates both of these canons, sounds very strange to my
ears:
4) ??If it had only occurred to Lefty to rob Capone
a couple of banks, he might have succeeded
in gaining the gang leaders confidence.
In standard literary English, this construction has a somewhat
marginal character. Nevertheless, we suggested that a way to
deal with it is to generate a pronominal position to the imme-
diate right of the verb--effectively restricting this position
to pronouns--and associating with this structure a rule which
would ensure that this (benefactive) pronoun would receive an
interpretation compatible with only the appropriate range of
contexts. Since it is not our purpose here to present a the-
ory of speech acts, we left the formulation of this rule open.
What I would like to suggest now is that many of the
instances of the intersection of the verb+particle construc-
tion with the double object construction share some of the
properties of this benefactive construction. There are sev-
eral indications of this.
The first is that in many cases, the results of apply-
ing the passive transformation to structures of the form
...V-NP-PRT-NPT are surprisingly bad. Thus, compare the fol-
lowing cases:
5 a) I passed him the salt.
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b) He was passed the salt.
c) I passed him down the salt.
d) ?*He was passed down the salt.
6 a) They handed me the wrench.
b) I was handed the wrench.
c) They handed me up the wrench.
d) ?*I was handed up the wrench.
7 a) They read me the figures (over the telephone).
b) I was read the figures (over the telephone).
c) They read me off the figures.
d) ?*I was read off the figures.
8 a) They sent me the wrong order.
b) I was sent the wrong order.
c) They sent me over the wrong order.
d) ?*I was sent over the wrong order.
It might be suggested that the governing factor in the ungram-
maticality of such examples is the difficulty in real-time
processing of determining the underlying grammatical relation
of the surface subject. The fact that it could be either
direct object or indirect object would, on this account, unbal-
ance the perceptual processing mechanism. And presumably this
possibility is strengthened by the possibility of analyzing
the string '.. .P NP...' as a prepositional phrase. Although
this might be plausible in certain cases, e.g. I was tossed
over a barrel, such a theory predicts that there is a strong
distinction between this case and a sentence like (7d), where
there is no reason to suspect that the derived subject could
be construed as the direct object. (In some cases, in fact,
there is no difficulty whatsoever in the passive: e.g. I was
given back the money. For reasons which I do not understand,
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these sentences are distinct from the cases under discussion.)
If it could be shown that in the cases in which the
passive does not apply easily, the indirect object in fact has
a benefactive interpretation, the failure of the passive could
be assimilated to the failure of the passive in other cases of
the for-dative.
Although I am not able to show this definitively, we
note first of all that in some cases a pronoun appears more
easily as the indirect object than does a full NP. Further-
more, in many cases, these constructions seem much more idio-
matic in imperative sentences than in declarative ones. Both
of these tendencies--they are probably no more than that--lend
some credence to the partial assimilation of these cases to
the benefactive construction discussed above with respect to
(2-3). Let me give a few examples, in which the violation of
these criteria lead to a sharp decrease in idiomaticity.
9) Hand me over that gun, Capone.
10) ??If you hand Max over that gun, Capone, things will
go easier for you.
11) John refused to toss anything up to me.
12) ??John refused to toss me up anything.
13) George was kind enough to toss me up a beer.
14) ??George was rude enough to toss me up a beer.
If there are differences of this kind, it is extremely diffi-
cult to control the applicability of a transformational rela-
tion between e.g. (13) and (14). Furthermore, an attempt to
paraphrase (13) by means of a to-dative sentence fails if (13)
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has the kind of benefactive force we are imputing to it. An
attempt to paraphrase (13) by means of a for-dative sentence
fails since it misses the point that the inside object is the
motional goal:
15) George was kind enough to toss a beer up for me.
16) George was kind enough to toss a beer up to me.
It is partly for this reason that an assimilation of these
cases to the benefactive dative construction is suggestive,
since the interpretive principles which I proposed above in
the case of sentences with rob offers a natural way to handle
the constraints on occurrence of such constructions.
Suppose that this assimilation were attempted. Then
sentences like (9), (11), and (13) would contain as a sub-tree,
the structure presented in (1). There is an interesting side-
effect of this hypothesis, which concerns the position of the
particle. Given an underlying structure which contains (1),
the particle movement rule given in the above chapter will
apply to move the particle to the right. And since in this
structure only pronouns will be generated under V', we should
expect to find in some cases a distinction between surface
structures of the form '...V-PRO-NP-PRT ... ' and surface struc-
tures of the form '...V-NP-NP-PRT... f, where the first NP is
not pronominal. And in fact it seems that such distinctions
exist:
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17) Can you send me some of those cigars over?
18) ??When are you going to send Reginald some of those
cigars over?
19) Hey, toss me that wrench up, will you?
20) ??Hey, toss Marilyn that wrench up, will you?
Although judgments of the precise grammatical status of such
sentences are not terribly reliable, nevertheless the relative
difference exemplified in these pairs seems fairly clear. And
it is this difference which our proposal offers the possibil-
ity of an account of.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II.
1. For example, we have nothing to say about the problems of
reflexivization, primarily because the behavior of reflexives
is not uniform over the range of the dative alternations. A
variety of contrasts seem to exist, but it is difficult to
see how a transformational account could even describe them
in a uniform way. Consider the following contrasts, for
instance:
i) Faust sold himself to the Devil.
ii) *Faust sold the Devil himself.
iii) *John gave a present to himself.
iv) John gave himself a present.
v) He's been telling stories to himself.
vi) He's been telling himself stories.
In particular, if (iii) and (iv) are related transformation-
ally, and (v) and (vi) are related transformationally, any
theory based on the dative alternation that rules out (iii)
should rule out (v), while a theory that allows (v) should
allow (iii). Thus, we shall not consider this problem, as it
seems to have no bearing on the issue.
Similarly, we shall not take up the problem of the
relation of the dative constructions to the possibility of a
verb's occurring with an infinitival complement. Consider
the fact that the verbs promise, offer, and owe occur in both
the to-dative construction and the double object construction.
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Furthermore, each of these verbs occurs with an infinitival
complement. Yet in this latter case, these verbs betray
striking syntactic differences:
vii) John promised Albert to leave.
viii) *John promised to Albert to leave.
ix) *John promised it to Albert to leave.
x) John promised to leave.
xi) *John owes Albert to leave.
xii) *John owes to Albert to leave.
xiii) John owes it to Albert to leave.
xiv) *John owes (it) to leave.
xv) *John offered Albert to leave.
xvi) *John offered to Albert to leave.
xvii) *John offered it to Albert to leave.
xviii) John offered to leave.
I know of no theory which accounts for these distinctions,
nor do I see how they bear on the alternatives that face us.
Therefore I shall ignore them: Wovon man nicht sprechen kann,
dariber kann man schweigen.
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2. Almost every case, that is. A counterexample may be
found by consulting the first sentence of the third paragraph
of the acknowledgment printed on the back of the title page
of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky, 1965, p. iv). I
quote the relevant portion of this sentence below:
xix) ??The research reported in this document was made
possible in part by support extended the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, Research
Laboratory of Electronics, by the...
Because of its questionable grammatical status, however, I
take the effect of this example on our generalization to be
minimal.
3. Although I agree with Williams in principle, I think that
his examples might have been better chosen. His first exam-
ple (*The children were sung a song) is plausibly related
more closely to a sentence with a for-dative than to one with
a to-dative. His second case (John was thrown a pillow)
seems to me better than he indicates. Because of this, I
have chosen different examples.
Williams has also suggested that the distinction in the
passive construction between the to-dative and the for-dative
might be related to the obligatoriness vs. optionality of the
dative NP with respect to any given verb. Although this idea
is interesting, I do not think that it is right. For
instance a dative NP is optional with bring, yet the passive
is possible: The King was brought his pipe and slippers.
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4. A relaxation of the condition that only a single particle
may intervene between the direct object and the to- or for-
phrase is needed independently to account for such sentences
as Toss me back up the hammer please.
5. Note that the formulation of the surface condition is no
simple matter, since there exist cases in which the direct
object occurs to the right of right+PRT, presumably because of
the operation of Heavy-NP Shift: I'll send right over the
stuff you ordered, Mr. Jones.
6. Cf. also Jackendoff (1973).
7. I say "under certain conditions" because of pairs like:
back
xx) John came in exhausted.
outI
xxi) *John came exhausted.
Evidently, the addition of the particle is crucial here. I am
unable to explain why.
8. Note that whatever account is chosen will have to deal
with the fact that in simple intransitive cases, the particle
1
does bear the nuclear accent: John fell down.
9. Infelicitously named because no characterization in terms
of 'heaviness' has ever been given--or is likely to be given--
which accounts for the application of this rule. Consider
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examples like
xxii) We found in the barn, a stick.
The phrase a stick is unlikely to count as 'heavy' under any-
body's definition.
In part the difficulty here may be due to the fact that
more than one rule is in effect, although if that is the case,
it would appear that both rules perform the same operations.
Nevertheless they may be distinguished by intonational
effects. Thus, I have inserted a comma in the above example
to indicate the fact that when the sentence is pronounced,
barn is prominently stressed and there is an intonation break
between barn and a stick. In the case in which the shifted NP
is significantly 'heavy', 'complex', 'long', etc., such into-
national effects are not necessary:
xxiii) We found in the barn several pieces of evidence
which indicate that the defendent was
actually at the scene when the crime occurred.
It's not clear that this distinction is indicative of the
existence of two rules. Alternatively, there may be only one
rule in operation and the intonational patterns may be gener-
ated by independent aspects of English prosody.
10. Cf. Jackendoff (1973) for futher evidence that such
phrases form single constitutents.
11. Jackendoff credits this insight to Emonds.
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12. The situation is actually somewhat more complex. Consid-
er Jackendoff's base rules for prepositions, which include
the following cases:
xxiv) PP --. P
PP -- + P PP
PP --4 PP PP
PP -- j P NP
These rules should generate phrases of the form
xxv) PP
PP PP
P NP P
but as far as I can tell, there are no such expressions in
English. Compare:
xxvi) Max pushed Harold off the board into the water.
*Max pushed Harold off the board in.
Max pushed Harold in.
One way to handle this problem is to write the base rule as
follows:
xxvii) PP -- 3> P*(NP)
A consequence of this formulation, however, is that we cannot
generate as a constituent complex phrases of the type from
here to there.
13. The restriction to unstressed pronouns is important.
Bolinger (1971) has presented cases in which pronouns may
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plausibly follow the particle, but only if the pronoun bears
a contrastive accent. Some of Bolinger's examples:
xxviii) The lady bade her take away the fool; therefore,
I say again, take her away. --Sir, I bade
them take away you.
If you want to ease your mind by blowing up
somebody, come out into the court and blow
up me.
He's just lucky I ain't sewin' up him.
14. The situation here is actually more complicated, and may
involve a distinction between the verbal particle and the
other two types. Since my point is only to show that the
intonational properties of the sentence play a role in deter-
mining the position of the particle, I shall not attempt a
fuller analysis of this phenomenon.
15. In the discussion of Emonds's proposal, we have gone
over the various accounts possible on a transformational
account of the dative alternative of the placement of the
particle. With respect to alternatives in which the particle
is not generated solely to the right of the direct object,
the general situation is as follows: in order to maintain
the syntactic distinctions discussed earlier, we shall want
to avoid a right-left particle movement rule: in order to gen-
erate all three particle positions, then, the verbal particle
will have to remain in the left-most position until after the
dative movement rule has applied; thus, no special advantage
with respect to the positioning of the particle is available
unless the to-dative rule is formulated separately from the
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for-dative rule, in which case a distinction may be main-
tained. But we may just as freely suggest a different base
structure for the for-dative cases. Cf. footnote 16 below:
16. An alternative to (137) is discussed in an appendix to
this chapter. This alternative is based on the following
structure:
xxix) VP
I? NP
V NP PRT
17. In some cases, the double object construction with the
particle does not maintain the same range of interpretations
as the prepositional dative construction. For instance, the
sentence
xxx) John offered me back the red rose.
can only be construed as a reciprocal offer, i.e. back has
the same interpretation it has in sentences like John hit
Harry back. In contrast, the sentence John offered the red
rose back to me is true of a situation in which I had given
John the rose and he offered to give it back to me. (Note
incidentally, that back is not a verbal particle: *John
offered back the red rose to me.)
Similarly, in some cases, we find a particle occurring in
the double object construction which does not occur at all in
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the prepositional construction, e.g. ?Send me by some of those
delicious tomatoes of yours vs. *Send some of those delicious
tomatoes by to me.
The particle along has somewhat idiosyncratic properties.
When it occurs in the double object construction, it seems to
be the case that it is always construed as an elliptical form
of the complex prepositional phrase along with x,
xxxi) While you're at it, why don't you send me a couple
of those Cuban cigars along.
xxxii) Take John a couple of these cigars along.
In the first case, the cigars are to be sent along with what-
ever else the addressee is sending; in the second, the addres-
see is asked to take some cigars along with him.
15. Whether Wh-Movement and Relativization are to be disting-
uished or not is of no importance here.
19. Langendoen et al. argue that it would be desirable to
account for the violations exhibited in (3-6) on the basis of
perceptual strategies in part because they believe that the
only alternative is the postulation of a global derivational
constraint. In section 3, I have shown such a constraint to
be inadequate. Furthermore, the constraint on performance
that they formulate is, if properly emended, equivalent to the
movement constraint formulated below in (31). In particular.
it is hard to see whether any conceptual advantages are
achieved by casting their constraint in terms of a theory of
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performance rather than competence: they certainly provide no
evidence for this, except the undesirability of language-par-
ticular constraints on transformations. I fail to see how
language-particular perceptual constraints constitute a great
leap forward, however.
The argument that some speakers find sentences like (3-6)
both grammatical and acceptable is also far from compelling.
The authors note (p. 452) that "Judgments that expressions are
acceptable do not guarantee that they are grammatical... .there
are many expressions for which speakers do not give consistent
acceptability judgments; such inconsistency has misled many
linguists into postulating the existence of 'dialects' for
which there is often no geographic, socioeconomic or other
language-independent basis....". The authors then constructed
an experiment to test the hypothesis that double object con-
structions to which an unbounded movement rule has applied to
the first object are in fact grammatical. One would think
that in order to avoid the problems noted in the above cited
passage, the authors would have constructed the experiment in
such a way that the subjects of the experiment would not be
asked to perform a linguistic task, but rather in the course
of carrying out some other task, linguistic data of relevance
to the hypothesis would be generated. Labov has carried out
experiments of this kind dealing with such topics as scope
order and the differences between the 'get-passive' and the
'be-passive' (reported in a lecture at MIT, spring 1974).
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However, the various tests the authors constructed all revolve
around the performance of linguistic tasks. Furthermore,
there is no control on intonation, no control on the impact of
using definite as opposed to indefinite NP's, no examples
involving pronouns. Furthermore, the crucial sentences are
all of a rather marginal character. Finally, the argument
that dative questions ('DQs') are acceptable is based on the
following crucial step: "If.. .the S's response indicates that
he or she construes the postverbal noun phrase in an ambigu-
ous DQ as a direct object, there is no non-DQ model that he
or she could possibly be using as a basis for that response;
hence the acceptability of DQs for that S." (Footnote 16,
p. 462.) But the authors have included precisely such a
model: namely, the ungrammatical sentence Who(m) did you
direct the person?
In view of these defects, one can hardly consider the
conclusions drawn from this study compelling.
20. In their formulation of the perceptual rules, Langendoen
et al. make crucial reference to the fact that the noun
phrase whose grammatical relation is at issue is marked as
interrogative. This marking is irrelevant for cases in which
the NP has been moved by Topicalization or been affected by
Tough-Movement (or Tough-Deletion, as the case may be). A
more general formulation, then, would have to subsume under a
single case the notions 'having been moved over a variable'
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and 'controlling an NP over a variable'. A general theory of
perceptual strategies would thus need the means to identify
all such cases. The construction of such a general theory
being a rather large undertaking, we shll rest content with
our formulation of a movement constraint, which covers pre-
cisely the same range of facts.
21. It is noteworthy that this constraint cannot be formu-
lated, as far as I can tell, simply by reference to string-
conditions (without hierarchical information). One reason
for this is that the constraint does not apply to sentences
which contain predicate nominals:
xxxiii) The man who everyone had considered a genius was
a spy.
If the constraint is formulated in terms of the string
'...V-NP-NP...', such sentences would be ruled out since they
satisfy this structural description.
One might, however, attempt to formulate (31) in terms of
an output condition. This is only possible in a theory which
incorporates the trace theory of movement (cf. Fiengo, 1974,
and the references cited there). In order to maintain the
distinction between the passive and unbounded movement rules,
the output condition must include mention of the subject of
the sentence. This can be done as follows, ignoring for
expository purposes the point made above with reference to
string conditions:
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xxiv) Rule out any structure of the form
X-NP1- (Adv)(Aux)V-t-NP2-Y
unless NP binds t.
I will not attempt to choose between (31) and (ii).
22. If the double object constructions have the structure
xxxv) V?
V1 NP
V NP
it may be possible that what Chomsky (1973) refers to as the
'subjacency condition' may be capable of formulation in such a
way as to make (31) or its equivalent unnecessary. The cru-
cial distinction would then be that the passive moves the
(first) NP a lesser distance up the tree than do the rules
which induce violations.
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III. The Status of the English Dative Alternation
0. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to determine
the proper way in which the dative alternation should be inte--
grated into a grammar of English. In order to carry out this
investigation, we shall formulate two general hypotheses,
review the information at our disposal, and raise the question
of which hypothesis more adequately accounts for our knowledge
of the dative alternation.
1. The possibility of choice concerning the treatment of the
dative alternation arises in the following way. Given a con-
ception of grammar which includes a syntactic level of deep
structure and a syntactic level of surface structure, there
should be a distinction between the properties of deep struc-
ture phrase-markers and surface structure phrase-markers.
Consider now Anderson's (1971) discussion of the so-called
'spray paint' cases. These involve alternations of the type
illustrated below:
1) The man sprayed paint on the wall.
2) The man sprayed the wall with paint.
3) John emptied some gas from the tank.
4) John emptied the tank of gas.
On the basis of certain aspects of the interpretation of these
sentences, Anderson concluded that both manifestations of this
alternation were generated in the base. The argument is
essentially of the following form: there exists a distinction
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in truth-conditions concerning the members of such pairs; this
distinction cannot be stated at surface structure, since a var-
iety of rules can obliterate the relevant structure; therefore,
deep structure is the appropriate level at which to state this
distinction. Anderson also offered a variety of other evidence to
support this conclusion, including facts concerning subcategor-
ization. 1
The acceptance of Anderson's conclusion does not force us
to ignore the alternation altogether. In particular, there re-
mains a syntactic question: give a structure NP -V -NP 2-P-NP3'
under what conditions does there exist a corresponding structure
NP -V -NP -P NP 2? I will assume that such a question deserves
consideration. Regardless of the precise details of this rule,
however, Anderson's conclusion forces us to state the alterna-
tion as part of the lexicon. (Cf. Jackendoff, 1974a, for further
discussion.)
If this is correct, then evidently the rule in question
will specify an operation on subcategorization frames. I will
assume that this rule is to be construed as a redundancy rule
which lessens the cost of lexical information, along the lines
of Jackendoff's proposals concerning morphology. Thus, the
rule will have roughly the following form:
5) If a verb is subcategorized for the structure
NP __NP2 LocP NP an additional subcategorization
of the form NP __NP3 with NP2 may exist without
adding to the information content of the lexicon.
Insofar as idiosyncratic information must be added, it will
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add a proportional.cost.
Such a rule has several attractive aspects. First, rules
of this kind are (ipso facto) restricted to operations on
material specified in subcategorization frames. Thus no rule
of this kind could take a noun phrase out of a purpose clause,
for instance, and make it the subject of the sentence. Sec-
ond, such rules are designed to account for cases of syntactic
alternations in which semantic equivalence is not necessarily
preserved. Thus, they are concerned with cases in which not
all properties are invariant. In view of the way such rules
are to be construed, we have an immediate way to build marked-
ness considerations into the rule itself. Finally, note that
all such rules will of necessity be structure-preserving,
since in every case the structures related by the rules must
meet the conditions specified by one phrase structure rule
expansion in order to be generated. We return below to the
question of whether all structure-preserving rules can be
formulated as lexical redundancy rules.
2.0 The existence of lexical rules of the type just discussed
raises the question of whether the dative alternation should
be stated as a lexical rule of this kind or as a transforma-
tion which maps one (full) phrase-marker onto another. Given
the plethora of technical devices available, it is not imme-
diately clear how to resolve this question. The decision as
to whether the dative alternation should be considered a
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phrase-marker transformation or a lexical redundancy rule
hinges then not so much on questions of feasibility as on
questions of appropriateness.
Furthermore, from a general methodological point of view,
if both types of rules exist, we should like to place enough
restrictions on rules of each type so that for any given
alternation, we would be forced to consign it to the domain of
one type of rule or the other without the possibility of
choice on our part. In line with this principle, questions
such as the richness of information necessary to the statement
of the rule arise.
3.0 At this point, it is useful to recapitulate the general
characteristics of the dative alternation,such as we have been
able to determine them.
First, on the basis of several considerations, both the
double object construction and the prepositional construction
are base structures of English. I.e. there are phrase struc-
ture rules of the form
6) VP --,V NP PP...
VP -4 V NP NP...
Obviously, part of our investigation is concerned with the
question of what set of surface sentences is generated in each
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of these base structures.
Second, if assuming for the moment that there is a
transformation which maps phrase-markers of the form
X-V-NP -P-NP2-Y into phrase markers of the form X-V-NP 2
NPl-Y (or vice versa), is there a set of significant proper-
ties which distinguish base structures of the form V NP NP
from derived structures of the form V NP NP? The major
conclusion of Part Two is that no such distinctions exist.
Third, there is the question of what sort of con-
ditions are necessary to the statement of the dative alter-
nation. If our formulation of the domain of the dative
alternation at the end of Part One is correct (insofar as
it goes) there are several noteworthy characteristics to be
considered. One concerns the morphological condition that
seems necessary to distinguish e.g. get from obtain and
procure,rfrom purchase, give back from return, etc. Another,
of a more speculative nature, concerns the possibility of
excluding verbs like float and drift from the domain of the
dative alternation on the basis of insufficient control of
the path of the direct object.
Fourth, there is the troublesome question of the
semantic equivalence of the members of pairs of sentences
related by the dative alternation. If such distinctions can
be defended, obviously the dative alternation (for these
cases at least) cannot be stated as a (phrasemarker) trans-
formation in a grammar in which all semantic interpretation
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is to be carried out at the deep structure level. The
possibility of surface interpretation, however, complicates
the question.
4.0 In view of this evidence, there are a variety of con-
siderations which favor the treatment of the dative alter-
nation by means of a lexical redundancy rule over a treat-
ment by means of a transformational operation on phrase-
markers. No single one of these considerations is in and of
itself compelling. Yet they are each worth considering, in
that they are each concerned with ways in which lexical
redundancy rules can be distinguished from transformations,
and, as I pointed out above, it is of interest to articulate
and distinguish these two types of rules.
Nevertheless, in certain respects, the two alter-
native hypotheses formulated here are equivalent. For
example, we have not succeeded in specifying exactly the
domain of the dative alternation -- although certain ways
in which the domain of the alternation can be restricted
have been suggested (cf. Part One, Sections 6-7). But
neither theory developed here provides immediate insight
into how certain problematic cases are to be treated, e.g.
the distinction between raise and lift, on the one hand and
lower on the other. Thus, certain difficulties are common
to both hypotheses. On the other hand, given that the
operation performed on either hypothesis is essentially
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identical, it is evident that each theory will be able to
deal with a wide variety of facts in the same fashion, e.g.
selectional similarity. It is for this reason that I
emphasized that the choice between the two theories hinges
on matters of appropriateness rather than feasibility.
4.1 Consider first the fact that there appears to be no
syntactic advantage gained by postulating a phrase-marker
transformation. In other words, with respect to syntactic
properties, double object base structures seem to be in-
distinguishable from those double object structures which
are putatively derived by a phrase-marker transformation.
2
On methodological grounds, this fact, if true, providessan
argument in favor of the lexical redundancy rule hypothesis.
The argument is simply that the lexical treatment entails
this state of affairs,since on this account all mani-
festations of the dative alternation are present in deep
structure. Whereas the transformational hypothesis --
.3
though consistent with this state of affairs -- is con-
sistent with other possible states of affairs. For this
reason, the lexical theory has consequences that the trans-
formational theory does not entail. The lexical theory is
thus stronger -- i.e. more falsifiable -- and therefore
preferable.
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4.2 A second consideration which bears on this question
concerns the status of the morphological constraint dis-
cussed in Part One, Section 6. There is of course a certain
amount of leeway in how this restriction is to be incor-
porated into the statement of alternation. On a trans-
formational account, the appropriate way to incorporate
this constraint is by means of rule features and a redun-
dancy rule, since the internal structure of words is not
information that in general transformations need have access
to. In particular, we would like to rule out the possi-
bility of rules like topicalization or %± -movement being
subject to morphological conditions. No such consideration
applies in the case of the lexical treatment, since it is
a property of the lexical entry that it brings together a
variety of morphological, syntactic, and semantic information
concerning words. Thus, on the lexical account, the morpho-
logical condition can be written into the rule itself
without invoking redundancy rules. It should be noted that
the construction of verb and particle combinations is subject
to a similar condition, i.e. whereas we find combinations
like buy up, purchase up does not exist. Although we are not
able to express these two conditions as a single generaliza-
tion, it is preferable to treat rules with similar proper-
ties at similar places in the grammar. By assigning the
dative alternation to the lexicon, this goal is partially
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achieved. This provides another indication that the lexical
treatment is to be preferred.
4.3 We have seen thus far that certain methodological con-
siderations suggest that the lexical hypothesis is to be
preferred. Let us now take up the question of whether
semantic considerations play a role in this decision.
4.3.1 I argued above in Part One J 6 that there exist
cases in which the truth conditions of certain pairs of
sentences related by the dative alternation are distinct,
particularly in the case of the for-dative alternation,
though marginally in the case of to-dative alternation as
well. On a transformational account, such distinctions
of necessity will have to be handled by rules of surface4
interpretation, and it is worthwhile to inquire into the
nature of such rules.
If we consider the general question of what semantic
properties are affected by transformations, there are a
variety of answers. In the general case, the functional
contribution of various constituents to the truth of the
sentence of which they are parts is not affected. It is
this fact which lies behind intuitions concerning 'logical
subject' and 'logical object' with respect to the passive
transformation, for example. On the other hand, the property
of coreferentiality is obviously affected by transformational
movement rules, as are, apparently, certain facts concerning
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quantifier order. (cf. Wasow, 1972; Kroch, 1974).
Let us assume that the appropriate level for the
interpretation of anaphoric relations and quantifier order
is surface structure (or shallow structure). Ideally, if
we are to maintain a split between aspects of interpretation
which are relevant at deep structure and those which are
relevant at surface structure, we would like the split be-
tween those two aspects of interpretation to be correlated
with the distinction between deep structure properties and
surface structure properties. For example, we might impose
the following restrictions: rules of surface interpretation
are sensitive only to such properties as (relative) order;
derived structure cannot take into account such things as
the disparate effect of two lexical items which occur in
isomorphic structural environments. I'm not sure that such
a distinction could be maintained, but it is desirable to
impose such restrictions.
Consider now the semantic distinctions discussed in
Part One. Note first of all that if there are distinctions
to be drawn both with respect to the for-dative alternation
and the to-dative alternation, and if the derived structures
of the double object-reflexes of the two prepositional
constructions is the same (which I see no obvious reason to
doubt), then any rule or rules of surface (or cyclic) inter-
pretation will have to be sensitive to more than merely
279
derived structures, for there is no clear way of generalizing
the differences in truth conditions associated with the
for-dative cases and the to-dative cases: in the one case,
the distinction resides in how we interpret the intention
operator, whereas in the other, we were faced with a problem
concerning the 'success condition.' If all of these as-
sumptions are correct, then, treating these semantic differ-
ences in terms of surface interpretive rules necessitates
that the rules in question have access to either derivational
history or lexical information. Either consequence is un-
desirable.
Second, there is the problem of whether the semantic
distinctions in question are general or idiosyncratic. If
they are idiosyncratic, they will have to be stated as part
of the lexical information concerning the various verbs in
question. In other words, if the distinctions we are con-
cerned with are to be handled by surface interpretive rules,
the rules will not only have to have access to the lexicon --
the lexicon itself will have to specify that if such and
such a verb occurs in such and such a derived structure, a
certain interpretation is assigned. But this is equivalent
in information content to the lexical theory, except that
a transformation is postulated in addition to the specifi-
cation of double lexical entries. In fact, then, if the
semantic distinctions are idiosyncratic, the transformational
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hypothesis seems to have to duplicate the essential aspects
of the lexical approach. But then the transformation
itself is superfluous. Since the distinction concerning
the to-dative alternation does seem to be idiosyncratic, it
appears again that there is a slight reason to opt for the
lexical approach.
4.3.2 It is to be noted that given the undertain status
of semantic interpretation, as well as the subtle nature of
the semantic distinctions at issue, arguments based on the
amount of semantic information that must be stated are not
terribly strong. For example, they depend in part on the
assumption that surfact interpretive rules should be re-
stricted from referring to lexical information -- an as-
sumption which at the moment is at most programmatic.
There are other indications, however, -- related to
questions of interpretation -- which also indicate that the
lexical solution is to be preferred. Consider the fact that
many verbs which occur in both the double object structure
and the prepositional structure develop extended senses
which are available only in the double object construction.
The most obvious indication of this is the ability of these
verbs to occur with abstract subjects.
7a) The victory got Ali a shot at the title.
b)*The victory got a shot at the title for Ali.
8a) The victory guaranteed Ali a shot at the title.
b)*The victory guaranteed a shot at the title to Ali.
9a) The development of new ocean-mining techniques
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offers the world a new source of raw material.
b)*The development of new ocean-mining techniques
offers a new source of raw materials to the world.
One can argue that the new senses involved here il-
lustrate an extension from the first two types of reading
discussed in Part One to the third type of reading. (Note
that a shot at the title contains an instance of a 'pre-
dicative noun'.) Such extensions do not seem to be available
to verbs which do not occur in the double object construction:
10) The victory procurred a shot at the title for Ali.
11) The victory obtained a shot at the title for Ali.
Evidently, whatever process is responsible for such
extensions is in part a lexical process, in that new con-
ditions on insertion are involved (i.e. the possibility of
abstract subjects). Furthermore, one would like to relate
new extensions to the fact that the double object con-
struction is subject to similar splits of interpretation
elsewhere. On the lexical approach, there is a natural way
to do this -- namely, such an extension is possible if a
verb is subcategorized for the double object construction.
On a transformational account, however, if the process that
is responsible for this extension is itself a lexical
process, the only way it can distinguish between verbs like
get and verbs like obtain and procure is by rule feature,
since none of these verbs will be subcategorized for the
double object construciton. But this seems to miss the point,
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since the crucial fact is not whether or not a verb undergoes
the rule or not, but the structural configuration in
question. Again, this involves the problem of appropriate-
ness, rather than feasibility, but I think we can construe
data of this sort as providing another slender piece of
evidence in favor of the lexical nature of the dative alter-
nation.
5.0 All of the considerations discussed above suggest that
the lexical approach is to be preferred to the transform-
ational approach. The evidence in favor of this decision
is not overwhelming. But this conclusion suggests that we
attempt to articulate further the distinctions between the
two types of rules considered. Although we shall not be
able to pursue this investigation further here, the questions
that arise offer promising lines of future research which
may not only bear directly on the problems considered in
this work but be of some intrinsic interest as well.
5.1 There are several interrelated questions that are of
immediate interest.
1) the domain of lexical rules of the kind
suggested here is smaller than the domain
of transformations, since the domain of
lexical rules is only material contained
in a lexical entry. Is it possible to
exclude transformations from operating in
this domain?
2) all operations performed by lexical rules
must be structure preserving (due to the
definition of this term). Is it possible
to treat all structure-preserving rules
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can be treated as lexical rules?
3) Is there any connection between the notion
lexical rule and the distinction between
rules that have lexical exceptions and
those that do not?
To some extent, the resolution of these and similar problems
is contingent on the treatment of the passive, and a formi-
dable obstacle stands in the way of considering the passive
a lexical rule of the kind envisioned--namely, its inter-
action with there-insertion. Other questions of interest
arise in the course of pursuing these matters further.
For example, the problem of characterizing the possible
structural relations amenable to treatment by lexical
redundancy.rule revives the problem of the depth and width
of subcategorization frames.
It is to be hoped that in pursuing answers to these
questions, our insight into the nature of linguistic structure
will be increased.
284
FOOTNOTES
1. It is not impossible, given the trace theory of movement,
that the semantic distinctions could be stated at the level
of surface structure. There are at least two reasons to
retain Anderson's conclusion, however. One is that it's
not clear whether traces would be recoverable at surfact
structure, rather than being obliterated. Note that the
two manifestations of the alternation are structurally
equivalent. Given current formulations of the trace theory
-- i.e. Fiengo (1974) - the traces would be covered up by
the transposed lexical material and therefore not available.
A second consideration concerns the evidence from subcate-
gorization that Anderson presents, which is not statable in
terms of surface structure.
2. We are of course not claiming that pairs of sentences
related by the dative alternation are identical in syntactic
properties. This is obviously not the case. For instance,
there are distinctions concerning reflexivization, as in
the following:
i) Faust sold himself to the Devil.
ii) Faust sold the Devil himself.
Although I have no adequate account of such facts, I would
like to point out that it's difficult to see what insight
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into this problem is provided by the postulation of a phrase-
marker transformation, in a way that distinguished this
treatment from a lexical treatment.
3. I.e. if the dative alternation is ordered before other
rules that affect the relevant structures. Note that
Williams's (1974) ordering hypothesis does not affect our
point, since more than one rule is operative in the relevant
domain (as he defines domains).
4. Or cyclic - the distinction is irrelevant to the point.
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